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ABSTRACT 
In the decade following the Mexican War, Nicaragua 
became one of the focal points for American expansion. Mani­
fest Destiny, commercial interests, the spirit of adventure, 
and the desire for a transit route--preferably a canal-­
across the Central American Isthmus all contributed to the 
attraction this small Central American state had for official 
and unofficial American expansionist sentiment. 
The first efforts to establish a viable transit route 
through Nicaragua were made by Cornelius Vanderbilt who 
signed a treaty with the Nicaraguan government in 1849 calling 
for both the establishment of a land crossing and the con­
struction of a canal. Later Vanderbilt reorganized his enter­
prise into three separate companies: the Vanderbilt Steam­
ship Line to carry passengers from American ports to those in 
Nicaragua, the Accessory Transit Company to transport passen­
gers across the Isthmus, and the American Atlantic and Pacific 
Ship Canal Company to build the canal. For financial and tech­
nical reasons, the canal construction was never undertaken. 
Nonetheless, a land and water transit across Nicaragua was 
functioning smoothly by 1855. Before that time, however, 
Vanderbilt's control of the transit company had been· chal­
lenged by former colleagues, and this dispute was never de­
finitively resolved. 
A soldier of fortune, William Walker of Tennessee, took 
advantage of the Liberal-Conservative civil war raging in 
ii 
1160�48 
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Nicaragua in 1855 to make himself temporary master of that na­
tion. He was finally dislodged i� 1857 by Nicaraguan dissi­
dents and the combined forces of the other four Central Ameri­
cen republics, along with the intervention of the United States 
Navy. 
Also in 1855, Henry L. Kinney of Texas took a group of 
American colonists to Nicaragua to settle a portion of the 
Caribbean coast which he purportedly had purchased. En­
countering the enmity of Walker, Nicaragua, Great Britain, 
and the United States Department of State, the colony foun­
dered and died within a few months. 
Throughout the period, the United States government 
attempted to maintain a correct diplomatic posture toward 
Nicaragua and the other Central American states, blunt British 
conunercial and imperialistic thrusts in the region, and re­
strict illegal activities of its own citizens while trying 
to protect their legitimate rights and interests. The State 
Department underwent severe frustration, having been unable 
to conclude a satisfactory treaty of friendship and commerce 
with Nicaragua during the entire decade. With the onset of 
the Civil War in 1861, American attention was diverted from 
the Isthmus, not to be renewed·until the end of the century. 
For its part, Nicaragua emerged from the period with an in­
crea�ed sensitivity toward foreign intervention or entangle­
ments, and with a heightened xenophobia directed at the 
United States. 
iv 
The most valuable sources for this study were the New 
York newspapers, the State Department Archives, and the col­
lected papers and published accounts of some of the partici­
pants. Unfortunately, Nicaraguan sources are sparse: the in­
stability of the period, subsequent changes in archival loca­
tions, and finally, the 1972 earthquake have combined to make 
documentary material on the period negligible. 
PREFACE 
Americans intervening in Nicaraguan affairs during the 
decade between the Mexican War and the Civil War seldom thought 
in terms of Nicaragua alone, but rather in the broade� sphere 
of Middle America--that area between the Rio Grande River and 
the Panama Canal, including Mexico, Central America, and the 
Caribbean. Virtually all these Yankee intruders, whether of­
ficial or unofficial, regarded Nicaragua as a steppingstone 
to greater achievements. Their activities were of such a di­
verse nature that I have chosen to write· their stories em­
ploying a topics approach, following each person or activity 
from beginning to end before turning my attention to another 
facet of the story. As a result, the reader may encounter 
something akin to flashbacks, or even an occasional sense of 
d
/ ., eJa vu. Nonetheless, I feel that the various threads will be 
more recognizable than in a straightforward chronological ac­
count. 
A major portion of the story deals with the activities 
of the so-called "filibusters. " The word is an English cor­
ruption of the Dutch Vrijbuiter (freebooter) and was first 
applied to seventeenth century English buccaneers, who spent 
their time preying on Spanish shipping and Spanish colonies in 
the Caribbean. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
term was applied to American adventurers engaged in armed ex­
peditions against countries with which the United States was 
V 
at peace. It was also pejoratively applied to many Ameri­
cans whose intentions were essentially peaceful. 
vi 
The story of William Walker, the most famous--and tem­
porarily the most successful--of the filibusters, has been 
told many times, but not in the context of the whole spectrum 
of American intervention. The same observation would apply 
to the efforts of Cornelius Vanderbilt and other entrepreneurs 
of Isthmian transit. The diplomacy of the period heretofore 
has not been dealt with as an integrated whole, and the unsuc­
cessful colonist, Henry L. Kinney, has remained virtually un­
noticed by historians. Altogether, this study represents a 
synthesis of previous accounts, though portions of the infor­
mation have not been published previously. The latter would 
include some details of the Kinney expedition and of the role 
the United States played in an effort to resolve the Costa 
Rican-Nicaraguan boundary dispute. 
The reason for the time frame used in the study will be 
obvious. When the Mexican War ended� there was an enormous 
reservoir in the United States of unsatiated desire for ful­
fillment of this country's "Manifest Destiny. " Given the 
strategic location of Nicaragua, much of the attention was 
directed at that small Central American state. With the coming 
of the Civil War, America turned inward, addressing itself to 
the life and death struggle of the nation. As an example of 
the interest in Nicaragua during the decade, one can cite the 
New York Times: . between 1851 and 1860 hundreds of articles 
appeared; in 1861, there was a mere handful and, in 1862, 
none at all. 
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A major source for this study was the archives of the 
Department of State. Ministers were sometimes appointed to 
a specific country or countries and at other times to Central 
America as a whole, but during the period, they usually resided 
in Nicaragua and reported on that country because of the events 
occurring there. Consular reports add local flavor to the na­
tional picture and directives from the Department of State 
attempt to clarify for the diplomatic and consular agents 
United States policy in the area. 
Because much of the activity directed at Nicaragua ori­
ginated in the port cities of New York, San Francisco, New 
Orleans, and Mobile, the newspapers of those places provide 
interesting background for the Isthmian ·events. In addition, 
the New York papers often employed journalists who filed their 
reports from Nicaragua itself. 
Among collections of personal papers, those of William 
L. Marcy, Secretary of State, William Sidney Thayer, a com­
panion of Henry L. Kinney, and John H. Wheeler, minister to 
Nicaragua during the Walker era, were the most useful. Whee­
ler's papers include twenty scrapbooks of items such as letters 
and newspaper clippings, with four scrapbooks pertaining to 
his sojourn in Central America. 
A few participants in the events of the decade published 
personal accounts. The most complete with respect to William 
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Walker's activities is that of Walker himself. It is a dis­
passionate and surprisingly objective recounting of his ef­
forts to establish and maintain himself as master of Nicaragua, 
written shortly before his fifth and fatal endeavor. The only 
true "Walker scholar" to emerge has been William o. Scroggs of 
Louisiana State University, who wrote early in this century. 
Scroggs authored one book and several articles on the subject, 
relying substantially on the papers of Wheeler and John P. 
Heiss. The best study of the financiers who were attempting 
to establish a transit route across Nicaragua is David I. Folk­
man's The Nicaragua Route, published in 197 2. There are no 
serious Central American studies of the events of the period, 
and Nicaraguan archives are at best fragmentary. 
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CHAPTER I 
MANIFEST DESTINY AND MIDDLE AMERICA 
We have a destiny to perform, a 'manifest destiny' 
over all Mexico, over South America, over the West 
Indies and Canada. 1 
This grandiose sentiment expressed by a New Orleans edi­
tor in 1850 reflected the attitude of a large portion of 
public opinion in the United States between the end of the 
Mexican War and the beginning of the Civil War. It was a 
crucial period in American history, not only domestically 
because of the extension of slavery to territories anticipated 
for admission as states, but also diplomatically with respect 
to further enlargement of the American empire, and these two 
issues were inextricably woven together. A major area of 
focus for these broader issues was Middle America, and a 
significant key to Middle America was the state of Nicaragua. 
The thoughts and actions of �..merican citizens and the American 
government with respect to that country were, in many ways, 
pivotal for United States relations with Central America as a 
whole during the nineteenth century. 
A British magazine in 1856 referred to the role of 
Nicaragua in an editorial about the belief of the American 
1James D. B. DeBow, quoted in William H. Goetzmann, When 
the Ea le Screamed, The Rornanti� Horizon in American Di lornacy, 
800-1860 New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. , 1966 , 75. 
1 
2 
people in their "manifest destiny" that they should "have the 
control of all the North American continent": 
The manner in which the State of Nicaragua has been 
reduced, or, it should rather be said, raised to her 
present position, by being occupied and governed by a 
large body of Americans, affords an instance of the 
truth of this statement • • . •  Should the Americans 
in that country be able to maintain· their position, of 
which, at present, there seems to be every probability, 
the successful filibustering of Nicaragua will be but 
the beginning; the end will be the occupation, by 
Americans, of all the Central American �tates, and, in 
due course of time, of Mexico and Cuba. 
The term "manifest destiny" was coined by John L. O'Sullivan 
who wrote in 1845 that "our manifest destiny [is] to over­
spread the continent allotted by Providence for the free 
development of our yearly multiplying millions. 113 The attitude 
itself which the term characterized was a long-standing tradi­
tion in American history. This self-acknowleged right of 
continual expansion began as early as 1763, when loyal British 
subjects in America chafed at the Proclamation Line running 
along the crest of the Appalachians, beyond which the colonists 
were forbidden to venture. The subsequent surge. to occupy and 
cultivate the Northwest and Louisiana territories was evidence 
of that sense of destiny. Finally, the acquisition of the 
211 Nicaragua and the Filibusters, " Blackwood's Magazine� 
March, 1856, reprinted in Littell's Living Age, XIII, No. 62 1, 
April 19, 1856. 
3John L. O'Sullivan, "Annexation, " The United States 
Magazine and Democratic Review, July, 1845. O'Sullivan was 
more modest in his anticipation of the extension of our national 
patrimony than DeBow was five years later. His editorial had 
reference primarily to North America above the Rio Grande, but 
he envisioned this domain would encompass 250-300 million 
Americans by 1945. 
whole of the Mexican territory north of the Rio Grande and 
Gila rivers put America on the Pacific shore facing the 
Orient. At this juncture, still-restless Americans found 
themselves perplexed as to which direction they should next 
choose in order to expend their bursting energies. 
The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which formally ended 
the Mexican War, was a compromise. While Nicholas P. Trist, 
the Chief Clerk of the State Department and President Polk's 
agent for securing the peace treaty, feverishly negotiated 
with the remnants of the Mexican government,.two contending 
forces in the United States pressured the President to alter 
the terms of Trist's instructions. 4 On the one hand, Whigs 
in Congress threatened to cut off appropriations for the 
prosecution of the war, and thereby forfeit the opportunity 
to seize part or all of the Mexican territory subsequently 
acquired. On the other hand, a growing group of American 
expansionists demanded that all of Mexico should be annexed, 
perhaps as a preparatory step to expansion through Central 
America to the Gulf of Darien. 
3 
The terms of the treaty, signed on February 2,  1848, pro­
vided that Mexico cede to the United States the territory that 
includes the present-day states of New Mexico, California, 
Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and part of Colorado, and confirmed 
4Polk's displeasure with Trist's apparent inab�lity to 
expedite the negotiations induced the President to reca�l his 
envoy; Trist ignored the summons, and concluded the negotiations. 
4 
American title to Texas as far as the Rio Grande, in return 
for the payment of $15,000,000. The United States also 
assumed the claims of its citizens against the Mexican govern­
ment to the value of $3,250,000. The acquisition of this new 
area served to inflame a smoldering social and political 
problem in the United States: the question of the extension of 
slavery to territories with aspirations toward statehood. The 
pattern had been established in 1820 that a "solution" to the 
problem would be worked out in Congress with each new incorpo­
ration. Thus, the Missouri Compromise of th�t year admitted 
Missouri as a slave state while free-soil Maine, formerly a 
part of Massachusetts, was admitted as a separate state. In 
addition, in the future slavery would be prohibited north of 
the line of 36 ° 30', the southern boundary of Missouri, in the 
area comprising the remainder of the Louisiana Territory. 
Many anti-slavery Whigs in Congress had opposed the war 
against Mexico because a victory would ensure the admission 
of Texas as a slave state. Subsequently, the delicate balance 
between slave and free states was maintained, but the additional 
territories in the Southwest added a new dimension to the 
problem, and one that particularly concerned the South. 
California clamored for admission as a free state, and the 
popularity of the institution of slavery in the remaining area 
was dubious. Between 1848 and 1850, the South became increas­
ingly disillusioned over the prospects qf the fate of the South­
west, an area that southerners regarded as their heritage since 
the effort and the blood expended to acquire it had been 
largely southern. A new compromise was reached in 1850, 
which provided for the admission of California as a free 
state with the remaining area--the territories of Utah and 
New Mexico--left open to "popular sovereignty," i. e. , a 
territorial referendum. Perhaps some southerners felt that 
an expected migration of slaveholders from Texas into the 
contiguous areas would assure the slavery-oriented future of 
the territories when time for admission arrived. Other south­
erners had witnessed the handwriting on the wall. Given the 
nature of the anticipated agricultural and �ornmercial uses 
of the remaining territory within the Union, there seemed 
little hope that either popular sovereignty or Congress 
would concede these areas to the embattled institution. As a 
result, eyes were cast toward the tropics, where a type of 
plantation economy was already in existence, for land which 
could be annexed as territories and conditioned for statehood 
with slavery. This reorientation brought Central America and 
the Caribbean into the vortex of American domestic politics, 
and into the arena of projected American expansion. 
Aside from those who were interested in the tangible 
practice of counting states, there was a large body of public 
opinion in the United States that believed the ultimate destiny 
of the nation was continued expansion. Some of these limited 
their designs to specific targets such as Cuba. At the other 
end of the spectrum were those who dreamed of an American 
empire that stretched from the Arctic Circle to the Gulf of 
Panama, and perhaps even beyond. Many of these felt that it 
6 
was America's manifest destiny and duty to carry the fruits 
of our civilization to the benighted inhabitants'living 
beyond our borders. This attitude did not base itself in such 
mundane issues as slavery, commerce, or agriculture; rather it 
soared with such grandiose concepts as liberty, justice, and 
equality, all of which the United States was destined to 
purvey. Expansion to the north had been sealed off by the 
1846 treaty with Great Britain which had divided the Oregon 
country between the two nations. Despite the cries in the 
Pacific Northwest, a hotbed of manifest destiny, for "Fifty­
four forty or fight!", the existing demarcation line of 49° 
was extended westward to Puget Sound. In the south, Mexican 
territory had become diplomatically inviolable with the 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo line. All this meant that manifest destiny 
now had to address itself elsewhere, and again Central America 
and the Carribean came into the picture. 
A third group of expansionists viewed intrusion into 
Central America as a necessity for reasons of communication 
and transportation. By 1849, gold had been discovered in 
California, and waves of Americans including prospectors, 
merchants, and general opportunists were seeking ways of going 
from one coast to the other without having to cross the almost 
trackless wilderness of the American interior. An alternative 
was to sail around Cape Horn at the tip of South America, but 
this was a long, arduous, and expensive passage. More to their 
liking was sailing from ports such as New York or New Orleans, 
7 
crossing the Isthmus of Central America, and connecting with 
sailing ships or steamers which would carry them to San 
Franciso. A major problem was that the only reliable route 
across the Isthmus was a mule trail across Panama. 
The ideal solution was a ship canal across the Isthmus, 
by which travelers and cargo could avoid the cost and incon­
venience of debarkation or transshipment. The idea of a trans­
oceanic canal was not a new one. It had been dreamed of as 
early as the reign of the Emperor Charles V in the first half 
of the sixteenth century. Spain, for reasons ranging from 
technological to zenophobic, had never undertaken the massive 
project. The time seemed appropriate to rectify that over­
sight, and possible routes were actively scouted by both 
American and European entrepreneurs. One possibility was 
Panama, then a part of Colombia, but a more attractive site 
at the time was Nicaragua. Engin�ers and investors thought it 
possible to construct a route utilizing the San Juan River 
which flowed from Lake Nicaragua to the Caribbean Sea, cross 
over the upland lake, then dig a canal the rest of the way to 
the Pacific, a distance of less than twenty five miles. The 
most aggressive of the American entrepreneurs was transporta­
tion magnate Cornelius Vanderbilt, who signed a contract with 
Nicaragua which provided for an interim land-water route across 
the Isthmus within the borders of that country, and ultimately 
for the construction of a ship canal. Although Vanderbilt was 
subsequently frustrated in his efforts to build the canal, his 
transit route employing river .steamers, lake steamers, and 
carriages was the most popular route for crossing until 
closed in 1856 after being embroiled in the power struggle 
in Nicaragua. Nevertheless, other Americans continued to 
maintain--both before and after the Vanderbilt debacle--that 
ultimate American control of the country, whether by subter­
fuge or annexation, was the only viable hope for security 
for American capital. 
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At the same time, the United States government wanted to 
make sure that American capital was protected in the region 
generally, and with respect-to transit and canal routes in 
particular. But Washington found itself in an awkward 
position. Although bound by the Neutrality Law of 1818 to 
prevent its citizens from making armed incursions into the 
sovereign domain of other nations, 5 the government could not 
turn a deaf ear to demands of its citizens for protection of 
their traditional rights to "colonize" if this colonization 
conformed to the laws of the recipient states. Therein lay 
the dilemma: with the introduction of filibusterism from the 
United States into Central America, adequately and definitively 
labeling these efforts was often difficult and sometimes impos­
sible. In addition, the larger question of the "enforcement" 
of the Monroe Doctrine was inextricably interwoven with all 
the other problems facing the United States government with 
5u. s. Statutes, III, Chap. LXXXVIII, 447-50. 
respect to Central America. 
The Monroe Doctrine was initially a statement of United 
States policy made by President James Monroe in his message 
9 
to Congress on December 2,  1823. At that time, the United 
States was alarmed by the threat of French intervention, 
supported by the powers of the Holy Alliance, with the purpose 
either of restoring Spanish rule over the newly-liberated 
Spanish-American republics or of imposing some form of 
monarchical government. The original suggestion .came from 
British Foreign Secreta�y George Canning, and was intended 
to be a joint British-American statement. Prophetically, 
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams persuaded the president 
to make the unilateral declaration with the thought that it 
might, some time in the future, be necessary to employ it 
against the encroachments of Great Britain. 
Its initial impact in Europe prompted some resentment, 
and not a little amused disdain, and its "enforcement, " if 
such it can be called, was probably a result of the superior 
British navy in the Atlantic and Caribbean protecting that 
nation's own commercial interests. The Doctrine was restated 
in 1845 by President Polk because of his concern about English 
and French diplomatic activities in Texas and British interest 
in Oregon and California, and became a recognized principle of 
American foreign policy. With those issues settled·either 
amicably or by force of arms, the United States turned its 
attention to the problem of apparent British expansion in 
10 
Central America. It was clear to many, given the new American 
interest in this area, that the two nations were on a colli­
sion course over hegemony in the Isthmus. 
The position of the United States in the Isthmus was not 
an enviable one. Despite repeated efforts, it had never 
really "normalized" relations with either the Central American 
federation or its successors, the five Central American 
nations. State Department envoys floundered around seeking 
out governments to which they ·could present their credentials. 
Transportation from the east coast of the United States to 
Central American capitals was always inconvenient and some­
times virtually non-existent. Somber instructions from the 
Department of State to its envoys often revealed an appalling 
ignorance of the geography of the area to which the diplomats 
were dispatched. One writer later characterized the situa­
tion in 1849 in almost dyspeptic terms: 
In the best of circumstances, there was little that any 
United States agent could do; for Central America had 
fallen under the dominion of Britain. Though it was 
almost at our doors, its approaches were guarded by the 
British outposts of Jamaica and Belize. Its flanks-­
Guatemala and Costa Rica--while American forces slept, 
had surrendered to British direction and control. Its 
Atlantic shore line, embracing the eastern terminus of 
the Nicaragua Canal route, had become in effect British 
territory under a thin Mosquito mask. Its Bay of Fonseca, 
dominating the western terminus of the route, lay under 
the guns of British warships. Its whole extent of land 
and waters was under the observation of British officials. 
Its very existence as a single state was subject to 
British whim • • . •  
Such was the Central American situation in 1849; such the 
result of a quarter of a century of diplomatiq prepara-
tion on the part of Great Britain; such the result of 
a quarter of a century of diplomatic futility on the 
part of the United States. 6 
11 
Although the situation was probably not as desperate as 
thus characterized, there was no question but that the 
British had a head start on the United States in this strate­
gic area. British businessmen had been for years systemat­
ically deputized as consuls and commercial agents, and many 
had spent their entire adult lives_in the region, marrying 
into local families and acquiring the confidence of native 
businessmen and politicians. Their reports to the Foreign 
Office were invaluable aids to the calculation of British 
policy in Central America. The British navy did roam the 
shores nearest the Pacific and Caribbean coastlines, and were 
ever ready to show the flag in protection of British commer­
cial and diplomatic interests. But perhaps the most serious 
threat with respect to violation of the Monroe Doctrine were 
neo-British colonies on the Isthmus and the adjacent islands. 
Belize·or British Honduras, had been seized by the British at 
the end of the eighteenth century and it had remained under 
their rule, although the surrounding areas were fighting for 
their independence from Spain. Guatemala claimed the terri­
tory _in vain, and in 1859 finally ceded the disputed area to 
Great Britain, with a number of conditions attached to the 
agreement. 
6Joseph B. Lockey, "Diplomatic Futility," Hispanic 
American Historical Review, X (1930), 294. 
12 
The history of the Mosquito Coast of Honduras and 
Nicaragua is even more complex. The basis for the earliest 
British claim was that English freebooters had utilized the 
shoreline of Cape Gracias a Dies on the frontier between 
Honduras and Nicaragua as a haven, and during the recurring 
colonial wars between Spain and England they had been 
conunissioned as privateers by the Jamaican governors. Because 
the area did not fit into the scheme of Spanish colonial 
development, the Spanish had neglected it and had left its 
fortunes to the aboriginal Mosquito �ndians. The British 
recorded a pseudo-protectorate status for the region with the 
"voluntary" submission in 1740 of the Mosquito king to the 
British crown. The Spanish attempted to recover the area in 
the 1763 Treaty of Paris, in which Great Britain agreed to 
demolish all its fortifications on the "Spanish continent. " 
The British, employing a pattern of diplomatic deviousness, 
interpreted this to mean South America, with, concomitantly, 
North America being the American continent. The Spanish tried 
again in a supplementary treaty of 1786, but the British still 
retained the right to cut logwood, and thus preserved their 
foothold. After the decline of Spanish power in America, the 
British resumed transporting Mosquito "kings" to Belize for 
solemn but contrived coronation ceremonies. The British 
returned in force in 1848, seizing the mouth of the San Juan 
River under the guise of preserving it for the Mosquito king, 
even though a Mosquito Indian had never dwelt within fifty 
13 
miles of the river in any direction. Even so, the British· 
claimed that it constituted "part of the proper dominions 
of his Mosquito·Majesty of whom Great Britain was the law-. 
ful protector. " In reality, British Foreign Secreatary Lord 
Palmerston felt he had grasped "the key to the Central 
American Isthmus • • • the only feasible rreans of 
communication between the two seas. 117 
Far from retrenching or maintaining the status quo 
during the period, the British continued to press other 
claims. Shortly after occupying the mouth of the San Juan, 
Lord Palmerston attempted to seize the island of Tigre in the 
Bay of Fonseca, which he judged would be the western terminus 
of a canal route. 8 The British were also charged with 
quietly annexing Roatan Island and other nearby islands in 
the Gulf of Honduras. 9 It was clear to many in Washington 
7Ephraim G. Squier, Adventures on the Mosquito Shore 
(Gainesville, 1965, orig. pub. 1855), 337-351. In an intro­
duc·tion, Daniel F • . Alleger states that Squier had been sent 
in 1849 by President Zachary Taylor to Nicaragua as charge' 
d'affaires as ."one move in an effort to forestall a British 
dream of a Nicaragua canal up the San Juan River from the 
Caribbean to the Pacific. " Ibid., ix. 
8Ibid., 352. 
9El Nicarguense (Granada), July 12, 1856. John P. Heiss, 
who had been a�pointed by William Walker's Nicaraguan govern­
ment as charge d' affaires in Washington, made the charge in an 
open letter to be read at a rally held in New York on May 24, 
1856, in support of American filibusters in Nicaragua. Heiss 
also called on the United States government to revoke its 
"odious" neutrality laws and allow its citizens to aid anybody 
14 
that the pious platitudes of the Monroe Doctrine were not 
going to retain America for the Americans, and that positive 
and vigorous action was called for by the United States govern­
ment. In spirit, and with the legacy of the expansionist 
Polk administration as a precedent, some of the succeeding 
administrations on the Potomac were not unwilling to act. 
After his inauguration on March 4, 1849, Zachary Taylor, 
the Mexican War hero and political neophyte, had hoped to 
conduct a non-partisan administration. This non-partisan­
ship would extend not only to patronage politics but to 
critical national issues as well. He would leave these issues 
to Congress to settle, and would content himself merely with 
implementation of the legislature's collective judgments. 
Unfortunately� he was unable to keep the office of the presi­
dent above the battle that continued to rage over the question 
of the extension of slavery into the newly-acquired south­
western domain. When the territory of California petitioned 
for statehood, and indicated that it would enter� slavery, 
a great hue and cry was raised in the South. Taylor adopted 
a stance of righteous indignation, feeling that sectional pres­
sure was attempting to surrogate national law. His death in 
July, 1850, ended his opposition to the last compromise 
anywhere in obtaining a more liberal form of government. He 
charged that while the United States had interfered with 
"immigration" to Nicaragua, the British had aided the fili­
busters; opponents with arms and ammunition. Nevertheless, he 
maintained, Central America, along with Yucatan and the Bay 
Islands, would become Americanized and formed into one great 
republic. 
15 
carefully pieced together by Henry Clay. 
Taylor's successor and the last of the Whigs, Millard 
Fillmore, was, if anything, even more passionately opposed 
to the institution of slavery. He was more concerned with 
the preservation of the Union, and, rather than threatening 
to hang those who interfered with California's "popular 
sovereignty" as Taylor had done, he concurred with the 
Compromise of 1850. His acquiescence may have spelled doom 
for his own political career, and also that of his party, but 
it did allay the issue for the remainder of his term. It 
was the Pierce administration, taking over in March, 1853, 
that raised the spectre of new acquisitions and their 
c�rollary, new slavery extensions. The Pierce administration, 
with its general program of southward expansion, was heir to 
the "Polk Doctrine" in both spirit and personnel. Pierce 
pimself had been appointed to the rank of general by Polk in 
the Mexican War and his cabinet included Secretary of State 
William L. Marcy, who had been Polk's secretary of war. Key 
representatives abroad were also a heritage from the Polk 
administration. Polk's secretary of state, James Buchanan, 
was minister to London, and Polk's second secretary of the 
navy, John Y. Mason, was minister to Paris. Perhaps the most 
curious appointment was Pierre Soul�, a naturalized Frenchman 
and former Louisiana senator, as minister to Madrid. 
/ 
In rising to eminence in New Orleans [Soule] had fervently 
defended states' rights, the institution of slavery, 
Manifest Destiny, and especially the acquisition of 
Cuba. He had campaigned for Cass in 1848 on the 
ground that Cass would annex Cuba. His appointment 
to the Madrid post, in view of this record, was near 
to being insulting. 10 
Pierce made his position clear in his inaugural speech, 
as previewed during the campaign, with reference to Middle 
America in general and Cuba in particular: 
16 
The policy of my administration will not be controlled 
by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion. Indeed, 
it is not to be disguised that our attitude as a nation, 
and our position on the globe, render the acquisition of 
certain possessions, not within our jurisdiction, 
eminently important for our protection, if not, in the 
future, essential for the _preservation of �he rights of 
commerce and the peace of the world. 11 
The president also addressed himself to the problem of 
British--and perhaps other European states'--encroachment in 
Middle America and the concomitant challenge to the Monroe 
Doctrine. European colonization upon "this side of the ocean, " 
indeed any "idea" of interference or colonization, would be 
rejected as "ut"terly inadmissable. 1112 
The most active foreign policy objective of the early 
Pierce administration was the acquisition of Cuba. Aside from 
its proximity to the United States mainland, other reasons 
attracted adherents to its incorporation into the American 
Union. First and foremost for many was the plantation economy 
lOFrederick Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and American 
Expansionism, 1843-1849 (New York, 19 66), 271. 
llNew York Evening Mirror, March S, 1853. 
12rbid. 
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which was well-suited to the employment of black slaves. 
Southerners concerned about the precarious balance in the 
Senate were heartened by the prospect of possibly carving-
up the island into two or more states. Others were interested 
in the strategic location of the island in terms of both naval 
and merchant marine activity. It was pointed out that Cuba 
commanded access to the mouth of the Mississippi River, the 
Gulf of Mexico, and future trans-Isthmian passages. Finally, 
there was the intriguing character of its ownership. The 
last great bastion of Sp�in's former empire in America, it 
was an anachronism, secured by the unsteady hand of a depressed 
European state, its citizens anxious to throw off the yoke of 
colonialism and to rise with the fortunes of the colossus to 
the north. The last two points--that Spain because of her 
weakness had forfeited the privilege of holding the colony, 
and that there was overwhelming support within the island for 
independence, were not universally accepted. Senator John P. 
Hale of New Hampshire spoke for those who felt there was some­
thing immoral about taking advantage of Spain's decrepitude. 
He wryly pointed out that if the administration was so concerned 
about the s_trategic position of Cuba that it was willing to 
attempt to bully Spain, then what about Canada, a British 
possession? 
I suppose that this country is not so low; or its 
patriotism is not of that doubtful character • • • •  
that it will take a position before a weak nation 
which it will not assume before a strong one • • • •  
I ask if the local position of Canada, in any aspect 
in which you may view it, whether in relation to the 
interests of peace or war, is not a thousand fold of 
more consequence than Cuba • • •  , 13 
This was logic, not realism, and the Pierce administration 
was early committed to southern expansion. In addition, 
Manifest Destiny tended to lose some of its fervor when 
directed at Anglo-Saxon lands and institutions, as in the case 
of Oregon. 
18 
With respect to the anticipated help from native Cubans, 
America was disabused of this expectation during the Taylor­
Filmore years. A number of filibustering expeditions to Cuba 
sailed from American ports during this period, i� spite of 
official efforts to discourage them. Their leader was 
Narciso Lopez, a Venezuelan who had long been resident in 
Cuba. In 1848 he formed a revolutionary group on the island, 
but was defeated and fled to the United States the following 
year. In this country, he organized a group of North Americans 
and mounted other expeditions to Cuba to fight for indepen­
dence. In the course of these activities, he was arrested and 
prosecuted in the United States, but public sentiment was so 
much in his favor that a conviction could not be obtained and 
he sailed again with another force. He was captured and 
13congressional Globe, 32 Cong. , 2 Sess. , App. 97. 
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executed in Havana in 1851. 14 The expected uprising in the 
island never occured, and the Pierce administration determined 
to address itself to alternative means of acquisition, either 
by purchase or by some ill-defined method of "detachment " 
from Spain. 
This new orientation led to the ill-fated "Ostend 
Manifesto," drafted by Buchanan, Mason, and Soul,. The project 
was one that was conceived by James Buchanan within days after 
Pierce took office. In a letter to Secretary Marcy, Buchanan 
.advised, "If you desire to acquire Cuba in a peaceful manner, 
the President ought to select able and accomplished ministers 
to Naples, Spain, England, and France who would cordially 
work together. "15 Marcy acted on this suggestion, and 
appointed the expansionist trio to the operative posts. 
Marcy's instructions to Soul� were revealing. He expressed 
concern over the possibility of aid by France or Great Britain 
to Spain to protect Spain's sovereignty in Cuba, thereby 
.creating a virtual protectorate. 
We have recently learned in the instance of Central America 
what a protectorate means, and to what use it may be 
devoted. There is not a very great difference between the 
protector and the possessor of a territory, and when the 
possessor is weak and the protector strong, the distinction 
we apprehend would in effect be annihilated. 16 
14Robert G. Caldwell, The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 
1848-51 (Princeton, 1915), passim. 
lSBuchanan to Marcy, March 8, 1853, William L. Marcy Papers 
(Library of Congress). 
16Marcy to Soule, July 23, 1853 ,· ibid. 
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Marcy observed that the minister to Madrid during the 
Polk administration had approached the Spanish government 
about purchase of the island. The secretary further pointed 
out that it had not been the policy of the American govern­
ment to seek transfer of the island without the concurrence 
of the Cuban people. The United States might still be 
willing to purchase Cuba under certain conditions, but it was 
unlikely that the Spanish would be interested. Marcy believed 
that the Spanish government was under obligation to Great 
Britain and France 
not to transfer this island to the United States • • • • 
[most likely] Spain wili pertinaciously hold onto Cuba, 
and the separation, whenever it takes place, will be 
the work of violence. In the present aspect of the case 
the President does not deem it proper to authorize-you 
to make any propositions for the purchase of that island. 17 
Marcy added that the United States would favor a "voluntary 
separation" of Cuba from Spain, with Spain perhaps retaining 
a principal commercial interest. Thus Cuba would fall into 
the "American Continental System and contribute to its stabil­
ity instead of exposing it to danger. " The United States would 
contribute more than just good will, Marcy intimated, but 
couldn't elaborate until the situation with respect to Spain's 
attitude was better understood in Washington. 18 
Despite Marcy's admonition against purchase, hope of a 
spontaneous uprising on the island waned, and the secretary.'s 
subsequent instructions returned to the Polk-Buchanan procedure 
17rbid. 
18rbid. 
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of trying to buy Cuba in the face of Spanish intransigence. 
Marcy directed his envoys to persuade financial interests 
in the European capitals to bring pressure on Spain for the 
sale so that Spain would have the money to pay some of its 
debts long due these financiers. The ministers held a 
series of meetings in the autumn of 1854 in Ostend, Belgium, 
and Aix-la- Chapel_le, France, and forwarded their report to 
the Department of State on October 18. The report brought 
intimately into association the related ideas of American 
security, the importance of the Gulf of Mexico, the Isthmian 
routes, and the acquisition of Cuba in order to protect them. 
They also expressed concern about the "Africanization" of 
Cuba, fearing that a Haitian-type revolution and black seizure 
might encourage a similar. movement in America's southern states. 
After again recommending purchase of the island, the ministers 
observed that should Spain refuse, "then, by every law, human 
and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, 
if we possess the power"; and the trio left no doubt they 
believed the United States possessed that power. 
Although the report was confidential, and accurately 
reflected the attitude of the administration, Pierce and 
Marcy disavowed it when newspapers in both the United States 
and Europe ferreted out the story. The vociferous and 
increasingly influential Republican press in the United States 
was especially critical, attaching the epithet "manifesto" to 
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the report , and claiming that it was a pistol held to the head 
of Spain--a demand that Cuba be "sold or seized. " After this 
disclosure , the Pierce administration was reluctant to press 
the case for acquisition. Ironically , Buchanan won the Demo­
cratic nomination and the presidential election in 1856 partly 
because he was not involved in the Kansas-Nebraska issue , hav­
ing been out of the co?ntry , and because he was involved in 
. 
19 the Ostend Manifesto. Nonetheless , persistent efforts to ac-
quire Cuba during his administration were not only unsuccessful 
but added to sectional bitterness over the issue of slavery ex­
tension ·and probably hastened the coming of the Civil War. 20  
With the hopelessness of a spontaneous uprising , the 
failure of purchase efforts , and the discrediting of official 
government efforts to detach Cuba , the field was open to private 
adventurers. One of these was William Walker , whose primary 
interest seemed to be Nicaragua , but whose grand design probably 
envisioned a Middle American superstate under his direction. 
With a small band of filibusters from California , Walker inter­
vened in Nicaraguan civil strife in 1855 , an4 was successful in 
making himself master of that state for over a year. Though his 
motives and aspirations were never entirely clear to anyone but 
himself , many regarded his efforts as forerunners to the ex­
tension of American control over Central America and the Carib-
19 Roy F. ·.Nichols , "James Buchanan , "  Encyclopedia Britannica 
( 1 9  7 0 ) , IV , 3 4 1  . 
20Merk , Monroe Doctrine , 2 75. 
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bean. One of those interested in Walker's success was domingo 
de _ Goicouria, a cultured and highly regarded Cuban revolution­
ist. Goicouria's revolutionary credentials were respectable, 
as he had worked with Lopez in Mississippi on the 1849-51 
Cuban invasions. Early in 1856, Goicouria was living in New 
York, and he sent an emissary to Walker in Nicaragua to vali­
date reports that the latter was preparing to use the Isthmus 
as a launching base for a Cuban invasion. Walker and the agent 
reached an agreement to pool th�ir interests, first Nicaragua 
and then Cuba. Walker subsequently received aid from Cuban 
revolutionists, but it became increasingly clear to them that 
Walker's ambitions were not parallel to their interests. The 
break betweetl the Nicaraguan filibusters and the Cuban revo­
lutionists resulted in Goicouria's publication of Walker's 
letters indicating the filibuster's intent to annex Cuba in 
2 1  order to preclude the same action by the "barbarous Yankees. " 
Walker's ultimate intentions were never disclosed because 
they were never realized, as his short-lived regime in Nicaragua 
was wnded by armies from a coalition of Central American states. 
Speculation , then and subsequently, was rampant , and sectional 
interests in the United States tended to identify his plans with 
their aspirations. There seems to be little question with re­
spect to Walker's attitude toward slavery, for one of his first 
decrees after assuming power in Nicaragua was the repeal of 
the anti-slavery laws. Walker was from Nashville, Tennessee 
21william O. Scroggs, "William Walker's Designs on Cuba, " 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, I (September 19 14) , 20 1-208. 
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but it appears he became a partisan of slavery during a 
sojourn in New Orleans and was obsessed with the idea of 
finding a territory for slavery expansion outside the reach 
of northern abolitionists. The Mexican War had proved the 
weakness of that country, and he determined to make it the 
"nucleus of a new slavery propaganda. 11 2 2  
When his efforts in 1853 to detach Baja California and 
Sonora from Mexico and to establish an independent "Republic 
of Sonora" proved unsuccessful, Walker returned to San 
Francisco to �wait another opportunity to fulfill his ambition. 
The chance came with the offer by the Nicaraguan Liberals to 
hire a mercenary force led by Walker to aid them in their 
battle with the Nicaraguan Conservaties. Walker's subse­
quent meteoric rise to Commander-in-Chief of all Nicaraguan 
forces, and then President of Nicaragua, both startled and 
confused the Department of State, as well as those Americans 
who followed his fortunes . Some felt he was the emulator of 
Sam Houston, that he would Americanize Nicaragua, and then 
secure its admission to the American Union. Because of his 
identification with one side in the power struggle for control 
of the Isthmian transit , Walker · was regarded as an agent of 
a coterie of American capitalists. 23 It seems probable, 
2�ore H. Hittell, "History of the Filibuster, William Walker," 
unpublishe1 ms., ca. 1915, Su-tro Library, San Francisco, 12. 
2� York Herald, November 29, 1856. 
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however, that his aims went beyond Nicaragua. He apparently 
planned to create a strong federated state out of the five 
Central American republics, organized and governed on mili­
tary principles, and then to effect the conquest of Cuba. 
The introduction of an American population would serve to 
secure and regenerate the entire area. An interoceanic 
canal through Nicaragua would give the region an even greater 
strategic importance. 24 
In other words, Walker was bent on establishing a mili­
tary slaveocracy in Middle America, with himself as its 
dictator. Reaction in the United States to this possibility 
was mixed. Some southerners were delighted, and hoped an 
alliance with Walker's "empire" might check northern opposi­
tion in the event of secession; some northern proponents of 
Mani fest Destiny were alienated. Though they had taken 
slavery in the tropics for granted, they anticipated that 
action by Walker or the United States government would lead 
to opening up the area to trade or perhaps to annexation. 
They had not been expecting a competitive superstate with 
opposing ideas and institutions. 25 Initially, the ambivalence 
in the United States did not trouble Walker. His maj or 
concern was that equipment, supplies, and reinforcements arrive 
2 �scroggs, "Walker's Designs on Cuba, " 19 9.  
25Ibid. 210. 
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unimpeded from the northern republic ,  and for a time they 
continued to pour in without interruption. Ultimately , the 
pressure on the Pierce administration corning from opposition 
to official expansion and to the adventures of American 
citizens began to impinge. The government wavered , never 
entirely aware of the true situation in Nicaragua , and unable 
to decide whether to assign its imprimatur or employ its 
naval forces to assure the failure of the filibusters. A 
contemporary editorial took the administration to task over 
its indecision. 
The general policy , aside from mere legal questions 
involved in this whole series of blunders of the Marcy-· 
Pierce rule would seem to point to the encouragement , 
by every proper means , of the movement in Nicaragua . . 
It is a mode of foreclosing the Central American contro­
versy with England. It assures stability of government 
over the Transit route. It promises vastly increased 
growth in sugar , coffee and other tropical products. 
It binds California to the policy of the American Union . 
It stations a power to the southward of Mexico , and 
opens to that dissolving republic a mean_s of renovation. 
It is an expression of American enterprise , precisely 
at the right point--indicative of the future of the 
whole of the North and Central American States. It 
raises up a rival i� Cuba , where labor in freedom will 
be found vastly superior to that which is bound in the 
iron clamps of a military despotism . In short , the 
Nicaragua movement is wholly Anglo-American in character , 
orderly in administration , just in principle , and 
beneficial in results; and the sooner the government 
rectifies its mistakes the sooner will its errors be 
forgotten. 25 
If the administration's policy toward Walker , Vanderbilt , 
et al , seemed to lack continuity , there was even more confusion 
25Blackwood'� Magazine , March , 1856. 
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with respect to the confrontation with Great Britain over the 
enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and hegemony in Central 
America. President Polk, in his 1845 addres s which renewed 
the tenets of the Doctrine, had broadened the definition of 
"security" for this country, transforming the doctrine from 
a defensive statement to an expansionist statement. At the 
time, there seemed to be a contraction in the zone of appli­
cation. In 182 3, the zone had embraced two continents--it 
was hemispheric; in 1845 it comprised only one continent-­
North America_. 26 Taking the two together, the implication 
was either that the United States intended to make a more 
intensive effort to establish its fiat over Middle America 
or that this area was most vulnerable to British encroach­
ment. · State Department policy, however, was clouded by the 
fact that every British move seemed to be accompanied by 
diplomatic smoke screens and faits accomplis. With the 
acquisition of California and the gold rush, the concomitant 
renewed interest in a transoceanic canal, and the British head 
start toward exclusive influence in Central America, the 
Department initially strove to establish some degree of 
equality with the British. This effort resulted in a treaty 
between the United States and Great Britain signed in 1850 by 
the American secretary of state, John M .  Clayton, and the 
English ambas sador to Washington, Sir Henry Lytton Buh1er. 
2 6  Merk, Monroe Doctrine, 281. 
It guaranteed the strict neutrality of any interoceanic 
canal opened across Central America. The countries agreed 
that neither would seek to control any canal that might be 
built, nor to occupy or plant colonies in or exercise 
dominion over the part of Central America. 
28 
The ink was hardly dry on the agreement before the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty became the subject of conflicting 
interpretations � The United States government understood it 
to mean that the British process of establishing new colo­
nies in Central America would now be reversed and, at the 
very least, they would withdraw from their occupation of the 
Mosquito Territory. The British foreign office pointed out 
that the treaty did not apply to that portion of Nicaragua's 
coast as it was not a colony but a protectorate, therefore 
not included in the agreement, and that the treaty was not 
retroactive. British intransigence complicated Washington's 
diplomacy with respect to Nicaragua and Central America. 
Fully confident that American capital would build the canal, 
thereby enhancing American prestige, security, and commerce, 
the State Department attempted to establish the proper milieu 
for such an eventuality. The task included providing its 
good offices in settling the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border 
dispute, for the canal route would pass through part of the 
contested area. and hostilities might seriously impair transit 
operations. In addition, the Department also wanted to make 
it possible for the operating company to contract 
2 9  
with only one sovereign state, rather than risk the confusion 
of having to deal with two. A basic problem was the negotiation 
of a treaty of peace, amity, and conunerce with Nicaragua ; the 
treaty would be necessary to ensure the safety of United States 
citizens and their investments. Due to British interference 
and the actions of its own private citizens, the United States 
failed to exchange treaty ratifications with Nicaragua during 
the entire period . The border dispute was finally settled, 
but without United States help or arbitration. 
The advent of the Civil War curtailed American interest 
in southward expansion until the close of the century. When 
Confederate guns fired on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, all 
eyes turned inward at the coming holocaust. Little thought 
and less attention was given to what had recently been a 
pressing and formidable issue . In many ways, a short-lived 
era had passed: an era in which there was much agreement in 
the United States on something called Manifest Destiny, but 
much disagreement on its implementation and its implications. 
The nation ' s  leaders at times seemed to be committed to ex­
pansion ; indeed, many were elected on expansionist platforms, 
but their erratic courses left little in concrete achievement . 
A few intrepid individuals launched expansionist programs of 
their own, but by the end of the decade, these had borne little 
fruit. Nevertheless, governmental, entrepreneurial, and 
filibuster efforts in Nicaragua during the era provided an 
30 
insight into United States relations with Central America 
during the nineteenth century. The first issue lay in the 
realm of diplomacy, with the battleground being Central 
America (Figure 1) and more specifically the middle states 
of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica (Figures 
2 and 3). 
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CHAPTER II 
THE NICARAGUAN NON-TREATY 
The United States goverment's interest is in keeping 
the transit route under one authority (i. e. : Nicaragua) , 
and that conflicts arising from grants should be ad­
judicated by the judicial1authorities, that all parties should act in good faith. 
These instructions from the Secretary of State to his 
representative in Nicaragua highlight the area of overriding 
concern in trying to negotiate a satisfactory treaty with 
Nicaragua during the decade of the 1850's. Nicaragua had re­
cently emerged into separate nationhood and, aside from other 
considerations, the United States was anxious to "normalize" 
relations with that state and the other new republics in 
Central America. Nicaragua, however, was the point of pressure 
because its natural geographical and topographical advantages 
made it a likely site for an interoceanic canal or a trans­
isthmian transit route. A further concern of the united concern 
of the United States was that Nicaragua was one of the areas 
where the British were making not only commercial, but apparent­
ly nee-colonial inroads. The Mosquito Coast of Nicaragua had 
been occupied by the British since January 1, 1848, and this 
area included San Juan del Norte which was expected to be 
1Lewis Cass to Mirabeau B. Lamar, January 2, 1858, 
Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906, 
Nati6nal Archives Microfilm Publication M99, roll 27, frame 
288. 
34 
3 5 
the eastern terminus for either a canal or a transit route. 
In addition, the British were giving evidence of coveting 
naval bases in the Bay of Fonseca, shared by Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, and Honduras, and of establishing a pre-eminent 
sphere of influence in Central America as a whole. 
Early United States efforts to negotiate a bilateral 
treaty were frustrated by a number of events and circum­
stances. One problem was identifying a legitimate govern­
ment with which to do business. Even after the breakup of 
the Confederation _of Central America, numerous efforts were 
made in various states to put the federation back together 
again . On occasion, these efforts were nominally successful, 
but more often they resulted in temporary arrangements made 
by caudillo leaders of similar ideological proclivites. But 
the problem was not limited to the international level. 
Internai"ly in Nicaragua there were two principal parties, the 
conservatives (Legitimists or Serviles) and the liberals 
(Democrats) . Actually, this ideological demaraction was a 
legacy from the era of the federation, and continued well into 
Nicaragua's national period, being in many cases more important 
than the issue of international frontiers. As a result, civil 
war was endemic in that Isthmian country, causing precipitous 
changes in government and shifts in the location of the capital, 
with Ledn, Massaya, Managua, and Granada all vying for the 
distinction at one time or another. 
British efforts to frustrate American diplomacy in order 
�6 
to enhance their own commercial and strategic interests were 
largely in the domain of Frederick Chatfield, the consul­
general to Central America. During Chatfield's seventeen 
years on the Isthmus, . from 1834 until 1851, he was idefati­
gable in his efforts to establish British predominance there, 
even if it meant a rather undiplomatic subersion of American 
attempts to negotiate satisfactory international accords with 
the Central American republics. The first consequential 
American representative to feel the sting of Chatfield's 
interference was Elijah Hise, named by Polk as United States 
charge d'affaires to Central America in October, 1848. 2 
Hise's primary mission was to negotiate treaties of friendship 
and commerce with Guatemala and El Salvador, but a secondary 
responsibility was to keep an eye on Chatfield and report the 
British agent's activities. Hise was also assigned the task 
of urging a reunification of the replublics of Central 
America. It was felt in Washington that a renewed federation, 
or even a confederation, would be strong enough to blunt 
effectively British _imperial encroachments upon the Isthmus. 
There was a certain contradiction in Hise's instructions. · 
2Before his appointment, Hise, 47, had a large and lucra­
tive law practice in his native Russellville, Kentucky,· and 
had served in the Kentucky legislature. Subsequent to his 
diplomatic mission, he was twice elected to Congress . Hise 
committed suicide in 1867 because of despondency over post­
Civil War conditions. National Cyclopedia of American 
Bio·graphy (New York: James T. White & Company, 1904) , VII, 55. 
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Separate treaties negotiated with the various Central American 
states would imply recognition and encouragement by the United 
States of the individual character of each republic, and would 
undermine the secondary goal of aiding in the achievement of 
reunion. Inasmuch as part of Chatfield's overall plan was to 
prevent a resumption of the federation, the British agent was 
pleased with Hise' s progress in formulating separate accords_. 3 
Although no match for the intriguing Briton, Hise did 
recognize the importance of the projected canal and felt a 
special sense of urgency about coming to terms with the 
Nicaraguans on this crucial issue. Ac�ordingly, he signed 
a treaty with Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Buenaventura Selva 
on May 31, 1849, even though the administration which had 
' 
appointed him was now out of office and a new charge had 
already been appointed. 4 The treaty provided for a right of 
way for a canal, road, or railroad, in perpetuity and under 
American auspices, permitted fortifications if necessary, and 
guaranteed the territorial integrity of Nicaragua by the 
United States. The provisions giving the American government, 
or a company endorsed by it, an exclusive franchise, and- making 
Nicaragua a virtual protectorate of the United States, were 
3Mario Rodriguez, A Palmerstonian Diplomat in Central 
America (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1964), 300. 
4Miles P. DuVal, Jr. , Cadiz to Cathay (Stanford University 
Press, 1940), 52. Rodriguez fixes the date of the treaty as 
June 21. 
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greater commitments than those in any subsequent treaty which 
came under consideration. 
The Hise-Selva Treaty was hardly written when Hise's 
replacement, Ephraim George Squier, arrived at San Juan del 
Norte. 5 The treaty was rejected by the new administration 
of Zachary Taylor on three counts: Hise had never been 
authorized to negotiate a treaty with Nicaragua (though he had 
requested permission and had received no response from the 
Department of State), his commission had expired and he had 
already been replaced by Squier, and the administration had 
no intention of assuming a protectorate over Nicaragua. When 
Squier arrived, American financiers were already engaged in 
tryping to secure a franchise for either a canal or a transit 
route. Consequently, his instructions were to make a treaty 
of commerce in the interests of the American Atlantic and 
Pacific Ship Canal Company and to secure a right of way for a 
canal open to all nations. Squier could assure the Nicaraguans 
5squier had been a precocious youth who taught school in 
his native New York State while still a teenager and despite 
limited formal education . Early efforts at journalism brought 
mixed success, but his published works on the archeology of 
New York and Ohio were regarded as authoritative. In 1848 he · 
served as clerk of the Ohio House of Representatives. Squier's 
appointment as charg� when he was only 28 was largely through 
the influence of W. H. Prescott. After his stint in Nicaragua, 
he returned to Central America in behalf of the unsuccessful 
Honduras Interoceanic Railway Company. Later he served as 
United States commissioner to Peru and Honduran consul-general 
in New York City. He capitalized on his residence in Latin 
America by publishing a number of archeological works on the 
area. Squier died in Brooklyn in 1888 after a long illness. 
Dictionary of American Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 19 35), IX, 488-9. 
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of moral support in their struggle to recover the alienated 
Mosquito Territory, but under no circumstances was he to 
guarantee the territorial integrity of Nicaragua, or to 
commit the United States government to any alliances, contro­
versies, or speculative schemes. 6 
On September 3, 1849, within a week after the Ship Canal 
Company headed by Cornelius Vanderbilt had signed a contract 
with the government of Nicaragua for canal and transit 
rights, Squier reached an accord with the Nicaraguan foreign 
ministry. Sensitive to Chatfield's intrigues and diplomatic 
maneuvering, the American minister went beyond his instruc­
tions, conceding a limited guarantee of Nicaragua's terri­
tory. Articles 35 of the treaty reaffirmed the Vanderbilt 
company's transit franchise secured in a commercial contract 
of August 27. It required, however, that the United States 
recognize the rights of sovereignty and property which 
Nicaragua possessed over the line of the canal and guaranteed 
the neutrality of the strip as long as it remained under the 
control of American citizens. 7 Perhaps at the behest of the 
company, Secretary of State Clayton indicated that if the 
United States were committed to undertaking the defense of 
the canal, some extra-territorial provision or at least a 
provision for exclusivity should be included. In addition, 
6House E>c .  Doc. No. 75, 119-130. 
7oaniel Webster (Secretary of State) to J. Bozman Kerr 
(Charge d'Affaires to Central America), June 6, 1851, Diplo­
matic Instructions, National Archives, M77, 27/113. 
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Clayton pointed out to Squier that the treaty had only a 
twenty-year duration, with a provision for annulment on 
twelve-months' notice, whereas the franchise contract had a 
life of eighty-five years. Clayton did not feel that this 
gave the entrepreneurs sufficient protection, so he advised 
Squier to refrain from further bargaining pending an antici­
pated treaty with Great Britain encompas sing the whole 
Isthmian is sue. 8 The result of these latter negotiations 
was the Clayton-Buh,er Treaty, signed on April 19, 1850, in 
which the United States and Great Britain agreed that neither 
would obtain or maintain any exclusive control over a canal 
nor erect or maintain any fortifications commanding a canal. 9 
In the meantime, at the urging of Nicaraguan Charg� d' 
Affaires Eduardo Carcache, Clayton agreed to submit the Squier 
treaty to the Senate. The Secretary advised earache, however, 
that even if the Senate approved it, the President would sign 
only with the understanding that other provisions might be 
agreed upon later between the two governments for "more 
ef fectually securing the objects contemplated by the 3 5 th 
article. " Apparently the canal company had requested the delay 
in submis sion of the treaty until it could send agents to 
Nicaragua to discuss the import of Article 35. Clayton also 
thought that the article "might be changed so as to inspire 
8c 1ayton to Squier, Novemher 20, 1849, ibid., 27/101. 
9 Ibid. , May 7, 1850, 27/104. 
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greater confidence in capitalists who might be disposed to 
invest their funds in the construction of the ship canal and 
at the same time, extend the benefits of protection to the 
canal. " To facilitate this modification, Clayton recom-
I 
mended that Squier return to Leon and get full powers to 
negotiate a new treaty. 
10 
Aside from the canal company's interests, other sub­
stantial reasons existed for reaching an agreement with 
Nicaragua. William F. Boone, the United States Consul at 
San Juan del Sur, pointed out some of the problems inherent 
in the non-treaty status. In contrast to Britons who were 
residing and doing business there, Americans contended that 
no protection was provided by the United States government. 
American sailors complained that this situation was unlike 
that of any other port-of-call which they had visited. In 
addition, for the six-hundred Americans resident in Nicaragua, 
there was no postal arrangement unless twenty-five cents were 
prepaid in New York to the purser of the Vanderbilt line. 
One key to the languishing of the treaty was another change 
in the juridical status of Nicaragua. On December 15, 1851, 
I 
. 
• 
Boone was informed by Foreign Minister Pedro Zeledon that his 
10clayton to Carcache, January 2, 1850, Notes to Foreign 
Legations in the United States from the Department of State, 
1834-19 06, National Archives Microfilm Publication �99, roll 
10, frame 2. An extraordinary error was made by Clayton in 
this communication. He continually referred to the "Heisse" 
special convention of September 3, 1849. Presumably this 
meant "Hise", but it was Squier, Clayton's own representative, 
who signed it. 
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country no longer existed as a sovereign state. Zeledon 
contended that a confederation of Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Nicaragua had been formed some two years earlier, and that 
the seat of this government was in Tegucigalpa. Apparently 
the Granada-Leon rivalry played a role in what appeared to 
, be a pretense on Zeledon's part. The latter official was 
aligned with the Granada faction in Nicaraguan politics, while 
J. Bozman Kerr, nominated by the State Department as Charge 
d'Affaires, was in Leon. Kerr had given Boone his commission, 
but even Kerr had yet to be accredi ted . Z eledon told Boone 
that in order to receive official recognition, he would have 
to "apply to the Central Confederation, located some place 
in the mountains of Honduras, some five hundred miles off. " 
In later conversation, Zeledon conceded that he did not 
really expect Boone to find a government there. 11 
A problem for American citizens similar to that in San 
Juan del Sur arose on the opposite side of the Isthmus at 
San Juan del Norte where the United States was compelled to 
give ·a temporary countenance to the de-facto government 
installed by Great Britain in order to provide protection for 
her citizens congregating there. Far from resolving the 
llBoone to Webster, December 27, 1851, Consular Despatc._�es 
from San Juan del Sur, National Archives Microfilm Publica�ion 
T-152, roll 1, frame 38. John Bozman Kerr served as Charge 
d'Affaires to Nicaragua from March 24, 1851 until July 30, 
1852. 
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difficulties between the United States and Great Britain, the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty seemed to compound them because of the 
different interpretations put on its provisions. Although 
the United States never acknowledged the Greytown (San Juan 
del Norte) authorities as a legitimate government to be 
sustained against the claims of Nicaragua, the British 
continued to deny that Clayton-Bulwer was retrospective, or 
that they had yielded their protectorate over the Mosquito 
Indians. In his instructions to Solon Borland, newly appointed 
minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordi�ary to the 
Central American states, Secretary of State Marcy complained 
that a copy of the instructions from British Foreign Secre­
tary Lord Clarendon to British Minister to the United States 
John F. T. Crampton showed that Great Britain maintained the 
same right to "intermeddle" in Central American affairs as 
before the signing of the Clayton-Bulwer accord, and "continued 
to manifest an equally forward disposition to do so. " Marcy 
observed, however, that the British appeared to be willing to 
relinquish their protectorate if Nicaragua would give assur­
ances of good treatment of the Indians and would pay the 
Indians some compensation. Borland should therefore urge on 
Nicaragua the same type of settlement that the United States 
had made with her Indians ! Marcy noted that the Indian question 
might be a subterfuge, and the real  issue was Britain's 
concern about protecting the commerce in British manufactures 
44 
and Costa Rican coffee. 12 
Costa Rica was dependent upon the port of San Juan del 
Norte as the Serapiqui-San Juan River system provided the 
major outlet from Costa Rica's heartland to the Caribbean 
and thence to Europe. As long as the Central American 
"confederation" existed, there seemed to be no problem, but 
when it broke up and the independent state of Nicaragua 
purported to possess sovereign rights at San Juan del Norte, 
the British felt compelled to move in. Perhaps, Marcy told 
Borland, the best course for the United States government 
would be to urge the reconstitution of the confederation. 13 
The minister was also directed to negotiate another 
treaty with Nicaragua, and to try to include a provision 
that Americans could buy and hold property for any purpose. 
Marcy pointed out what he considered to be the benefits of 
such a program: 
The residence of our citizens in these states would 
import strength and stability to the political and 
commercial relations which for the mutual interest of 
both countries, should be maintained. Our citizens, 
should they find sufficient inducements to settle in 
any of these states would carry with them their capital 
and that enterprise, for which they are so much distin­
guished. Coming from a country of similar political 
institutions, imbued with the principles of a free 
government harmonizing with their own, such residents 
could not excite jealousies, or create any apprehen­
sions of disturbing influences. 
12Marcy to Borland, June 17, 1853, M77, 27/177. Borland 
served as Minister to Central America from April 30, 1853, 
until June 28, 1854. 
13Ibid. 
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Borland was warned not to give reciprocity for this conces­
sion, as the treaty might not pass the Senate. Moreover, 
such a provision was probably unnecessary, considering the 
openess of the various American states in granting these 
rights. 14 
Borland concluded "A General Treaty of Peace, Amity, 
Commerce, Navigation, and Protection between the United 
States and Nicaragua" on February 14, 1854, but the treaty 
was amended in Washington and returned to his successor for 
acceptance in its_ new form by the Nicaraguan goverrunent. 15 
By the time it was returned, other dramatic events had 
occured and the Borland treaty, like its predecessors, mis­
carried. The first impasse was the bombardment of San Juan 
del Norte by the United States Sloop-of-War Cyane on July 13, 
1854. 16 Carcache's successor in Washington, Jose de 
Marcoleta, protested vigorously to the Department of State 
and demanded reparations "to those respectable citizens of 
Nicaragua who suffered . grievous losses of property . 
and also , to the Government of Nicaragua. " Marcy's rejection 
of this protest clearly showed the depth of resentment and 
misunderstanding between the two governments engendered by 
the confused and complex situation in Nicaragua: 
14rbid. 
15Marcy to John H. Wheeler (Minister-Resident in 
Nicaragua) , October 23, 1854, M77, 27/228. 
16rbid. , 231. 
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I beg to submit that it is scarcely credible, as your 
note seems to imply, that any considerable number of 
respectable citizens of the Republic of Nicaragua had 
taken up residence or placed their property among 
those whom you properly characterize as "the pseudo­
sovereigns"--San Juan--a place as you admit, held by 
usurpation against the sovereign authority of their 
own government. These citizens for whom you make 
reclamation, must have lived in treasonable associa­
tion with the open and avowed enemies of your country, 
and if engaged there in business they must have been 
incorporated with that community which you describe 
in such severe but probably j ust terms. 
Marcy pointed out that the residents had been given notice 
"that the town would be punished for its misdeeds" and could 
have evacuated the area. Furthermore , they had time to. 
persuade the Cyane's commander, Captain Hollins, to make a 
distinction between them and those implicated in the destruc­
tion of American property. They chose instead to cast their 
lot with "the abandoned and lawless dwellers at that place. " 
Marcy concludes, 
Nicaragua may think herself kindly treated if she is 
not held responsible for the acts of those who were 
permitted by her to occupy her territory and perpetrate 
deeds injurious to friendly powers while within her 
jurisdiction. She owed it alike to herself and to 
these powers to have driven the band of marauders 
settled at San Juan from her acknowledged soil. If she 
had the indiscretion to open an account with the United 
States upon this matter this Government will be at 
liberty to make her responsible for all the inj uries 
its citizens have suffered from those occupying her 
territory. 17 
The second incident to disturb the relations between the 
two countries was the organization of a colonizing expedition 
by Colonel Henry L. Kinney. Kinney and his associates had 
17Marcy to Marcoleta, August 2, 1854 , National Archives , 
M9 9,  10/62. 
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acquired title to a grant originally made by the Mosquito 
Indian "King, " the grant being a tract of land on the 
Mosquito Coast which included San Juan del Norte. These 
American entrepreneurs formed the "Central American Land and 
Mining Company" to exploit the tract, and began advertising 
for stockholders in the fall of 1854 in American east coast 
newspapers. Not only Marcoleta but also Pedro Molina, the. 
Costa Rican representative in Washington, objected to the 
anticipated occupation. The Costa Rican concern stemmed 
from a claim to the south bank of the San Juan River and to 
rights in the Bay of San Juan. Molina vigorously protested 
against · the validity of "any title or grant made by the Kings 
or Chiefs of the Mosquito Indians, " and avowed that his 
government would "not allow any colonist or party of colonists 
from whatever country they may proceed to occupy, locate or 
take possies sion of lands belonging to Costa Rica fo'r the 
purposes of agriculture, mining or any other, unles s he or 
they shall have previously applied to the government of Costa 
Rica, and duly obtained a permis sion and legal title to that 
effect. 11 18 
Marcy replied that the expedition appeared to be peace­
able, so was not subj ect to the United States neutrality laws. 
The Secretary said that he presumed Costa Rica's concern was 
lBMolina to Marcy, December 13, 1854, ibid. , �9 9,  10/72  
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about the land title, but that this was the exclusive juris­
diction of Costa Rica and not the responsibility of the 
United States. 19 Subsequently, the State Department did 
develop misgivings about the nature of the Kinney expedition, 
and introduced strategies to prevent it. 20  Despite the 
concerted efforts of the courts and the New York port author­
ities, Kinney managed to make his way to San Juan del Norte 
with a reduced contingent by early September, 1855. While 
he was enroute, Marcoleta's importunities became more stri­
dent, and he finally demand�d that the State Department issue 
orders for the American Navy to intervene to prevent the 
disembarkation of the colonists on Nicaraguan soil. Again 
Marcy lectured Marcoleta, and this time he took the Nicaraguan 
agent to task for not recognizing the limitations of sover­
eignty and jurisdiction: 
Mr. Marcoleta is • • •  fully aware that unassociated 
individuals have a right to leave the United States, 
and go whither they please, and that this government � 
has no right to enquire into the motive for such a· 
removal. They can be dealt with only as roombers of an 
expedition fitted out within our limits, against a 
friendly state and while they are within our j urisdic­
tion. If such an expedition escapes the vigilance of 
officers and arrives within the territories of a foreign 
state, they cannot be pursued and seized while within 
such territories by the authorities of the United States. 
Marcy advised Marcoleta that an American naval vessel "could 
not, without assuming illegal power and involving the 
19Marcy to Molina, December 19, 1854, Ibid. , M99, 10/73. 
20At the direction of the District Attorney, the New York 
port authorities seized Kinney's ship. Kinney was arrested 
and subsequently released without trial. 
sovereign rights of that state, interpose to prevent the 
disembarcation of arms, ammunition, or other articles to 
which reasonable suspicions are attached. "21 
4 9. 
The third interruption of normal relations between the 
United States and Nicaragua, and one that might be termed a 
catastrophe, may have been referred to in Marcoleta's 
request. The Nicaraguan Minister's allusion to "the meeting 
of suspicious persons in that locality" may have been a 
reference not only to Kinney, but also to the filibuster 
William Walker. By August, 1855, Walker and his band had 
landed in Nicaragua and were conducting independent military 
operations against the government at Granada which Marcoleta 
represented, ostensibly on behalf of the Derno'c'ratas head-
' 
quartered at Leon. It was widely believed at that time, 
particularly on the·Arnerican east coast, that Kinney and 
Walker were acting in concert rather than as rivals, as subse­
quent events were to prove. Marcoleta may have been alarmed 
at the possibility of a filibuster pincer movement operating 
from opposite littorals of the Nicaraguan Isthmus . 
Unfortunately for Marcoleta, with Walker's arrival on the 
Isthmian scene, the Nicaraguan agent's days were numbered. By 
October 23, Walker had succeeded in establishing a nominal 
bipartisan government in Granada with himself in de facto 
2 1Marcy to Marcoleta, August 2 2, 1855, ibid. , �99, 
10/85. 
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control. One of the filibuster leader's first moves was the 
cancellation of Marcoleta's commission. Complicating matters, 
I 
the former conservative (Legitimista) president, Jose Maria 
Estrada, had escaped to the northeastern province of Segovia 
and there proclaimed his government still in existence. The 
Granada regime, under the provisional presidency of Patricio 
Rivas, was, according to Estrada, illegitimate and invalid. 
Having been appointed by Estrada, Marcoleta clung to his office 
and defied removal. When Walker's government named a replace­
mept, the Department of State found itself in a dilemma. If 
the government withdrew its recognition of Marcoleta, it would 
seem to be placing its approval of the filibuster government, 
which the Department considered unrepresentative of the will 
of the Nicaraguan people. On the other hand, Marcoleta was an 
embarrassment to the Pierce administration since everyone recog­
nized that the Nicaraguan represented a phantom government. 
The question was raised as to whom did he send his despatches, 
and from whom did he get his instructions? 2 2  As it was believed 
that Marcoleta had never received a regular salary from the 
government of Nicaragua, the New York Herald sarcastically 
editorialized : 
The generosity of this gentleman in serving a government 
which could not pay is only equalled by his piety in con­
tinuing to serve it after it is dead. He continues with 
a constancy and disinterestedness unparalleled in the 
annals of diplomacy to represent its . spirit long after the 
body is dead and buried. 2 3 
2 2El Nicaraguense, January 2 6, 1856. 
23New York Herald, January 12, 1856. 
The wording of a State Department note to Marcoleta on 
December 10 is obscure but Marcy seemed to as sure the 
Nicaraguan diplomat that his recall by the Walker government 
did not constitute withdrawal of Marcoleta's credentials. 24 
Nevertheless, such a withdrawal appears to have been conveyed 
to Marcoleta shortly thereafter. 
Even before Marcoleta's dismis sal, Walker began to send 
a succession of representatives to Washington. The leader of 
the parade was Parker H. French, an American who had been a 
member of President Rivas' cabinet. 25  The choice was not an 
inspired one, as it emphasized the foreign character of the 
Granadan regime. Nonetheles s, the State Department was under 
heavy pres sure from various sectors--both political and 
journalistic--to receive French. Some were in sympathy with 
the Walker cause, while others pointed out that he was the 
accredited representative of a de facto regime, and it was not 
within State Department prerogative to pa� s judgment on that 
regime. But the Department remained adamant in its position, 
refusing to recognize the government or its representative. 
24Marcy to Marcoleta, December 10, 1855, National Archoves. 
M9 9 ,  10/9 8 .  
25French had published a rival newspaper to Walker's in 
Sacramento before going to Nicaragua. In Granada, French 
offered his services to Walker and was appointed Minister of 
Hacienda and later Nicaraguan Minister to Washington. Marcy 
refused to accept him and, after American newspapers published 
a revelation of French ' s  shady past, Walker dismis sed and 
repudiated him. William O. Scroggs, Filibusters and Financiers 
(New York : Rus sell & Rus sell, 1969, orig. pub. 1916), 89, 
168-71. Senate Report 455, 33 Cong. , 2 Ses s. 
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Domestic political considerations now entered upon the 
scene to alter the situation. Pierce's administration was 
beginning to be criticized for being soft on British imperial­
ism and not devoted enough to the cause of Manifest Destiny. 
As the Democratic nominating convention was nearing, and 
Pierce was actively seeking re-nomination, an about-face on 
the issue of recognition of the Walker government was exe-
cuted. 26 
· ' 
This time the Nicaraguan emissary was Padre Augustin 
Vijil, a respected cleric and former lawyer. 27 Marcy received 
Vijil on May 14, 1856, thereby implying recognition of the 
Granadan regime, and asked for the padre's legation personnel 
list on May 16. 28 The resumption of relations was a cause for 
celebration in the streets of Granada and among Walker's 
supporters in New York. 
The official recognition alleviated the pressure on 
United States Minister John H. Wheeler2iho had already engaged 
in premature diplomatic activity. 
26scroggs, Filibusters, 171. 
2 7Wheeler to Marcy, April 17, 1856, National Archives, 
M2 1 9 , 1 0 . 
28Marcy to Vijil, May 16, 1856, lliid. , M99, 10/112. 
29John Hill Wheeler, lawyer, diplomat, and historical 
writer, was born in 1806 in Murfreesboro, North Carolina, the 
son of a merchant and shipper. He graduated from Columbian 
College (now George Washington University) in 1826, was 
licensced to practice law in 1827, and received an A . M. degree 
from the University of North Carolina in 1828. Wheeler served 
in the North Carolina House of Commons from 1827 to 1830, was 
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Wheeler had presented himself to the new government directly 
30 
upon its formation, and had been rebuked by Marcy for this 
show of initiative. The Department, Wheeler was informed, had 
embarked upon a course of watchful waiting and would therefore 
delay its judgment about the validity of the new regime . In 
the meantime, he was to assess the situation and keep the 
Department posted: 
It is very important that this government should have 
the most accurate information in regard to the actual 
political . . condition- - of--the. state -of---Ni-caragua. The . 
accounts which have been sent on here are conflicting . 
While �ome of them represent that the present political 
organization is satisfactory to the people of that 
state--others -represent ·tha-e- i t -has -no-found-a·t:ion- in the-·· 
hearts of the people, who would very generally shake off 
the power of Walker if it were possible for them to do 
so, and that terror is its sole foundation . Your situa­
tion is favorable -to the acquisition of a correct knowl­
edge of the internal affairs of that country. 31 
superintendent of the Charlotte branch of the United States 
mint from 1837 to 1841, and was North Carolina state trea­
surer during 1842-1844 . After serving again in the North 
Carolina legislature in 185 2, Wheeler was appointed Minister 
to Nicaragua on August 2, 1854. He resigned under pressure 
from Secretary William L. Marcy on March 2, 1857 . After 
living in Washington, Wheeler returned to his native North 
Carolina at the onset of the Civil War, then journeyed to 
Europe in 1863 to collect historical material. He then went 
back to Washington and historical writing until his death in 
18�2. His major historical publication, Historical Sketches 
of North Carolina, which came out in 1851, was undistinguished 
and error-riddled. The biographical portions were so partial 
to his own party that it was nicknamed " The Democratic 
Studbook. " J .  G. de Roulhac Hamilton, Dictionary of American 
Biography, XX ,  50. 
3�eeler to Marcy, November 8, 1855, National Archives, 
M219, 10/28. 
31Marcy to Wheeler, January 8, 1856, M77, 27/253 . 
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Unfortunately, the creaking wheels of packet-ship diplo­
macy could not keep apace of the events occuring in Nicaragua. 
Wheeler's acknowledgement of Marcy's despatch granting recogni­
tion carried the news of a new political change in the Isthmian 
state. The government in Nicaragua was no longer that of 
Rivas, who had defected to an opposition faction, but of 
President Walker, who had been chosen in an election of 
questionable validity. 3 2  At this intelligence, the perplexed 
. State Department simply refused to act, and for the remainder 
of the Walker period did nothing with respect to official . 
recognition. Walker himself sought to minimize the importance 
of his break with Rivas, and ask�d Vijil to reassure 
Washington that no substantial change had occured . 3 3  By the 
time Walker's message reached Washington, however, Padre Vijil 
had already departed, leaving John P. Heiss as charge d' 
affaires of the legation. 34 
Heiss had been sent to Nicaragua in February, 1856, as 
a bearer of dispatches from the State· Department. t\Then he 
arrived in Granada, Walker won his fellow-Nashvillian ' s  enthu­
siastic support . The latter then returned to the United States 
a "naturalized" Nicaraguan and devoted his energies to the 
filibuster cause. After first acting as charge for the 
32wheeler to Marcy, June 30, 1856, ibid. , 2 19 ,  10/59 
3 3walker to Vijil, June 29 ,  1856, John P. Heiss Papers, 
Tennessee Historical Society, Nashville. 
34vijil to Marcy, June 2 3, 1856, ibid. 
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legation , Heiss was designated by Walker as a special 
commissioner to the United States and Great Britain to adjust 
the continuing controversy over the British Mosquito protecto­
rate. Inconveniently , neither government accepted Heiss' 
diplomatic overtures. This setback notwithstanding , he con­
tinued to serve Walker in other ways as when Walker needed 
publicity in the press , or a defense against the attacks of 
his critics , or a spokesman with an entree to the realms of 
power and influence in Washington. Warm letters were exchanged 
between the two men into 1857 , but silence thereafter suggests 
a rupture in their relationship. 35 
Another American , Appleton Oaksmith , was the last of the 
Walker regime's nominations as representatives to the United 
States , and Oaksmith also was duly rejected by the Department 
of State. 36 One of the victims of this diplomatic imbroglio 
was the bilateral treaty. Wheeler had negotiated a "Treaty of 
Friendship ,  Corrunerce, and Navigation" on June 20 , 1855 , even 
before the arrival of Walker. Nicaragua had ratified the 
accord on September 27 , 1856 , and in a September 30  dispatch , 
Wheeler urged action by the State Department. The American 
Minister pointed out that the treaty had met the approval of 
the Department when he had first presented it , and that the 
35Elleanore Ratterman , "The Walker-Heiss Papers. Some 
Diplomatic Correspondence of the Walker Regime in Nicaragua ," 
Tennessee Historical Magazine , I ,  No. 4 (December , 19 15) ,  331. 
36Marcy to Oaksmith , September 13 , 1856 , M99 , 10/116. 
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President's annual message had indicated that it would be sent 
to the Senate. In order to comply with the time period 
designated for ratification, Wheeler counseled, the treaty 
would have to be �pproved during the current congressional 
session. His dispatch also enclosed a copy of the decree of 
the Nicaraguan government repealing the Act of the Confed­
eration Congress of Central America of 1824 which abolished 
slavery on the Isthmus. As if in explanation, the minister 
gratuitously observed: 
The experience of any pers9n who may reside for even a 
short space of time in Nicaragua will convince the most 
fanatical, that the rich soil so well adapted to the 
culture of cotton, sugar, rice, corn, cacoa, indigo
� etc. , can never be developed without s lave labour. 3 
In response the .Department not only ignored the treaty but 
recalled Minister Wheeler. 38 
Meanwhile, the problem of trying to determine j ust who 
_should be the authentic representative from Nicaragua continued 
in Washington. In early October, 1856, Patricio Rivas, 
ensconced with a rival government at Leah, nominated a min­
ister to the United States. But Antonio Jos� de Irisarri, 
already accredited as Minister from Guatemala and El Salvador, 
began an ill-starred year of efforts to secure reception by 
bungling his presentation of credentials. In acknowledging 
Irrisarri ' s  note which referred to an accompanying intro-
37Wheeler to Marcy, August 6 and August 30, 1856, M2 19, 
10. 
38scroggs called Wheeler's support of the decree "the 
proverbial straw that broke the back of the camel" in sealing 
the Minister's fate. Scroggs, Filibusters, 2 16. 
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duction from the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, Marcy quickly 
advised him of the faux pas: 
I have the honor to acquaint you, that the accompaniment 
to your note is of a different character, being a 
letter to me from the same functionary upon the subject 
of Mr. Walker's alleged election as President of 
Nicaragua. It is presumed that this was accidenta�ly 
substituted for the letter referred to in your note. 39 
On October 28, Marcy informed Irisarri that the President had 
declined to accredit him. The Secretary observed that there 
was too much confusion regarding who had the authority to speak 
for Nicaragua or to act as a de facto government, and some 
reason to believe that there may very well have been no one. 40 
After the fall of Walker on May 1, 1857, a new government 
was organized in Nicaragua. The chiefs of the political fac-
, , , . , 
tions, Legitimist Tomas Martinez and Democrat Maximo Jerez, 
formed a coalition and ousted Rivas, who went into exile in 
England. Martfnez was named president, with Jerez serving in 
various cabinet posts, and the new chief executive renamed 
Irisarri as the Nicaraguan delegate to Washington. In August, 
the new Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, advised Irisarri that 
the Nicaraguan's reception (and subsequent treaty negotiations) 
would be delayed until formal diplomatic relations were restored 
between the United States and Nicaragua. 41 While waiting 
for the State Department to make up its mind, Irisarri 
39Marcy to Irisarri, October 20, 1856, M99, 10/118. 
40Ibid. , October 28 , 1856, 10/119. 
41cass to Irisarri, August 28, 1857, M99, 10/131. 
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lived in New York until he received a summons from Cass in 
September: "Wishing to have a personal conference with you I 
will thank you to come hither so that I may see you on Tuesday 
morning of the 29th instant. 11 42 Whether from petulance, prior 
business conunitments, or indisposition, Irisarri declined to 
make the trip immediately to Washington. Cass' suspicion or 
ire was raised, as he revealed in his next communication: 
I have just received your letter of the 25th instant 
and much regret that your health is so impaired and 
especially, that it suffered in consequence - of your 
late visit to this place. I am unwilling to subject 
you to a recurrence of your illness, and if you cannot 
come on here, of course the question of the recognition 
of the existing government of Nicaragua, which has been 
submitted to the President must be determined without 
the benefit of your presence. It was upon that subject 
I desired to converse with you, and I invited you to 
repair hither by the direction of the President. The 
President is now absent, but will return at the begin­
ning of the ensuing week • . . .  I think your presence 
here • . • .  would be useful in the consideration of 
this matter. 43 
In October Cass again delayed a decision due to a report 
from the British Minister "and other sources" that Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica planned to form a confederation. Cass indi­
cated that the United States would have to await the outcome 
of this new development, and requested that Irisarri send the 
Department a copy of the proposal if such existed. 44 In 
response, Irisarri reassured the State Department that 
42Ibid. , September 23, 1857, 126 
43Ibid. , September 26, 1857, 127 
44rbid. , October 15, 1857, 128. 
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Nicaragua intended to remain a sovereign state, and that the 
rumors of a confederation probably grew out of the amicable 
boundary negotiations currently underway between the two 
countries. Irisarri was then duly received, and negotiated a 
standard bilateral treaty with Cass on November 16, 1857. 
After the recall of Wheeler, the State Department was 
severely circumscribed in its efforts to obtain independent 
intelligence on Nicaragua. Remaining to report were the 
consuls at San Juan del Norte and San Juan del Sur, but neither 
could be considered an asset. Both had become involved in 
Nicaraguan internal politics; the Greytown agent because of 
the transit imbroglio, while the consul on the Pacific 
littoral, John Priest, had apparently been committed to the 
downfall of the filibuster government. One American , a short­
time resident of San Juan del Sur, bitterly attacked Priest, 
complaining that he had solicited the intervention of the 
United States Navy against Walker in order that the consul 
might obtain his exequatur from the Chamorro government. 
Withal , Priest was not fit for the j ob, the complainant con­
tended. "He is certainly a very immoral man, dissipated and 
not strictly honorable. He is completely under the influence 
of the natives • . • •  [That he has] become the apologist for 
the Chamorro government is a well-known fact. "45 Cass tried 
45s. M. West to Cass, June 31, 1857, T152, 1/173. West 
had arrived in Nicaragua as a correspondent for the San 
Antonio West Texan j ust before the Allies facing Walker had 
closed the transit route. He was brought back to New York 
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sending down a special agent, William Cary Jones,  who osten­
sibly reported from July to September of 1857. Apparently, 
Jones also remained inebriated for that period of time and was 
singularly ineffective as a State Department correspondent. 46 
The advent of the new year saw a full-fledged profes­
sional named by the Department of State to carry out the 
difficult job of identifying factions and political currents 
in Nicaragua, and trying to secure ratification of the Cass­
Irisarri Treaty. The man selected was Mirabeau Buonaparte 
Lamar, a veteran of over twenty years of. international diplo­
macy. Lamar had been President in 1838 of the new Republic of 
Texas, an office he won largely by default and whose duties he 
did not discharge with any conspicuous degree of success. One 
historian credits Lamar with having "destroyed whatever chance 
there might otherwise have been of Mexican acceptance of the 
aboard the St. Marys, and when he wrote Cas s, he was destitute 
and requesting money from the Department of State to make his 
way back to Texas. 
46New York Herald, January 1, 1858. Scroggs claims that 
Jones "was rarely sober and never diplomatic, and was called . 
home without having furnished any information. " Scroggs, 
Filibusters, 356. A dissenting voice in the case of Jones was 
that of Dr. J. L. Cole, who claimed that Jones' inebriation 
was a facade in order to take advantage of "in vino veritas," 
and that the ploy was quite successful. In addition, accord­
ing to Cole, Jones was the only American agent who had not 
been "humbugged" by the local authorities. Cole to Heiss, 
June 20, 1858, Heiss Papers. 
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loss of Texas. 11 4 7  Most recently Lamar had been the Minister­
. Resident ot the Argentine Confederation. 
Cass's instructions indicated just how complex was the 
task which the former Texan was about to undertake. First 
priority went to the treaty, for without it, Americans residing 
in Nicaragua could not be assured of adequate protection from 
their own government. Cass cited William Carey Jones's report 
that citizens we�e under surveillance, restricted in their move­
ments, and threatened "with the penalty of instant death if they 
attempted to escape from the harsh and arbitrary measures which 
are imposed upon them. " Cass noted that Lamar could not appeal 
to treaty provisions for protection, but pointed out that amity 
between nations required that unoffending aliens be properly 
treated. Jones had also reported that the mails were violated 
in order to guard against filibuster movements. Lamar was 
directed to enter a strong protest and to report to the Depart­
ment immediately if the official mails were disturbed. 
The second item on Lamar's agen_da was the boundary dispute 
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Cass suggested that in order 
47Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co. , 1938), 2 05. Biographies of Lamar are: 
Herbert P .  Gambrell, Mirabeau B. Lamar, Troubadour and Crusader 
(Dallas: Southwest Press, 1934 ) , and Asa Kyrus Christian, Mirabeau 
Buonaparte Lamar· (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones Co. , 19 22). Both 
of these deal primarily with Lamar's activities in Texas, and 
make only passing references to his diplomatic service. Also, 
see: Ha�riet Smithers, ed. , The Papers of Mirabeau Buonaparte 
Lamar (Austin: A. C. Baldwin & Sons, 192 1). These were edited 
from the original papers in the Texas State Library, and volumes 
V and VI deal with Lamar's diplomatic posts. 
48cass to Lamar, April 15, 1858, National Archives, M7 7, 2 7/309. 
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to settle their differences, the two nations should retire 
within recognized territory and begin negotiations where they 
were left off when William Walker interfered. If that did not 
work, they could resort to the provisions of the Clayton­
Bulwer Treaty (either to mediation by the United States or 
Great Britain under Article 6, or the establishment of an 
international zone under Article 4), or, finally, to mediation 
by any friendly power. Cass observed that Costa Rica appeared 
to be trying to convert her success against Walker into 
territorial aggrandizement, and the Department did not approve. 
Lamar was directed to urge again that the Central American 
governments unite, since no "political or geographical consid­
erations" separated the m, but only divisions inherited fran 
the Spanish colonial system. They could prosper and avoid 
conflict, Cass felt, by using the United States federation as 
a model. 49 
There was also the continuing problem of the differing 
interpretations of the Clayton-Bulwer accord, a topic not 
strictly within the province of Lamar. The Mini ster was 
49 cass to Lamar, January 2, 1858, fuid. , 288. Cass also 
believed that a small party of filibust'ersunder Colonel Frank 
Anderson (left over from Walker's second filibuster attempt 
which had been arrested by Commodore Hiram Paulding) still 
occupied Fort Castillo on the transit route. Cass informed 
Lamar that the Department desired that their lives be spared, 
and that a naval squadron commander had been ordered to pick 
them up (actually, this had already been done). Just as in 
the Paulding action, Cass conceded, this was not strictly 
legal but was pragmatic and bloodless. 
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advised, however, that British legate William Gore Ousley 
was then in Washington to try to compromise the conflicting 
construction of the treaty. The United States would 
never agree to the British interpretation, Cass reflected, 
and had thought at one time that the British would give in, 
but recent events had made that possibility seem unlikely. 50 
The final issue was that of the reopening of the tran­
sit route and the confusion engendered by the companies 
competing for the franchise, not to mention the seeming 
Nicaraguan _ intransigence with respect to any reopening at 
all. Lamar was aware before leaving the United States of the 
aggressive attitude of Vanderbilt, and perhaps of the 
conspiratorial nature of the association between Irisarri 
and the Stebbins-White company. 51 Cass was unequivocal: 
The course of Mr. Vanderbilt, a citizen of the United 
States, is deserving of severe censure. His inter­
ference in this matter is in every way indefensible, 
and his assertion that he prevented for some time the 
recognition of Mr. de Irisarri, as the Minister of 
Nicaragua, is entirely unfounded, and certainly 
exhibits a mistaken estimate of his own influence. 
The delay in receiving Mr. de Irisarri originated, not 
in the representations or efforts of Mr. Vanderbilt, 
but in the political condition of Nicaragua and the 
apparent instability of the government. It is due to 
s o  Thid. 
51H. G. Stebbins and Joseph L. White, former colleagues 
of Vanderbilt in the transit enterprise, were now his canpe­
titors for control . of the route. Many believed that when 
Irisarri signed a franchise contract on his own initiative 
with Stebbins and White, the Nicaraguan was actually on 
White's payroll. 
64. 
Mr. de Irisarri to say, that while he has conducted 
himself as the faithful respresentative of his own 
government, he has secured the respect and confi-
dence of this, by the whole course of his proceedings. 52 
Despite these myriad problems, Lamar was optimistic about 
his mission, and thought he could forward the ratified treaty 
by the first steamer after his arrival. Much to his chagrin, 
he found that Nicaragua was not enthusiatic about the treaty, 
particularly because the government feared it would open 
rather than close the door to filibusterism. Irisarri had 
even written his government that Nicaragua could not expect 
anything but agression anyway, and they might as well sign 
the treaty as it was preferable to be filibustered by the 
United States government than by "private marauders ! "  Lamar 
was informed that the Assembly intended to adjourn before 
considering the treaty, but would reassemble just before the 
expiration date for approval, and at that time would ratify. 53 
Lamar did get an opportunity to discuss the ramifications 
of the treaty with Foreign Minister Roaslio Cortes, and 
, , 
Cortes in turn explained its provisions to President Tomas 
, 
Marti,nez, first observing that the United States would abstain 
from all agression agai·nst Central American territory, and 
would look with much disfavor on another outside country hold-
ing dominion over a part of the Isthmus. 
, 
Cortes assumed that 
52 Ibid. 
53Lamar to Cass, February 2 6, �858,  National Archives, 
M219, 11/6. Foreign Minister Cortes showed Lamar a copy of 
the letter from Irisarri. 
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Great Britain would hold the same views, in light of the 
Clayton-Bulwer accord. The Minister then discussed the 
various provisions of the treaty. Articles 1-13 were gen­
eral articles, the same as in all treaties of commerce and 
friend ship. Article 14 defined the rights of the transit 
companies, i. e. , for transit only, with Nicaragua retaining 
total sovereignty. Terminal ports were designated as free 
ports for transit goods, not to include troops and arms, 
in Article 15. By Article 16, the United States would 
guarantee all people and possessions passing through the 
transit route. It would be expected that Nicaraguan troops 
would enforce this, but in the event they could not, American 
troops would do so, ·after first advising the Nicaraguan government 
and then retiring when they were no longer needed. Article 
19 prohibited the transit company from raising transit 
prices by more than fifteen percent for ten years after the 
es.tablishment of the route. . Writing to the Minister of 
Finance, Gregorio Juarez, about the provisions for a free port, 
Lamar referred to the treaty of 179 5, negotiated by Thomas 
Pinckney, which provided that Americans could deposit their 
goods at the port of New Orleans, and export them with no other 
duty but the cost of renting a warehouse . He assumed that 
similar arrangements would apply in San Juan del Norte. 54 
In addition to the endemic frustrations that American 
54 Ibid. 
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diplomats suffered in Nicaragua, Lamar's burden was augmented 
by the continuing attempts of William Walker to reintroduce 
a band of filibusters into the country. Walker's arrival in 
San Juan del Norte in late November, 1857, had strengthened 
President Martfnez' fears of a new general war, and had 
caused his government to take extraordinary measures against 
the foreign residents within the country. The order issued 
by the Commanding General of the Rivas Department that all 
alien males and females must report for an interrogation 
particularly offended Lamar's southern sense of chivalry : 
I wish to know whether this unmanly insult and outrage 
is not a proper ground for reclamation. It is due to · 
the sex that such indignity and gross affront should 
not go unpunished. The idea that a rude uncultivated 
despot--and he a young man swaggering about with his 
arms--should drag our women to his cuartel for mili­
tary examination ! How uncivilized � And yet, how 
consistent with the character of this people. 55 
After Walker was intercepted and returned to Mobile by 
the United States Navy, he immediately began fashioning a 
third attempt. In February, 1858, the Alabama legislature 
incorporated the Mobile and Nicaragua Steamship Company, and 
the next month, the Southern Emigration Society, with branches 
throughout the South, was formed for the purpose of "coloniz­
ing" Nicaragua. 56 With only minimal effort at camouflage, 
Walker's aims quickly came to the attention of Irisarri, who 
55Lamar to Cass, March 27, 1858, ! bid. 
56scroggs, Filibusters, 369. 
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complained to the Department of State. Cass' reply reflected 
his weariness with the whole question of filibusterism and, 
with Irisarri's continual protestations: 
In respect to the apprehended invasion of Nicaragua 
through the agency of a company incorporated by the 
State of Alabama intended as is alleged in your note 
of the 16th instant "under the specious guise of 
emigrants to introduce large parties of filibusters" 
into that State, and to the measures by which it is 
proposed to defeat the suspected objects of the 
contemplated enterprise, the President instructs me 
to say that the officers of the United States have 
the most stringent orders to execute the neutrality 
law of April, 1818, and that, without specific infor­
mation which will warrant the interference of the law 
officers of the Government with suspected persons or 
movements, no other measures can, constitutionally, be 
adoptecl with the view of preventing the legitimate 
operations of the company referred. 
Cass affirmed his belief that Alabama's legislature would not 
knowingly have incorporated an unlawful enterprise. Nica­
ragua, he said had 
the unquestioned right to adopt such precaution as she 
may deem necessary for her own security or defence. 
But the President expects that in the exercise of this 
right, great care . will be taken not to interfere with 
or infringe the equally sacred rights of American 
citizens who may not have committed any violation of 
the laws of that state. 57 
Lamar thought he had finally succeeded when, on . March 
26, 1858, the Assembly approved the treaty and forwarded it 
' 
to the president for his signature. Martinez had hardly 
expected this, as his hostility to the agreement was well 
knowri, and his Legitimist party controlled not only the 
57cass to Irisarri, April 26, 1858, National Archives, 
M9 9, 10/138. 
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executive but the legislative branch of government as well. 
Nonetheless, the Domocrats managed to maneuver the treaty 
through by employing a parliamentary ruse, and the 
president was confronted with the results. 58 He therefore 
entrusted a sealed packet, purporting to be the presidenti­
ally-endorsed treaty, to Colonel Louis Schlessinger, a former 
filibusterer and now an agent for the Stebbins-White company, 
for personal delivery to Washington. So anxious was Lamar 
to see the document on its way that he accompanied Schless­
inger on the first leg of the trip from Managua to Granada, 
and he was astonished to learn subsequesntly that the treaty 
had not been signed and '.sent at all, but had in fact been 
returned to the Nicaraguan Assembly. Lamar was at a loss to 
explain , hut ventured the opinion that "th� object of 
practicing this deception upon me was to prevent me from 
making known to my Government the fact that the President 
had written to Mr. Irisarri instructing him to propose some 
amendments [sic] to the treaty. "59 Cass directed Lamar to 
lodge a protest with President Martfnez about the incident, 60 
but Lamar had some even stronger advice for his own govern­
ment: 
My own impression is that our Government will have to 
change entirely its policy toward this people. They 
are a low, ignorant and degraded race ; false in word, 
treacherous in action, and vindictive in all their 
58Lamar to Cass, June 2 4, 1858, i bid. , M2 19, 11/11. 
59Lamar to Cass, April 28, 1858, ibid. , M2 19, 11/8 . 
60cass to Lamar, June 3, 1858, ibid. , M77, 27 /312. 
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feelings • • • •  It is useless for our Government to 
establish any relations with them, founded, on their 
part, upon good faith and friendly feelings. One · Man­
of-War at San Juan del Sur would be worth more in 
bringing t·hem to reason and justice, than any appeal 
which may be made to their hearts, or to their under­
standing. 61 
Perhaps the frustrations attendant upon his task were 
beginning to affect Lamar's judgment, or perhaps he was sim­
ply not the proper person for the job after all. He could 
not seem to grasp the feelings of insecurity of the Nicara­
guans after nearly a decade of foreign intervention. He 
could not fathom their frustrations in realizing the potential 
of the country and yet seemingly unable to control their own 
destiny. But for Lamar the worst was yet to come : the 
French adventurer F;lix Belly had arrived on the scene in 
March, and Belly not only persuaded the presidents of Nicara­
gua and Costa Rica to grant an exclusive canal and transit 
franchise to a company which the Frenchman would form, but 
also to issue on May 1 a manifesto describing the American 
threat in such violent terms that it was scarcely creditable 
It said that a new invasion of filibusters was being pre­
pared under the patronage of the American government as the 
means of defitively taking possession of Central America if 
she refused to surrender herself to the United States. The 
declaration further maintained that "all the official agents 
of the United States in Nicaragua have made themselves 
accomplices and auxiliaries of the invaders. " But it i;:-eserved 
61Lamar to Cass, April 2 8, 1858, ibid. , M2 19, 11/8. 
its major virulence for Lamar : "The Minister at present 
accredited in Nicaragua boasts in public of imperiously 
7 ()  
laying down this ultimatum, either the taking legal pos ses sion 
of Nicaragua, by the ratification of the Cass-Irisarri Treaty, 
or by a new invasion of filibusterers organized at Mobile 
under the American banner. " According to the manifesto, the 
Washington government had itself declared that it was abso­
lutely powerless  to prevent new filibusters and to protect 
the neutrality of Central America. Finally the document 
emphasized the inability- of the Ce�tral Americans to defend 
themselves against a new onslaught: 
Three years of war and devastation have swept from the 
two republics any means of resisting a new attack of 
several thousand bandits; the cities of Nicaragua are 
destroyed in whole or in part, their commerce is annihi­
lated, their population is decimated, and, after an 
obstinate resistance, which gives evidence of their 
patriotism, they may succumb to superior numbers if 
Europe will not deign at last to defend them against 
unprecedented attempts in the 19th century. 
This last poignant observation was followed by the declaration 
that the supreme chiefs were placing "the independence and the 
nationality of the republics of Nicaragua and Costa Rica under 
the guaranty of the three powers which have caused to be res­
pected the independence and the nationality of the Ottoman 
Empire--France, England, and Sardinia. 11 6 2  
On questioning by Lamar, the Nicaraguan government con-
ceded that Martinez' signature was authentic, but deemed the 
document invalid because Martinez. was in Rivas, and the 
62Lamar to Cass, July 26, 1858, mid. , M219, 11/18. 
71 
constitution provided that when the president was out of the 
capital, he �o longer exercised executive power. Under the 
circumstances, the acting president was Senator Augustin 
Avilez, who had not signed the manifesto. 63 Cass was under­
standably furious over the incident, and indicated as much 
in his instructions to Lamar : 
This absured declaration that the United States were 
urging the annexation of this whole Isthmian region, is 
made with as much gravity as if the authors of it had 
the actual proof of the fact before them. The asser­
tion is unworthy of refutation • • • •  
Cass then proceeded to refute it, pointing out that Nicara­
gua "owes its political existence" to the implementation by 
the United States of its neutrality laws. Otherwise, there 
would descend on Nicaragua "bands of enterprizing men who 
would soon attain the control of its affairs and change the 
whole cause of its policy--probably of its destiny �6 4  The 
Secretary pointed out that normally when dealing with a major 
power in a situation such as this, the United States would 
simply suspend relations. Under the circumstances, she would 
show forebearance; nevertheless, Lamar was directed to 
give these governments distinctly to understand, that 
a suitable reparation will be insisted on, or the 
United States will no longer be restrained by the con­
siderations I have adverted to, from seeking by more 
63Lamar to Cass, August 26, 1 858, ibid. , M2 19, 11/23. 
6 4cass to Lamar, July 25, 1 858, '::ibid. , M77, 27/32 1 .  
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efficacious means, proper redress for these unworthy 
imputations. 6 5  
The treaty fiasco, the Belly contract, and the manifesto 
were beginning to take their toll on the Secretary of State 
as well as the American Minister. For a while their exchanges 
of ideas seemed to resurrect the ghost of the Palmerston­
Chatfield cabal of earlier in the decade. Lamar wrote, "My 
advice would be for our government to take measures of its 
own for opening the route ; and to plant the necessary force 
in the country to protect it without any reference to this 
governm�nt:6 6  He referred to the "strategic position and 
virtual impregnability" of Castillo Viejo, the fort commanding 
the San Juan River at one of the cataracts, and recommended 
that American forces occupy it forthwith. 6 7 Cass responded 
by directing Lamar to make both Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
"distinctly understand that the American people, and govern­
ment have yielded enough to the weakness of those republics, 
and without doing them injustice they will now take care and 
do justice to themselves. " The Secretary said that naval 
contingents would be stationed at San Juan del Norte, San Juan 
del Sur, and Realejo for the protection of American citizens 
and their property, and that the commanders would consult with 
6 5cass to Lamar, ibid. 
6 6Larnar to Cass, June 24, 1858, i bid. , M2 19, 11/11 .  
6 7Lamar to Cass, July 4, 1858, ibid. , M2 19, 11/16. 
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Lamar. 68 
By October the naval forces had arrived, and Lamar felt 
that things were taking a turn for the better. The Home 
Squadron flagship Roanoke, as well as the cruisers Savannah 
and Saratoga, were lying in San Juan del Norte. The Minister 
addressed a note to the Flag Officer assuring him "that your 
presence in the vicinity with the force under your command 
would materially facilitate . accomplishing an amicable 
and satisfactory solution of the present difficulties with 
these Republics. "69 The Merrimac was in the. harbor of 
Realejo, and Lamar took advantage of its presence to converse 
aboard with Costa Rican President Juan Rafael Mora, who was 
on his way to a Central American chief executives' meeting 
in Guatemala City. Mora assured Lamar that he would take 
the opportunity to promote good will _toward the United States. 
Lamar responded by reading to the president a portion of the 
State Department position (previously supplied by Cass) with 
respect to the Monroe Doctrine: 
The feeling of the United States toward these countries 
had undergone no change. No spirit of annexation, of 
absorption or of aggression had been engrafted upon the 
Monroe Doctrine. It still pretends to nothing further 
that that the destinies of these countries shall be 
68cass to Lamar, July 25, 18 58,  ibid. , M77, 27/32 1. 
69Lamar to Cass, October 2 8, 1858, ibid. , M219, 11/2 9. 
left in their own hands. It is simply a doctrine of 
non-intervention by the Monarchical Powers of Europe 
in the political affairs of this hemisphere--a doc­
trine which the peace and safety of the United States 
requires to be maintained at all hazard.70  
Reiteration was not enforcement, however, and Lamar 
74 
found himself trying to sort out the meaning of the mission· 
of Sir William Gore Ouseley, who was active in Nicaragua and 
supported by the British fleet. 7 1  Ostensibly, Ouseley had 
come to negotiate a bilateral commercial treaty and to arrange 
for the resolution of the Mosquito question. Notwithstanding 
these instructions, he at first insisted on a general treaty 
which gave Great Britain the right to land troops anywhere 
at the consent of the Nicaraguan government , or at San Juan 
del Norte to intercept filibusters without prior government 
consent. The British agent then gave Nicaragua an ultimatum 
regarding the Mosquito Territory which virtually amounted to 
acceptance of the Mosquito as an autonomous state, albeit 
not under British protection. 72 Fortunately for the Nicara­
guans, the British government disavO'wed the treaty and re­
turned it to Ousely for renegotiation, instructing him to 
relinquish the Mosquito protectorate and annul the military 
70Lamar to Cass, December 2 2, 1858, ibid. , M219, 11/33. 
71Lamar to Cass, December 2 6, 1858, ibid. , M2 19/ 11/34. 
72Lamar to Cass, January 2 9, 1859, ibid. , M2 19, 11/39, 
and April 28, 1859, M2 19, 11/43. BritisFi°a:nd Foreign State 
Papers, XLVIII, 6 67. 
and naval commitments he had made. 7 3  
While these diplomatic negotiations were going on, 
British capital was active. British financiers, notably 
7 5  
Thomas Manning, a former consul and still a resident of Leon, 
were angling for a franchise contract to build a transit 
route. One proposal was to use the route up the San Juan 
River to the Serapiqui, up the Serapiqui to a point to be 
fixed, and then to build an $800, 000 macadam road to San 
Jose, Costa Rica. From there, an existing road to Punta 
Arenas, Costa Ricq's only port on the Pacific, would be 
utilized. The new American Minister, Alexander Dimitry, who 
had arrived in September, 1859, watched these developments 
closely. He seemed reassured when the acting president, 
Senator Avilez, observed in a conversation thet "they had 
had American contracts, French contracts, English proposals, 
but he was satisfied now that Americans, from every consid­
eration of neighborhood, of community of interests, commer­
cial and political, [will ] ultimately [ be] called to open and 
carry on the interoceanic service. 11 7 4  Therefore, Dimitry was 
startled when he learned that a Nicaraguan commission appoint­
ed to st�dy the British proposal had in fact signed a con­
tract. The American Minister �eported to the State Depart-
73cass to Irisarri, May 4, 1859, National Archives, M99, 
10/158. British and Foreign State Papers, XLVIII, 67 6. 
7�Dimitry to Cass, December 7, 1859, National Archives, 
M21 9, 12/28. 
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ment that Avilez had given a very lame explanation. The 
commission was supposed to draft a contract, not sign one. 
"Through a mistake, " Dimitry said, the commission made a 
contract 
under a ninety years' lease of the route, with a supposed 
English company, supposed to be represented by a supposed 
agent in the Republic of Nicaragua ! The absurdity of 
the thing would be inexpressibly ridiculous, did it not 
borrow a certain degree of dignity from the help of 
ingenious dishonesty. 75 
The affair turned out to be a tempest in a teapot, as the con­
tract was rejected by the Nicaraguan Assembly. 76 
The final British diplomatic efforts of the period· were 
engineered by Charles L. Wyke, who had replaced the discre­
dited Ouseley in October, 1859. 77 Wyke negotiated a treaty 
with Foreign Minister Pedro Zeledon in January, 186 0, with . 
ratifications exchanged in August, by which the British 
government agreed to recognize the sovereignty of Nicaragua 
over the Mosquito Indians and their territory. In both 
Honduras and Nicaragua, the British protectorate was to be 
abolished at the end of three months after exchange ratific­
ations, and each of the two Central American governments 
pledged itself to pay to the Mosquito Indians the sum of 
$2, 50 0 semiannually for ten years. Nicaragua agreed to set 
75nimitry to Cass, February 28, 18 6 0, ibid. --
76 . .  t D1m1 ry to Cass, April 31, 186 0, ibid. 
77nimitry to Cass, October 31, 1859, ibid. 
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aside a definitive area, known as the Mosquito Reserve, with­
in which the Indians were guaranteed the right of local self­
government with the privilege of becoming Nicaraguan citizens. 
Greytown was to be a free port under Nicaraguan sovereignty. 78 
The real threat to American commercial dominion over the 
transit route was not British capital but French, or so it 
appeared at the time. Felix Belly reappeared on the scene 
late in 1858 and immediately began wheedling for another 
exclusive franchise. To make way for Belly, the Nicaraguan 
senate and Chamber issuai a decree in February, 1859, stating: 
"The transit route is free for all nations; therefore, there 
is not recognized or permitted a monopoly over it in favor of 
any individual or company. " The decree was aimed at American 
financiers; so for good measure, the Assembly issued an 
addendum cancelling the Stebbins-White contract {negotiated 
by Irisarri in New York) and confiscating the American com­
pany's property in Nicaragua. The publication of the no­
monopoly decree was deliberately delayed until a contract with 
Belly could be agreed upon. This latter contract, signed on 
April 12, 1859, for the Virgin Bay-San Juan del Sur portion, 
and on June 15, for the remainder , provided an exclusive 
78oimi try
. 
to Cass, December 7, 18 59, ibid. British ·and 
Foreign State Papers, L, 96. 
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transit franchise until a canal could be constructed. 79 
Cass was infuriated and conveyed this sense of outrage 
to the Nicaraguan Minister in Washington. He pointed out 
that "when fair contracts are fairly entered into with Ameri­
can citizens, they should not be wantonly violated. " 
This government has neither the authority, nor the dis­
position to determine the conflicting interests of these 
claimants. But what it has the right to do, and what it 
is disposed to do, is to require that the government of 
Nicaragua should act in good faith towards them, ·and 
should not arbitrarily and wrongfully divest them of 
rights justly acquired and solemnly guaranteed • • • •  
[When a contract is annulled] by a process which pre­
cludes any investigation, the plainest principles of 
justice are violated. BO 
In this instance, Dimitry seemed almost amused by the 
whole affair. He noted that President Martinez had taken a 
month's leave and left town the very day and the very hour 
that Dimitry arrived. The American Minister suspected that 
Martfnez did not want to talk about transit matters until the 
Belly contract was firm ; that is, until the European financing 
had been arranged. In a despatch to Cass, Dimitry face­
tiously noted: 
M219, 
[The president] repaired to Masaya • • • to attend the 
baptismal rites of the child of one of his intimate 
friends. For - this important object, which amply justi­
fies his recession from public duties and, it may be, 
for the equally important purpose of participation in 
the irrq;>endin} festivities, here and elsewhere of the 
Immaculate Conception and of the Christmas holidays, 
he .has given to himself a month ' s  leave. Bl 
79Dimitry to Cass, October 
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Perhaps the reason for Dimitry's equanimity was that he 
was becoming convinced that the transit was not going to be 
reopened under the auspices of anyone. One reason was 
physical: the bridges on the transit route were out, and the 
port at San Juan del Norte was rapidly silting up, with no 
one, apparently, disposed to maintain it. 82 The second rea­
son, and probably the more significant one, was that the 
government did not want the route reopened. Dimitry recei­
ved second-hand information that Avilez had declared: 
It is not to the interest of Nicaragua that [the tran­
sit] should go into operation--there is not a patriotic 
Nicaraguan who desires to see it re-opened ; because all 
are convinced that its active operations must infalli­
bly result in the sweeping of the country, by hordes of 
filibusters, on their way to the American possessions 
on the northwest coast of the Pacific. 83 
Dimitry's assessment was accurate. Belly was unable to o.eliver 
on his promises: the perfidy of business agents and financial 
angels alike, and the overthrow of President Mora, his major 
mentor in Central America, in August, 1859, spelled doom for 
his enterprise. 84 
Aside from the transit issue, there remained the prob­
lem of the disposition of the Cass-Irisarri Treaty, nego­
tiated on November 16, 1857. Although the Legitimist 
82oimitry to Cass, September 19, 1859, ibid. 
83Dimitry to Cass, December 7, 1859, ibid. 
84cyril Allen, France in Central America, F�lix Belly and 
the Nicaraguan Canal (New York: Pageant Press, Inc. , 1966}, 
117- 2 5 . 
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, 
President Martinez seemed determined to avoid its ratifi-
, cation, the Democratic faction, led by Maximo Jerez, was 
more disposed to cooperate with the Department of State. 
Jerez was so annoyed with the recalcitrance of the chief 
executive that he remained in Ledn, refusing to participate 
in the government even though it was ostensibly a bipartisan 
administration. Jerez even published a newspaper in the 
Democratic stronghold chiding the Assembly for its delay . 
The Democratic leader himself was under pressure by members 
�f his party to take the treaty to Washington, equipped with 
plenipotentiary powers, and substitute his own ratification 
for that of the Assembly. An American correspondent noted 
that Jerez was not "systematically opposed to the Americans, " 
and was n�t "so brutally ignorant as the pretended Solomon 
of the Granadian aristocracy. 11 85 
Jerez did take the treaty to Washington, but it was 
encumbered with a number of Nicaraguan amendments. His sub­
stitution for Irisarri as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary was officially recognized on October 5, 
1858. 86 Cass explained to Lamar that J,rez was received 
only after the Nicaraguan had given a clear explanation and 
85J. Debrin (Private Secretary to Lamar) to Cass, June 
28, 1858, National Archives, M219, 11. 
86cass to Jerez, October 5, 1858, ibid. , M99, 10/150. 
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disavowal of "the offensive language and imputations against 
the United States" contained in the notorious Manifesto. 
Jerez was empowered to conclude the treaty if the changes 
made by the Nicaraguan Assembly on June 28 were accepted. 
Cass indicated that the American government could no longer 
discuss the content of the treaty , but would accept one of 
the article modifications. With this limited concession 
Cass assumed that J�rez' mission was over , but gave the 
Nicaraguan time to submit the views expressed to his own 
government. 87 Jerez took the document back to Managua , but 
the Nicaraguan regime set it aside for consideration of the 
Ouseley treaty. 88 
With the Ouseley treaty confronting him , and time 
running out on his appointment , Lamar seemed to panic. On 
his own initiative , the American diplomat negotiated a new 
treaty with Foreign Minister Zeled6n which incorporated the 
Nicaraguan changes to the Cass-Irisarri treaty that Cass had 
already rejected. Lamar explained that these provisions 
were in the British treaty , and he thought they might now 
be accepted by the United States since there was no other 
basis on which a pact could be concluded. 89 The Lamar-Zeledon 
accord of March 16 , 1859 , was the last major official act of 
87cass to Lamar , November 
88cass to Lamar , March 4 ,  
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the frustrated American Minister. As his departure date 
neared, he began having second thoughts about some of 
his vituperative observations with respect to Nicaraguan 
officialdom. Trying to erase the record, he directed this 
last poignant request to Cass: 
I have also occasionally commented with some harshness 
upon the character and conduct of individuals. It is 
my desire, in case it should become necessary to pub­
lish any of my Despatches, that the portions alluded 
to may be omitted--especially as subsequent official 
and social intercourse with some of the gentlemen 
spoken of has materially changed my opinion with regard 
to them. 90 
' . ' 
Jerez dutifully transported the Lamar-Zeledon Treaty to 
Washington, and there he found the Secretary of State sur­
prisingly amenable. First, however, Cass pointed out that 
the President still considered the stipulations of the Cass­
Irisarri treaty "just and mutually beneficial. " He thought 
"that treaty should have been ratified by Nicaragua, without 
hesitation, and also, that the course of the government of 
that republic in the delays that took place, and in the other 
objectionable circumstances attending its actions, gave just 
cause of offence to the United States . "  The President's 
conviction " was still further strengthened by the rej ection 
of that treaty and by the substitution of another without the 
kn9wledge" of the United States government . Nevertheless, 
in order to expedite normalization of relations between the 
90Lamar to Cass, August 11, 1859, ibid. 
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two countries and to show the good faith of the United 
States, the President would submit the Lamar- Zeleddn treaty 
to the Senate if one objectionable passage were removed. 
Article 16 stated: "The United States agree to use all legal 
means and reasonable vigilance to prevent the formation, 
within their territories, of hostile expeditions destined 
for those of the Republic of Nicaragua. " Cass indignantly 
declared that 
the government of the United States . will consent to the 
insertion of no such provision in any treaty into which 
they _ may enter. They consider the proposition itself 
offensive. They choose to j udge what laws they will 
pass and how these shall be administered without the 
intervention of any foreign Power. The retention of 
this clause in the treaty will ensure its rejection by 
the United States. Its omission • . • will be 
91 followed by the favorable action of the President. 
With this admonition, Jerez hastily sought permission of 
his government to drop the offending article. The Nicaraguan 
Assembly made the concession on July 25, 1859, and Luis Molina, 
who had now assumed the duties of charge ' d'affaires for the 
Nicaraguan mission, so advised Secretary Cass. 92 Honoring 
his cornrni tinent, Cass then submitted the· Lamar-Zeledon treaty 
93  to the Senate. Unfortunately, the Senate was not as amen-
able as the Department of State. The Department found it 
necessary in June, 1860, to forward to the Nicaraguan govern­
ment two Senate resolutions with respect to the treaty, plus 
91cass to Jerez, May 26, 1859, ibid. , M99, 10/156. 
92Molina to Cass, August 30, 1859, ibid. 
93cass to Molina, September 27, 1859, ibid. 
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amendments to certain other articles. 9 4 The treaty was 
returned from Nicaragua the following June with additional 
amendments: 9 5  however, by this time Confederate guns had 
fired on Fort Sumter, eleven states had seceded from the · 
Union, and the nation no longer held in high priority a 
treaty with the Isthmian country. The era ended with no 
satisfactory diplomatic accord having been achieved. The 
decade did see the settlement of the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican 
border dispute, however, with the State Department playing 
a major role in arbitration efforts but none in. the eventual-­
albeit temporary--resolution of the problem. Figure 4 shCMS 
the area that was in dispute. 
9 4williarn Henry Trescott to Molina, June 2 9, 18 60, · ibid. 
9Swilliam H. Seward to Molina, June 4, 1 8 61, ibid. 
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Figure 4 . Area Disputed between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. 
CHAPTER III 
THE COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA BOUNDARY DISPUTE 
The government of the United States would see with great 
pain the prevalence of hostilities in the states of 
Central America either between themselves or between 
any of them and a foreign power. Recent events, the 
increase of commerce on both shores bounding this coun­
try, the plans for various lines of communication 
across it by railroads and canals from sea to sea have 
given to the whole region a new importance. All must 
desire that the Republics of· Central America should now 
come into the enj oyment of peace and the pursuits of 
industry so that they might commence that career of 
prosperity and progress to which their climate, soil 
and position seem to invite. I 
Thus Secretary of State Daniel Webster summarized the 
ambivalent attitude of American officialdom toward Nicaragua 
during this period. Couching his language in the rhetoric 
of diplomatic communication, Webster advised the Nicaraguan 
representative that hostilities in Central America, particu­
larly around the transit route, would seriously inconvenience 
American business enterprise. Fostering the efforts of pri­
vate American capital on the Isthmus was probably the first-­
and most practical--policy of  the Department of State. Other 
motives for interference in Nicaraguan domestic affairs, such 
as colonization and filibusterism, were entertained by 
Americans as groups or individuals, and tended to cloud the 
1Daniel Webster to Ignatius G6mez, February 7, 1851, 
National �rchives, M99 ,  10/6. In the same message, Webster 
advised Gomez that his accreditation would be delayed . until he 
received fresh instructions since his commission was rela­
tively old. 
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issues for the State Department. In addition, it was not 
clear what were the aims of British policy, or what degree 
of posture of defiance or belligerence the United States 
should adopt vis-a-vis this policy. Nonetheless, there was 
a high degree of altruism in the efforts of the State Depart­
ment to help settle the long-standing dispute between 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica over their mutual frontier. 
The ques�ion of borders among the various Latin American 
states was probably the most difficult and enigmatic that had 
faced the republics in the national period. The problem was 
largely inherited from colonial times, when Spain--considering 
that the territories in the new world would be under Spanish 
sovereignty in perpetuity--established a conglomeration of 
overlapping jurisdictions. Lines were drawn according to 
juridical, administrative, and canonical dictates , and were 
juggled regularly , often superimposed rather than readjusted. 
The system gave rise to friction between - among others ­
these two Central American states . 
The major areas in question were the San Juan River and 
the province of Nicoya (called Guanacaste by Nicaragua) , which 
lies on the Pacific side directly south of Lake Nicaragua. 
The influx of American travelers crossing the Isthmus after 
the discovery of gold in California provoked an inflammation 
of the issue . In its initial contracts with American transit 
entrepreneurs, Nicaragua seized the initiative , but by 1852 
the Costa Ricans were clamoring for their "legitimate" rights 
8 8  
and some participation in the proposed commercial ventures. 
In addition, economic reverses had caused Costa Ric1, to need 
desperately the San Juan port if its coffee was to �ompete in 
the European market, freight costs via Cape Horn having become 
prohibitive. The disagreement spanned the national period to 
that time, and both sides marshalled historical evidence to 
support their claims. 
As an example, a Costa Rican apologist demostrated the 
antiquity of that country's claim to Nicoya ( Guanacaste) by 
quoting an eighteenth century epgineer: 
On the 19th of January, 1744, I reached the mountain of 
Nicaragua, a very rough one, which marks the end of the 
province of that name • . • and I entered the juris­
diction of Nicoya, which although an "alcaldia mayor," 
separate from the Government of Costa Rica, is reputed 
to belong to this province. 2 
This vague colonial properietorship led directly to the issue 
of ownership in the national period. The same disputant clairrs 
that after the constitution of the Federal Republic of  
Central America was promulgated in 1824, Nicoya "by an act of 
its free and spontaneous will, asked for its annexation to 
Costa Rica. "3 Nevertheless, it appears that Costa Rica may 
have drawn its state lines in 1825 without including either 
2 ' ' h . Pedro Perez Zeledon , Argument on t e Question of  the 
Validity of the Treaty of Limits between Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, Translated by J. I. Rodr�guez (Washington: Gibson 
Brothers, 1887) , 26. 
3rbid. , 27. 
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the San Juan River � Nicoya. 4 Its first constitution, that 
of 1825, provided that: 
The territory of the State extends, for the present, 
from west to east, from the river Salta which divides it 
from the State of Nicaragua, to the river Chiriqui', 
bounding the Republic of Colombia ; and from north to 
south from one sea to the other; its limits on the North 
Sea being from the mouth of the river San Juan to the 
Escudo de Veragua; and on the Pacific from the mouth of 
the river Alvarado to that of Chiriquf. 5 
The reference to the Alvarado River is unclear, but the 
designation of the Salta River as the boundary between Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua clearly concedes Guanacaste to the latter, 
at least "for the present. " After the breakup of the Federal 
Republic in 1838, "the Province of Nicoya or Guanacaste felt 
once more the necessity of again emphatically expressing its 
desire to remain united to Costa Rica and, by new acts, it 
renewed its annexation. "6 What may be regarded as Nicoya's 
second secession from Nicaragua was formalized in the lan­
guage of Costa Rica's second constitution, promulgated in 
January, 1847. This document designated the frontier as the 
San Juan River, Lake Nicaragua, and the Rio de la Flor. 7 
4oavid I. Folkman, Jr. , The Nicaragua Route ( Salt Lake 
City: University of Utah Press, 1972), frontispiece map drawn 
by Ephraim George Squier, United States Charge d'Affaires to 
Guatemala·, in 1851. 
5Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts 
in Central and North America and the Caribbean (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1941), 3. 
6zeledon, Treaty of Limits, 28. 
7rreland, Boundaries,  3, 4. 
9 0  
The selection of the La Flor River boundary unquestionably 
incorporated the entire province of Guanacaste and, if any­
thing, encroached upon territory indisputably Nicaraguan; how­
ever, the language appeared to anticipate a Nicaraguan chal­
lenge, and provided that the issue might be settled by arbi­
tration. 8 During the period of the Federal Republic, 
Nicaragua had made gestures toward incorporating the prov-
ince, but failed to press its claim when Costa Rica threat­
ened hostilities. 9 Actually, it appears that Nicaragua, 
aside _from being distracted by domestic quarrels, was acting 
in a somewhat pragmatic fashion. Nicoya was not at the 
moment as important as the San Juan River, particularly after 
the establishment of the transit route in 1849. From this 
point on, it seems that Nicaragua acted with a cavalier dis­
regard for the presumed rights of Costa Rica in that area. 
The issue again goes back to the colonial era. Most of 
the references in colonial documents refer to the" desaguadero" 
(outlet) as the dividing line between the two jurisdictions. 
8Article 25 stated that " the frontier boundary line 
between this State and that of Nicaragua shall be definitively 
fixed when Costa Rica shall be heard in the national represen­
tation, or failing this, the matter shall be submitted to the 
impartial decision of one or more States of the Republic. " 
9rn 183 8, the Costa Rican representative to Nicaragua 
said his country would defend her frontiers of the San Juan 
River, the Lake, and the La Flor River. Zeledon, Treaty of 
Limits, 46. The first three constitutions of Nicaragua {1826, 
1838, 1850) do not establish definitive boundaries, but merely 
refer to the boundary with Costa Rica as being Nicaragua's 
southern limits. Ireland, Boundaries, 8, 9.  
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To what did the "desaguadero" refer? Costa Rica claimed that 
it meant the outlet to the sea for Lake Nicaragua via the San 
Juan River. (This posed another question: as the San Juan 
River has three mouths--the San Juan, the Taura, and the 
Colorado Rivers--to which did it refer?) The Nicaraguans 
claimed that the "desguadero" meant the valley--or port-- of 
Matina, some sixty miles to the south. lo 
The issue was brought to Washington with the nomination 
of Jose de Marcoleta as Nicaraguan Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary in February, 185�. 11 Although the 
State Department was already embroiled in the question of a 
United States-Nicaraguan treaty which would serve to protect 
the rights of the transit entrepreneurs, Webster was called 
upon to mediate between Marcoleta and Felipe Molina, 
Marcoleta's Costa Rican counterpart. 12 
lO zeledon, Treaty of Limits, 28-43 passim. 
11webster to Marcoleta, February 2 1, 1851, National 
Archives, M99, 10/8. 
12There was initial hesitancy over even recognizing 
Molina. To try to keep things untangled among the ubiquitous 
Central American representatives, who had a penchant for 
representing different republics in various categories, the 
State Department appeared to delay in the reception of 
Molina, the representative of both Costa Rica and El Salvador. 
The required interview with the President for Molina to pre­
sent his credentials was postponed the first time due to 
"unforeseen causes," and on the second scheduled occasion 
because the President had to accompany some army officers to 
Mount Vernon. (Webster to Molina, March 20 and 2 1, 185\, 
ibid. ) The problem was further confused when Ignacio Gomez 
claimed a commission from El Salvador , 
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Even though the State Department initially acceded to a 
request by Molina to lend its good offices in a different but 
allied dispute, 1 3  it hesitated about assuming the responsi­
bility for ensuring that an equitable treaty between Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica should be drafted on Marcoleta's request1 4-­
reluctance due, according to the Department, to the fact that 
' 
the United States charge d'affaires had not been, even after 
three months, recognized by Nicaragua, and to the rumor that a 
treaty was being drafted among Nicaragua, Salvador, and 
Honduras, which might nullify any efforts toward a bilateral 
accord. As in the case of many previous plans to reestablish 
all or part of the Central American federation or confeder­
ation, the latter treaty proved to be a will-of-the-wisp. 
By early the next year, however, the State Department 
realized that the claims of Costa Rica would have to be taken 
into consideration before the contract between Nicaragua and 
the transit company could be considered secure, and before a 
definitive treaty between the United States and Nicaragua 
could be formalized. 15 In April Webster conceded to Molina 
13w. s .  Derrick (Acting Secretary) to Molina, August 14 , 
1851, ibid. , 10/14. Derrick promised to instruct the newly­
appointed Chargi to Central America, J. Bozman Kerr, to use his 
good offices--within the bounds of propriety--between Guatemala 
and other Central American states. 
14webster to Marcoleta, November 11, 1851, ibid. , 10/15 
15webster to Molina, November 2 5, 1851, ibid. , 10/17. 
Webster acknowledged receipt of a copy of Molina's letter to 
Joseph L. White, agent of the Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal 
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that the President would hesitate to sign a treaty with 
Nicaragua without the cooperation and consent of Costa Rica , 
in view of the latter's claims. But he also pointed out that 
Nicaragua had already granted the transit company land on 
either side of the San Juan River , so if Nicaragua sho�ld--by 
treaty with Costa Rica--cede the south bank , Nicaragua should 
simply stipulate the rights of the company , thereby expediting 
the matter. 16 
In view of the positions of the two nations and the 
personalities of _ the emissaries , the State Department's deci­
sion to accept the role of honest broker put it into an almost 
untenable position. The first response from Marcoleta was not 
encouraging : 
Costa Rica should sacrifice either the district of 
Nicoya , or the right bank of the San Juan River , and the 
river itself , which since the foundation of the colony 
[Nicaragua] had been , and is , one of its principal exits 
to the Atlantic , and which will afford to it a proper 
communication with both seas when the work of the Inter­
oceanic Canal shall be accomplished. 17 
But it was Molina's reply that most irritated Webster. Costa 
Rica would concede two sections of land on the south bank to 
the transit company if Nicaragua would pay Costa Rica $ 100 , 000 
from revenues from the company , along with other conditions. 
Company , protesting projected plans of the company to occupy 
lands claimed by Costa Rica. 
16webster to Molina , April 8 ,  1852 , ibid. , 10/2 0. 
17zeledo'n , Treaty of Limits , 48. 
Webster's annoyance at the presumption of Molina's propo­
sition was evident: 
9 4  
It is to be regretted that the expectations of your 
government should be so high in regard to its differ­
ences with the Nicaraguan government. I had indulged 
the hope that the proposition contained in my note of 
the 8th instant would under the circumstances, have been 
considered by you so moderate and reasonable that you 
would not, by rejecting it, lose the opportunity which 
it afforded Costa Rica to avail herself of the good 
offices of the United States and Great Britain towards 
accommodating the disputes between her and Nicaragua. 18 
Because of the Costa Rican attitude, Webster said, he and 
British Minister John F. T. Crampton would resolve the 
Mosquito question (as the British protectorate encompas sed the 
San Juan area} , and would merely communicate this settlement 
to the governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua. 19 
Aside from the request that the United States take a role 
in the mediation of the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan treaty, there 
were other distinct reasons why the agreement should be vir­
tually quadripartite. The major interest of the United States 
was to settle the question of conflicting claims along the 
existing transit route (and the proposed canal route) in order 
to guard against confusion for American companies which might 
secure the transit conces sion by contract with--preferably-­
only one of the contending states . Great Britain ' s  interest 
lay in the fact that she claimed a protectorate over the 
Mosquito Kingdom, a strip of land lying on Nicaragua's 
18webster to Molina, April 15, 1852, National Archives, 
M9 9 ,  1 0/ 2 1 . 
19rbid. 
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Caribbean coast , and had occupied the area (which included 
the Atlantic terminus of the transit route) since January 1, 
1848. Conversely, it was the hope and the continuing policy 
of the United States to try to remove British influence from 
the area, something the State Department mistakenly thought 
it had achieved with the signing of the Clayton-Bulwer 
agreement. 
After Webster and Crampton worked out a tentative solu­
tion, Webster dispatched Robert M. Walsh as corranissioner to 
Costa Rica to circumvent the Molina-Marcoleta bottleneck, and 
to persuade the Costa Rican government to accept the arbitra­
tion treaty. As background information for Walsh's mission, 
Webster explained that the Costa Rican claims to the south 
bank of the San Juan River were sound, but not those to 
Guanacaste. Costa Rica probably calculated that if its 
claims were upheld, and if the Pacific terminus of the canal 
were the Bay of Salinas in Guanacaste, it would have virtually 
exclusive control of the canal. Conversely, Webster continued, 
the Webster-Crampton arbitration actually did j ust the oppo­
site, giving Nicaragua effective control . Costa Rica would 
get Guanacaste, but that would be immaterial, since the 
engineers indicated that the most feasible Pacific terminal 
would be at Brito (north of Guanacaste), and thus wholly within 
Nicaraguan territory. On the Atlantic side, Costa Rica would 
be awarded only the right bank of the Colorado River (the 
southernmost mouth of the San Juan River), well below the 
96 
Atlantic terminus of San Juan del Norte (British Greytown). 
The negotiators felt it preferable to have the entire route 
in Nicaraguan territory to avoid possible conflicting grants 
to other companies by Costa Rica, and because of the history 
of negotiations between Nicaragua and American companies (as 
well as the money already spent by the latter) under the 
assumption that the area was indeed Nicaraguan territory. 
Webster advised Walsh that if Costa Rica did not agree-- and 
it appeared from Molina's representation in Washington that 
it might not--the United States and Great Britain would 
simply impose settlement by means other than persuasion. 20 
At the same time, Webster sent instructions to John 
Bozman Kerr, the charg; d'affaires in Nicaragua to obtain 
that government's adherence to the mediation. He first 
explained why Marcoleta and Molina had been bypassed : 
Marcoleta had not been invited to join the negotiations 
because it initially appeared that Kerr had not been received 
in the Nicaraguan capital, and when that was resolved it 
seemed Marcoleta's instructions from his government were 
inadequate. As for Molina, he was merely written off as 
uncooperative, and Webster and Crampton had proceeded to sign 
the agreement, which restored the Mosquito Territory to 
Nicaragua on the payment of a stipulated amount to the 
20webster to Robert M. Walsh (United States Special 
Commissioner to Central America) , April 29,  1852 , ibid. , M77, 
2 7/123 
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British-protected Mosquito Indians. If Nicaragua objected, 
Kerr was to point out that the payment did not concede the 
validity of the British occupation, even though that occu­
pation had never been contested. In addition, the amount 
was small and the terms reasonable. If Nicaragua should 
think that by being obstinate it could wait out the admin­
istration in Washington until a new one would allow them to 
take the area by force of arms, the proposition would be 
self-negating, as potential investors of capital simply 
wouldn't risk their money. Kerr was to ask the Nicaraguan 
president and senate to ratify the quadripartite treaty and 
empower Marcoleta to sign, and it would be submitted to the 
United States Senate at the current ses sion. Finally, Kerr 
was to point out that this was probably Nicaragua's last 
chance to settle amicably and peaceably, and as the canal 
would probably use the San Juan River bed, along with locks 
and dams, it would presumably be entirely in Nicaraguan 
territory. 21 
After the mes sage advising the United States represent­
atives of the situation and of their responsibilities were 
dispatched, Molina was informed of the contents of the 
settlement . The Department explained to him that the major 
difference from Webster's previous "recommendation" was that 
it now required that four sections rather than two be stipu-
2lwebster to John Bozman Kerr, April 29, 1852, ibid. , 
2 7/129 . 
9 8  
lated for the transit companies' use on the south, or Costa 
Rican, bank of the San Juan River. To soften the impact, 
the Department observed that the company might not want to 
use all four sections. In addition, the area now had no 
appreciable value, but that would come i f  the company 
"should apply capital and skill to the cultivation of the 
.sections allotted to them • Pesides raising the value 
of the lands reserved by Costa Rica this will give her an 
important source of direct revenue and other incidental 
adyantages. 11 2 2  In a subsequent note to Molina, the Depart­
ment acknowledged his concern about losing steam navigation 
rights on Lake Nicaragua and the San Juan River in perpetu­
ity, but felt that Costa Rica should not mind a stipulation 
that it be ceded only for the life of the contract--that is, · 
until its normal expiration or legal forfeiture. 23 
Considering all the groundwork laid by the State Depart­
ment, the response from Nicaragua was unexpected. The legis­
lature ·not only rejected the treaty but also castigated the 
United States for " interference. " On this occasion, it was 
Marcoleta who sustained the brunt of State Department anger. 
A Department spokesman explained to him that the United· 
States government had interceded with Great Britain at the 
"solicitation" of Nicaragua. The State Department had not 
2 2william Hunter (Acting Secretary) to Molina, May 5, 
1 8 5 2 , ibid. , M9 9 , 1 0/ 2 3  
23Hunter to Molina, May 19, 1852, ibid. , 10/24/ 
gotten all that Nicaragua wanted, but certainly more than 
Great Britain had heretofore conceded. The Department had 
also presented the recommendation to the Government of 
Nicaragua for "consideration" only, and the latter had a 
perfect right to reject it. Unfortunately, "the Legisla­
tive Assembly of Nicaragua saw fit 'solemnly to protest 
against all foreign interference in the affairs of their 
government. '" The response was "unfair and unexpected. " 
Had it been made by a "more powerful nation, " Washington 
would simply have declined further cornmunication. 24  
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Hard on the heels of this impasse, Marcoleta got into 
personal trouble with the Department of State. Previously, 
in spite of the fact that the treaty was being negotiated on 
a tripartite basis (due to his lack of credentials) , the 
Department had endeavored to keep him informed, allowing him 
to read the draft negotiations . The chief clerk had given 
Marcoleta the treaty to read in the anteroom of the clerk's 
office, and he seemed to have taken an inordinate amount of 
time to peruse it. On July 2 5, 185 2, a Senate resolution 
calling for a copy of the propositions to be sent by the 
President to Congress indicated that the Senator who had 
framed the resolution had actually seen the document itself. 
The executive branch did not comply, but on July 1, the draft 
24c .  M . · Conrad (Acting Secretary of State) to Marcoleta, 
October 28, 1852, ibid. , 10/28/ 
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proposals were published in the New York Courier & Esquirer 
over the byline of its Washington correspondent who, 
incidentally, was known to be an intimate of Marcoleta. In 
describing the incident to Kerr, the Secretary of State noted 
that Marcoleta's hostility to the canal and particularly to 
the transit company were " known to any reasonably informed 
man in Washington. " Continued the Secretary, 
It was impossible for any person, living in the society 
of Washington, to remain ignorant of the boasts which he 
made of his influence with Senators, and of his menaces 
to use it. The executive might have been destitute of 
every feeling of self respect, if it had continued to 
place confidence in a man who was daily threat�ning that 
he would baffle their measures in the Senate. 2 
This episode resulted in Wa�hington's e fforts to get 
Marcoleta recalled. 2 6 Again there was frustration on the 
Potomac when the Nicaraguan government virtually ignored the 
request, inquiring only as to the reason for it. Subsequently 
the Department's position was that Nicaragua's reluctance to 
replace Marcoleta amounted to a rupture of relations. In any 
event, Washington felt that unless the Nicaraguan government 
gave an explanation for the rej ection of  the quadripartite 
25Edward Everett ( Secretary of State) to Kerr, January 
5, 1 8 5 3 , ibid. , M7 7 ,  2 7  /1 5 2. 
26The New York Times added that because Marcoleta was 
afraid that Nicaragua's interests were being sacrificed to 
England and her " protege"  Costa Rica, he had " indulged in some 
rather undiplomatic language with respect to Mr. Webster and 
the Administration. " Also, " there is no doubt that the influ­
ence of· the Canal and Transit Company • . . has been actively 
employed against him. " Times, January 4, 1853. 
27Everett to Kerr, December 30, 1852, National Archives, 
M7 7 ,  2 7/1 4 7. 
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treaty, no further discussion could take place. 2 7  Marcoleta 
continued to reside in Washington, and with the change in 
administration was subsequently recognized as Nicaragua's 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary; 28 thus his 
previous problem with the Department of State did not perma­
nently impair chances for a settlement. 
At the same time that Marcoleta was under a cloud, 
Molina ' s  star was rising. The Department notified him that 
it was pleased that Costa Rica had accepted the Anglo­
American proposal in direct proportion to the displeasure it 
felt with Nicaragua for rejecting it. The State Department 
also indicated it would study the Costa Rican suggestions for 
modifications, but could not treat separately with that 
country yet (and hoped it would not become necessary at all) . 
In order to expedite matters, Washington would send a minister 
to Central America to reside alternately in the various 
capitals to try to arrange some sort of settlement of the 
problems existing between the several governments. 29 In the 
meantime, Secretary William L. Marcy assured Molina that the 
United States and Great Britain would not prej udice the rights 
of Costa Rica with respect to the borders claimed by that 
27Everett to Kerr, December 30, 1852,  National Archives, 
M7 7, 2 7/147. 
28william L. Marcy (Secretary of State) to Marcoleta, 
November 16, 1853, ibid., M99, 10/47. 
29Everett to Molina, February 23, 1853, ibid. , 10/40. 
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country. 30 
Molina's apparent effort to enlist the United States in 
backing the Costa Rican position to the exclusion of 
Nicaragua was soon matched by a similar maneuver on Marcoleta's 
part. Marcy declined to cooperate with Nicaragua in making 
a tripartite treaty with Great Britain with respect to terri­
tory and jurisdiction on the grounds that (1)· the issue was 
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica and no treaty could be made 
without Costa Rican participation or at least its assent , and 
(2) as the United States denied that Great Britain �ad any 
territorial rights in Central America , such negotiations might 
be misinterpreted as tacit acknowledgment of British claims. 
Marcy did suggest that it might be acceptable to submit the 
provisions of a Costa Rican-Nicaraguan treaty to Great 
Britain for acquiescence to the provisions for the Mosquito 
Indians. 31 
This was the last effort of the United States to negotiate 
a multilateral convention in association with Great Britain to 
res olve the confusing and conflicting claims. New initiatives 
30Marcy to Molina , October 14 , 1853 , ibid. , 10/45 � Solon 
Borland had been dispat.ched on April 30 with instructions to 
"use his good offices in regard to any controversies that may 
exist among the Central American states. " He was "cautioned 
against any interference in these matters which may be objec­
tionable to any one of them. " Ibid. 
3 1Marcy to Marcoleta , February 2 1 , 1854 , ibid. , 10/53 . 
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were now the responsibility of the Central American states. 
Henceforth, both the United States and Great Britain would 
fall back on the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 
which provided for each to negotiate bilateral treaties with 
the various Central American republics to implement fully 
the intent of that treaty. 
Marcoleta and Molina finally broke the impasse the next 
year and, on January 28, 1854 , signed at Washington a pre­
liminary convention upon boundaries and interior navigation. 32 
In Article 1 it was agreed that unfortunate differences 
should be terminated as soon as possible by direct agreement 
or by arbitration of a friendly power. Article 2 provided 
that if pending negotiations failed ,  the questions should be 
submitted without reservation to the arbitral judgment of the 
French emperor or any other government agreed on at the 
exchange of ratifications. Article 4 stipulated that in the 
meantime the status quo should be strictly maintained ,  with no 
concession of land or navigation privileges on the disputed 
rivers and la�e. In Article 5 ,  Cos ta Rica conceded that 
although Nicaragua .had made contracts for the opening of an 
interoceanic canal , with privileges which Costa Rica considered 
affected her rights, she would not oppose Nicaragua's ful­
filling her obligations in case of the execution of the pro­
jected canal works. On the other hand , Nicaragua agreed to 
put no obstacle in the way of the execution of the contracts 
32rreland, Boundaries , 12 , 13. 
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which Costa Rica might have made for the navigation of the 
Serapiqui River , a southern tributary of the San Juan River 
and Costa Rica's principal outlet to the latter river and the 
port of San Juan del Norte. 
Unfortunately for the troubled San Juan frontier area , 
this Marcoleta-Molina preliminary agreement was not brought 
to fruition for four more years. The major distraction was 
the interference of American adventurers Henry L. Kinney 
and William Walker. Walker's government sent its own repre­
sentatives to Washington ., thus presenting the Department of 
State with a quandary with respect to recognition and nego­
tiation. At the same time , there was little hope of reaching 
any understanding over frontiers or any other mutal problems 
with Costa Rica since the latter country never recognized the 
legitimacy of the Walker regime. 
Costa Rica emerged from the Walker era both stronger and 
more prestigious than Nicaragua , and generally set the tone 
for boundary negotiatio�s that followed. 
I • I 
General Jose Maria 
Canas for Costa Rica and Gregorio Juarez for Nicaragua signed 
at Managua on July 6, 1857 , an agreement setting out the · 
proposed boundary between the two countries. On December 8 ,  
General Canas and Emiliano Quadra for Costa Rica and President 
I • '  
General Tomas Martinez for Nicaragua signed at Rivas , Nicaragu� 
a treaty of peace. 33 There were two major reasons for this 
new and--in the context of recent relations among Central 
3 3 Ibid. , 13 . 
105 
American states--enlightened--convention. The first was that 
both countries were now governed by moderate and progressive 
presidents. 34 Martihez for Nicaragua and Juan Rafael Mora, 
' ' ' 
brother of General Jose Joaquin Mora, for Costa Rica. The 
second was a certain sense of urgency, and a feeling of 
commonality of fate and inter-dependence. Walker had landed 
on the San Juan River with a new collection of filibusters, 
and though the invasion failed due to the intervention of 
American Commodore Hiram Paulding, feelings of Yankeephobia 
again ran_ high. 
h 
"" · '  T e  Canas-Martinez agreement provided that Costa Rica 
should return to Nicaragua El Castillo Viejo  and Tortuga 
Point, that the countries should mutually forego their claims 
against each other, and that the boundaries should be either 
,. ' 
those of the Canas-Juarez treaty of July, 1857, or the ancient 
lines of the Partido de Nicoya, as Costa Rica should prefer . 
If Nicaragua should cease to be bound by the transit conven­
tion made for her by Antonio Jos; de Irisarri in the United 
States with the canal company, Nicaragua would make no further 
contract concerning transit without first hearing the opinion 
of the other Central American governments. A boundary treaty 
was signed at San Jose, Costa Rica, on April 15, 1858, with 
34Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union, Central America, 
182 4- 19 6 0  (Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press, 
19 6 1 ) , 1 4 2 . 
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the second article3 5establishing the frontier as the San 
Juan River upstream to Castillo Viejo, then two miles south 
of the San Juan, Lake Nicaragua, and the Sapoa River, to the 
Pacific. 
It was also agreed to mark this line, with power vested 
in the conunissioners to deviate slightly from the described 
lines in case of natural landmarks. The bays of San Juan del 
Norte and Salinas were to be common to both republics, who 
consequently were bound to their defense. Until Nicaragua 
should recover full possession of the port of San Juan del 
Norte from the British protectorate of Mosquito, Castilla 
Point was to be for equal use, and without collection of port 
taxes by Costa Rica from Nicaragua ·. Nicaragua was to have 
exclusive dominion and full power over the waters of the San 
Juan, from the lake to the Atlantic, but Costa Rica was to 
35The dividing line of the two Republics, starting from 
the North Sea, shall begin at the extremity of Castilla Point, 
at the mouth of the San Juan river, in Nicaragua, and shall 
continue along the right bank of said River to a point three 
English miles from El Castillo Viej o ,  measured from the 
exterior fortifications ; thence in a curve , with center in the 
works of El Castillo and distant three English miles therefrom, 
to a point two miles from the river bank at the waters above 
El Castillo; thence towards the Sapoa river, which empties 
into Lake Nicaragua, in a course distant always two miles 
from the right bank of the San Juan river , with its turnings, 
to its origin in the Lake and along the right shore of said 
Lake to the aforesaid Sapoa river, where this line parallel to 
the said banks terminates; from the point where it meets the 
Sapoa river, which as stated should be two miles from the 
Lake, in an astronomically straight line to the center point 
of Salinas Bay in the South Sea, where the demarcation of 
territory of the two Republics terminates. Ireland, Boundaries, 
14; Coleccidn de Tratados Internacionales de Nicaragua 
(Managua, 1909), 33 5. 
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have perpetual rights of free navigation in those waters. It 
was further agreed that this territorial division was not to 
prejudice any obligations previously contracted by Nicaragua 
in political treaties or in canalization or transit contracts. 
If for any reason the canalization or transit contracts 
previously made by Nicaragua ceased to be in force, she was 
not to make any new ones without consultation with Costa 
Rican rights, the latter's opinion would be merely advisory. 
As in the Marcoleta-Molina agreement, all claims by both 
countries were to be permanently suspended. Finally, with 
El Salva�or acting as . both mediator of the treaty and special 
guarantor of this particular clause, no act of hostility was 
to be permitted in the port of San Jaun del Norte nor in the 
San Juan River or Lake Nicaragua. 36 
If at the beginning of the negotiations, Costa Rica 
claimed both Guanacaste and the right bank of the San Juan as 
bargaining chips, she achieved more than expected. Except 
for a three mile buffer zone from the shores of the San Juan 
River and Lake Nicaragua running from Castillo (about three­
quarters of . the way up the San Juan from San Juan del Norte to 
the lake) to the Sapoa River on the Pacific side, Costa Rica 
got both of the major areas she claimed. It may well have 
been that Nicaragua made these concessions because she was 
still fearful of a return of Walker or some other North 
36Ibid. 
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American filibuster, and wanted a defensive alliance to ensure 
against this eventuality. 37 A Nicaraguan government official 
later maintained that Nicaragua was still obsessed with 
gratitude for Costa Rica's earlier deliverance from the hands 
of Walker, and that she was also intimidated in the negoti a­
tions by Juan Rafael Mora's superior army. 37 
Nevertheless, the boundary agreement if not the treaty 
itself proved remarkabiy res ilient . The first challenge was 
by Nicaragua, which doubted the validity of the treaty 
considering the circumstances under which it was negotiated . 
The issue was submitted to President Chester A .  Arthur, who 
found generally in favor of Costa Rica. On February 5, 1883, 
the two governments involved signed a new accord in Granada, 
Nicaragua, resolving some of their conflicting interpreta­
tions based on the Arthur judgment. 38 Though slight 
modifications have subsequently been made and remade, the 
present Nicaraguan-Costa Rican frontier remains substanti ally 
the one fixed in the treaty of 1858. 
Throughout the decade of the eighteen-fifties, Nicaraguan 
intransigence and diplomatic eccentrism seemed to be the bane 
of the Department of State . Nonetheless, the Nicaraguans had 
difficulty formulating a consistent foreign policy due to the 
intervention in that country of the American filibusters Henry 
L. Kinney and Willi am Walker, for which the Central American 
37 zeledon, Treaty of Limits, 62, 63. 
38rreland, Boundaries, 15 ; Tratados de Nicaragua, 437 . 
country had a legitimate gri evance. Walker operated primarily 
on the Pacific side, while Kinney attempted to colonize a portion of 
the r-t:>squito Coast (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5 . toc,squi
to coast. 
CHAPTER IV 
HENRY L. KINNEY: COLONIST OR FILIBUSTER 
A country [which is] · without a rival in its natural 
capabilities and in the importance of its geographical 
position, yet for want of the improving hand of man, 
declining even in the plenitude of its resources, is 
to be created anew. The civilization, the arts, the 
stable laws and policy, the religion, the business 
enterprise and industry of the hardy Anglo-American 
race are yet to be extended over a territory ample 
enough for their most generous expansion . • . .  I 
have entered upon one of the noblest enterprises of the 
present century. 1 
The man who made this statement was one of the American 
entrepreneur-adventurers who viewed Nicaragua in the 1850's 
as the definitive answer to a search for wealth, prestige, 
and perhaps historical immortality. Henry L. Kinney was born 
in t�e Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania in 1814 to a family of 
moderate means, even though his father was a lawyer. He left 
home at the age of fourteen, settling two years later in the 
area that was to become the metropolis of Chicago, but was 
then virtually uninhabited wilderness. According to his own 
account, Kinney was--by the age of twenty-one-- perhaps the 
' richest and most influential man in Illinois. His baptism of 
fire came as a volunteer in the Black Hawk War, and he later 
helped . flush out the Seminoles in Florida. He next earned a 
reputation as a "swashbuckling merchant" in Havana, and in 
1839 moved to Corpus Christi, Texas; there he began accumu-
. 1Henry L. Kinney, · "Pronunciamento, "  New York Weekly 
Po�t �  September 6, 1855. 
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lating land that by 1855 totaled nearly one-half million acres. 
A member of the Texas legislature from 1841 to 1855, Kinney 
served in the Mexican War where he earned the rank of colonel, 
the title by which he was subsequently known. 2 During the 
years after the war, Kinney maintained a small private army 
of eighty to one hundred men whom he employed against both 
the Indians and the Mexicans, and this may have been the 
genesis of the famed
.
Texas Rangers. 3 
The fringe area of · Nicaragua coveted by Kinney, the 
Mosquito Coast, had _ already undergone a turbulent history 
quite apart from that of the Pacific Ocean side of the Repub­
lic. Geographically, it is a strip along the Caribbean coast 
of Nicaragua (and a portion of Honduras) about 40 miles wide 
and 2 25 miles long. The name is derived from its early Indian 
inhabitants, the Miskito or Mosquito Indians. While the term 
2The Royal Standard and �azette of the Turks and Caicos 
Islands, July 7, 1855. Material on Kinney's early life is 
sketchy. The information in The Royal Standard came from an 
interview with him when Kinney' s  ship Emma was shipwrecked on 
. Grand Turk Island on his first voyage to Nicaragua. Scroggs 
merely notes that Kinney was a native of Pennsylvania who 
migrated to western Texas in 1838. There he traded in live 
stock ·and speculated in real estate on an extensive scale. 
Scroggs , Filibusters , 99. 
3New York Times , December 15 , 1854. This last attribu­
tion may have been fanciful, perhaps on the part of Kinney 
himself. One historian points out that Stephen F. Austin 
formed a company of ten men at his own expense to serve as 
"rangers" against hostile Indians. John Coffee (Jack) Hayes 
was authori zed in 1836 by the Congress of the Republic of 
Texas to organize and serve as captain of a company of Texas 
Rangers , "  and these-grown to several companies--were mustered 
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"Miskito" can still be used to refer to an identifiable 
Indian population, a large percentage have long been mixed 
with Negroes from Jamaica and especially the Lesser Antilles. 
Although the Mosquito Coast was first discovered by Columbus 
in 150 2, the Spanish made only a few tentative efforts at 
colonization, and for practical purposes it did not come 
into contact with Europeans until the era of the buccaneers 
in the seventeenth century. 3 
A British claim to the area dates from the colonial 
period when, between 1741 and 17 8 6, the British actually _ 
occupied the coast with a small contingent and the Spanish 
permitted the Mosquitos " to consider themselves under the 
protection of Great Britain, " Britain never relinquished this 
shadowy authority. She continued to crown Mosquito kings in 
farcical pomp and circumstance, but more practical aid and 
control came from the supplies of money and goods given by 
the British to the somewhat unindustrious and apathetic 
Mosquitos. 4 
King Robert Charles Frederick I (the king and his chiefs 
were required to adopt " Christian names" )  was crowned April 
23, 1825. In 1839, His Majesty cancelled a debt contracted 
into federal service by General Zachary Taylor in 1846. 
Joseph Chadwick, The Texas Rangers (Derby , Connecticut: 
Monarch Books, 19 63) 5-40, passim. 
3Mari�no Fiallos-Gil, "Mosquito Coast, " Encyclooaedia 
Britannica (Chicago: William Benton, 1970) , XV ,  8 87 . 
4Peter F. Stout , Nicaragua: Past, Present and Future (Phila­
delphia: J. E. Potter, 1859) , 16 8-7 1. In a letter informing the 
heir apparent of inaugural arrangments, A British official 
114 
for "sundry liquors and other royal supplies" by making a 
grant of territory encompassing the mouths of the San Juan 
River and amounting to about 2 2, 500, 000 acres. The grantees, 
Peter and Samuel Shepherd, formerly of Georgia, subsequently 
transferred the grant to the Central American Colonization 
Company, an American association. This was the basis for what 
afterwards became known as the Kinney Expedition. 5 The grant 
made in January and confirmed in November, had the advice and 
consent of the King's chiefs and head men. The land was to be 
subject to colonization, and free from taxation and other 
"burdens usually incident to citizens and subjects. 1 16 
It could be--and was--argued that the land was not really 
theirs to alienate and that they did not have an inkling as to 
what they were doing. The most serious economic crisis they 
had heretofore faced was when the turtle shell harvest was bad, 
remarked: "I sincerely trust you will not be disappointed in 
the advantage you expect to derive by its being understood by 
your subjects, that you are in a particular manner under the 
protection of the British Government. " Sir George Arthur 
(Superintendent of Honduras) to Prince George, January 14, 1816, 
British and Foreign State Papers, 1848-1849, XXXVII, 679. 
SJames Jeffrey Roche, By-Ways of War, The Storv of the 
Filibusters (Boston: Small, Maynard & Company, 190 1) ,  84-85. 
6stout, Nicaragua, 172. The Shepherds had been intinerant 
traders in the area for a number of years. In May, 1833, ,King 
Robert had granted them a license to trade in the Chiriqui 
Lagoon region which was well to the South and in present-day 
Panama. The concession included the right "to build houses and 
land traders at any ports or places" in return for an annual 
payment of $ 100. British and Foreign State Papers, XXXVII, 
690. 
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so their naivet; probably knew no bounds. At the instigation 
of the British, Robert Charles Frederick's successor, King 
George William Clarence, revoked the grant two years later on 
the grounds that (1) the consideration was insufficient, and 
(2) the grant had been fraudulently obtained inasmuch as the 
king and his court were drunk. When it appeared that there 
was a movement in the United States to utilize the grant, and 
that Nicaragua might intervene, the British reoccupied the 
area on January 1, 1848. 7 
The British position vis-a-vis the Mosquitos was. outlined 
in a letter of May 2,  1854, from Foreign Secretary Lord 
Clarendon to Secretary of State William L. Marcy. Britain, 
Clarendon averred, had never claimed sovereignty over Mosquito, 
but her protectorate had not been extinguished by the Clayton­
Bulwer Treaty. He conceded that a British consul might "be 
called upon to give his opinion or advice to the Mosquito 
government, as is usual when weak governments are in alliance 
with strong ones. " The Foreign Secretary also observed that 
Englishmen may thus be in the councils of the king of 
Mosquitos, acting as his ministers . • • . To alter this 
state of things might, at the present moment, be impos­
sible, but her Maj esty's government would be ready and 
willing to enter into such engagements as should prevent 
Great Britain from receiving any privileges or advantages 8 from the Mosquito government, not qranted to other States. 
7stout, Nicaragua, 175. 
8Boston Daily Advertiser, January 30, 1856. 
116 
In character with Kinney's previous restles snes s, he was 
preparing to undertake a journey to Europe in order to observe 
the military operations of the Crimean War when his attention 
was diverted to Central Arnerica. 10 Along with eighteen other 
capitalists from New York and other cities,  Kinney obtained 
the Shepherd Grant and organized the Central American Coloni­
zation Company to exploit it. In order to pave the way 
diplomatically for the venture, Kinney went to Washington in 
December, 1854, and "had interviews with the President and 
other members of the Government, and • . satisfied them 
entirely that the enterprise is not a filibustering one in any 
sense, and contemplates neither a violation or evasion of our 
neutrality laws � 11 11 The company is sued 225, 000 shares at 
twenty-five dollars each, a share representing 100 acres, and 
offices were opened in New York and Philadelphia to promote 
the sale of the stock. The company's stated obj ectives were 
the colonization of the land and the development of its 
resources. 12 Kinney himself spent more than $52, 000 of his 
own funds in fitting out a party of coloni sts to carry out 
this design. 13 
10The Royal Standard and Gazette, July 7, 1855. Again 
this was Kinney's own te�timony. 
· llNew York Times,  December 15, 1854. 
12scroggs, Filibusters, 100.  
13The Royal Standard and Gazette, July 7, 1855. 
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Although Kinney was not prescient enough to anticipate 
it at the time, the opposition--in Washington, New York, and 
Nicaragua--which his expedition would engender would prove 
to be overwhelming. The apathy of prospective American 
colonists would eventually be the death blow, but there were 
a number of other problems along the way. It might be 
expected that there would be some objections from the British 
government over this encroachment into its protectorate, but 
perhaps Kinney actually believed the British masquerade with 
respect to the independence and sovereignty of the Mosquito 
king. The first registered opposition, however, occured not 
in Nicaragua, but in the United States. 
Jos� de Marcoleta, Nicaraguan Minister to Washington, 
lodged a vigorous protest against this planned " invasion. "  
He did not rely exclusively on diplomatic channels of commu­
nication, but took his case directly to the newspapers. 14 
Initial suspicions were aroused that Marcoleta was not acting 
on instructions from his government when it was reasoned that 
since Nicaragua was caught up in the distraction of a civil 
war, that nation could hardly address itself to ·the problem of 
a colonization scheme being projected in faraway New York. 
Nor was Marcoleta's own status entirely clear. Suspicions were 
heightened when it was determined that his legal counsel was 
14At one point, Marcoleta and Joseph W. Fabens, former 
United States Consul in San Juan del Norte and an associate of 
Kinney's, exchanged insults in letters to a New York paper. 
Marcoleta attempted to prevail upon Secretary Marcy to obtain 
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Joseph L .  White, a director of the Accessory Transit Company, 
whose terminus on the Caribbean side was the very area that 
Kinney proposed to settle. The extinguishing of any author­
ity at San Juan del Norte (British Greytown) other than that 
of the transit company was a goal of White and his colleagues. 
The Kinney Expedition could not be regarded as anything but a 
threat to that goai. 15 
Nicaragua itself did act when on June 1, 1855, President 
' ' 
Jose Maria Estrada issued a proclamation stating that the 
government had information that the "filibusters Kinney and 
Fabens" were mounting an expedition in the United States and 
calling for war to the death against them. All able-bodied 
men were subject to mobilization. All foreigners (except long 
residents and transients on the transit route) were to be 
moved away from the frontiers . Anyone caught helping the 
filibusters would be considered traitors. Any area occupied 
by the filibusters should be abandoned, and those not comply­
ing would suffer the consequences . 16 A protest was also made 
to the United States government . 
"reparations" from Fabens for the "rude" things the latter 
had said about the Nicaraguan minister. Marcy declined on 
the grounds that Fabens was not acting in an official capac­
ity, and because apparently Marcoleta introduced the conflict 
by writing the paper first about Fabens. Marcy did say that 
he regretted the language Fabens had used. Marcy (unofficial) 
to Marcoleta, May 1, 1855, National Archives, M99, 10/77. 
to 
to 
15scroggs, Filibusters, 102 .  
16John Priest (United States Consul in San Juan 
Marcy, June 1, 1855, National Archives, T152, 1 ;  
Marcy, July 1, 1855, ibid. , M2 19, 11/19. 
del Sur) 
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Sympathy among both the press and the public in the United 
States depended--though by no means exclusively--on one's 
position vis-a-vis slavery. Those who condoned the institution 
hoped that the private incursions into Nicaragua would be the 
opening wedges of Anglo-Saxon domination, turning the Central 
American Isthmus into another Texas. They assumed that 
Mosquito, given the putative nature of its plantation econany, 
would be a new slave-holding region. Supporters also were 
motivated by the fashionable creed of Manifest Destiny. Those 
opposing the expedition did so out of a fear of slavery 
extension, as well as a legal and moral concern about the 
flouting of American neutrality laws. 
An indication of the interest and indignation aroused in 
the United States can be found in family letters to William 
Sidney Thayer, a journalist who subsequently accompanied and 
aided Colonel Kinney. Thayer was of a prominent New England 
family, a Harvard graduate in the class of 1850, a sensitive 
if unpolished poet, and an admirer of Charles Sumner, the 
abolitionist senator from Massachusetts ; hardly, it would seem, 
a likely ·candidate for an expedition reputed to have filibus­
tering designs. Nonetheless, when Thayer moved to Washington 
to become a correspondent for the New York Evening Post and to 
launch his journalistic career, mutual friends led him into 
association with the controversial Kinney. Thayer's father 
wrote him in May, 1855, that the New York Tribune had charged 
the expedition was designed to establish slavery in Central 
12 0 
America. 17 In June the elder Thayer wrote that he had read 
in the newspaper that his son had "taken stock in the Kinney 
Expedition. " It was bad enough, he said, that Thayer should 
associate with Kinney, and write articles and make speeches 
in the colonel's behalf, but this was too much. Apparently 
Thayer's father had never been satisfied with the legality 
and morality of Kinney's activities in Texas. 18 
Thayer's brother wrote him in August that he was having 
trouble explaining to their friends (who read the Tribune and 
other New York papers) just what "Bill" was doing on a fili­
buster expedition. "I am always careful, " he said, "to state 
first what I believe to be the nature of the expedition, which 
is simply praiseworthy, and second that you go out not as a 
member of the concern but for the sake of the trip and to see 
the country. 11 19 Two days later, Thayer's father wrote : 
The government prosecutions of Col. K. and his partner, 
together with the printed condemnation of the expedition 
by the New York Tribune, identifying it with the brigand 
troop of Walker & Co. and also alluding to it in connec­
tion with the Cuban Filibusters [presumably a reference 
'!=f the landings in Cuba of former Venezuelan Narciso 
Lopez] ,  have created a strong public sentiment against 
the whole enterprise; and everyone in any way connected 
with it is regarded as more or less of a fillibuster-­
an outlaw. 2 0  
17Abijah W. Thayer to William Sidney Thayer, May 2, 1855, 
William Sidney Thayer Papers, Library of Congress 
18Ibid. , June 8, 1855. 
l9Jarnes B. Thayer to w. S. Thayer, August 3, 1855. The 
word "concern" is a reference to the Central American Coloni­
zation Company. 
2 0A. W. Thayer to W. S. Thayer, August 5, 1855. 
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Regardless of this civil opposition, it still appeared 
that the expedition would at least be able to get underway 
without official interference. American lawyers of the 
calibre of Daniel Fletcher Webster, and English lawyers such 
as William Burge, had rendered the opinion that the grant was 
valid. 2 1 Kinney claimed to have a letter from Secretary Marcy 
with "instructions" on how to avoid violating the neutrality 
laws. 22  The New York Times correspondent in Washington opined 
that "the Government will throw no obstacles in their way. "2 3  
Despite these reassurances, a popular but damaging chord was 
struck by the British news-magazine Blackwood's: 
A great deal was said about the promotion of agriculture 
on the Mosquito coast ; but it was pretty generally 
understood by the public, that the real object in view 
was to filibuster the State of Nicaragua, or at all events 
to establish a ·depot in that part of the world, from 
which, when all should be ready, a descent upon Cuba 
might be conveniently made. 2 4  
It was apparently this view held by the public (and pro­
moted by the press), as well as the remonstrances of the 
Nicaraguan minister, which finally caused the government to 
intervene . A proclamation was issued by New York District 
2 1samuel Shepherd, Peter Shepherd, and s.  T. Haly (orig­
nal grantees) to the New York Herald, December 1 2, 1855. 
Webster, son of the form�r Secretary of State, was a member of 
the Kinney Expedition. This association may have affected his 
objectivity. 
2 2New York Times, April 30, 1855. 
2 3Ibid. , December 15, 1854 . 
2 4Blackwood's Magazine, March, 1856, reprinted iri Littell's 
Living Age, XIII, No. 621, April 19,  1856. 
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Attorney John McKean warning people "not to take part in the 
hostile invasion of a friendly state. "25 In the meantime, a 
federal grand jury returned an indictment against Kinney, 
charging him with violation of the neutrality law of 1818, 
to wit: "Setting on foot a military exp�aition. " A United 
States marshal brought the defendants to court on April 28, 
1855, and, on McKeon's recommendation, bail was set at 
$10, 000. Trial date was set for May 7 . 26 
A co-defendant of Kinney was Joseph Warren Fabens, former 
United States commercial agent at San Juan del Norte. Fabens 
had managed to acquire "title" to one and a half million acres 
in Chontales, an area bordering on Lake Nicaragua, by pur­
chase from the Nicaraguan government, the church, and from 
local "owner-associates. "27 He had created the Nicaragua Land 
and Mining Company for the purpose of developing agriculture, 
mining, industry, and transportation on his lands. 28 Because 
Kinney's venture appeared to be better organized and financed, 
Fabens had elected to join forces with the redoubtable colonel. 
Kinney and Fabens had chartered a large steamer, the 
United States, to take several hundred colonists to Nicaragua. 
On May 24, the government stationed three steamers and a reve­
nue cutter in New York harbor to prevent a surprise departure 
25Ibid. 
26New York Times, April 30, 1855. 
27rbid. 
28Ibid. , April 19, 1855. 
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by the emigrants. Government litigation against Kinney was 
introduced in Philadelphia, and he was compelled to travel 
there to post another substantial bond. It became clear that 
the strategy of White and Marcoleta, aided and abbetted by 
McKean, was to delay the expedition while Kinney's funds 
dwindled and his supporters became demoral{zed. 2 9  
When the Kinney-Fabens case was brought to trial on May 
7, McKean requested a postponement because he had not located 
two essential witnesses who lived in Philadelphia. The 
. district attorney's maneuver was revealed as a sham when it 
was shown that the affidavits of search had neither the first 
names nor the addresses of these "key" witnesses. McKean 
also tacitly acknowledged that the grand jury had not examined 
these witnesses and the judge correctly pointed out that, in 
that case, the prosecutor should be able to proceed without 
them. This McKean declined to do. 30 
The attorney for the defendants contended that the dis­
trict attorney was deliberately inconveiencing his clients. 
The expedition was scheduled to sail that very day, and in 
anticipation a ship of 1, 600 tons was waiting at dockside with 
coal and provisions on board. The charter cost for the vessel 
was $21, 000, and daily demurrage of $ 1,500 had to be defrayed 
by the company. In addition, four to five hundred colonists 
29scroggs, Filibusters, 1 02. 
30New York Times, May 8, 1855. 
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were being quartered at New York hotels at a cost to the 
company of $ 1, 000 a day. "The proposition of the District 
Attorney was to plant the colony here termporarily--to detain 
all these men in the City of New York through the dog days. 11 31 
Kinney's lawyer then turned his attention to the motiva­
tion for McKeon's strategy. "The indictment, " he charged, 
"was founded upon the suspicions, if not upon the affidavit 
[of ]  Mr. Marcoleta. " Marcoleta's attorney, who was assisting 
the prosecution, responded by ridiculing the defendants' 
assertion that the expeditionists were "peaceful agricul­
turists. " "There would be about as many furrows turned up by 
the plow, as many hillocks made with the hoe, and as many 
fields leveled by the harrow by them here. " This was a "new 
breed of farmers,"  he asserted, who lived in hotels and 
frequented public houses to the tune of $ 1, 000 a day ! Con­
cluding the hearing, the judge reduced bond for the two defen­
dants to $ 1, 000, released them on their own recognizance, and 
reset the trial for June s. 32 
Marcoleta was not satisfied with the government ' s  efforts, 
and he asked Marcy to prevent the departure from American ports 
of every vessel which may have been chartered by Kinney and 
company. 11 Mad enthusiasm" and "excitement, " he remonstrated, 
had been created by a map of Nicaragua "embellished with like- · 
nesses of Kinney [� ] and Fabens, and in which the points are 
J!Ibid. 
32Ibid. 
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marked where the new cities of Montezuma, Cortes, Fabensville 
and Kennyville, are to be built. 11 3 3  Marcy replied that "the 
prosecuting attorney has availed himself of all the proof 
which Mr. Marcoleta could indicate or which could be otherwise 
obtained • • • • The government and its officers have done 
their whole duty in this matter. 11 34 
Marcoleta's importunities seem to have borne fruit in 
the surveillance of the United States, but the Nicaraguan agent 
did not rest. Shortly afterwards, he advised Marcy that 
Kinney now planned to hire a small vessel, the Grape Shot, 
and perhaps sail from another port. In that event, the United 
States should send a warship to intercept him at San Juan del 
Norte . Should Kinney land there, he "would at once place the 
de facto Government of that town at his disposal. " Among 
other calamities this would cause, the peaceful settlement of 
diplomatic problems there , ...,ould be seriously impaired. 35 
On June 5, Kinney secured a one-day continuance of his 
arraignment. When he failed to appear the following day, his 
trial was postponed until June 7, but by the latter date Kinney 
was safely at sea. By employing a ruse involving a mass 
3 3Marcoleta to Marcy, May 9, 1855, in William R. Manning, 
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American 
Affairs, 18 3 1- 18 60, IV, Central America, 1851- 18 60 (Washing­
ton: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 34) , 
457-60. 
34Marcy to Marcoleta, May 15, 1855, ibid. , 68 . 
35Marcoleta to Marcy, June 1 ,  1855, ibid. , 463 . 
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meeting at dockside--where the United States was moored--to 
protest the government ' s  treatment, Kinney distracted the 
federal marshals and quietly slipped the lines of a small 
schooner in another part of the port. The New York Times 
description of the coup was that in order "to cure a conges­
tion in one part he claps a blister on a distant part. 11 36 
Nonetheless, the White-Marcoleta plan had been reasonably 
successful, and when the � sailed on the evening of June 6,  
Kinney's army of colonists had been reduced to a mere p�atoon. 
Even out of the clutches of the government, the emigration 
was not uneventful, and a near-disaster occurred with a wreck 
in Turks Islands in the West Indies. After about a week on 
the island, Kinney and his argonauts were carried the rest of 
the way to San Juan del Norte on the English brig Huntress, 37 
where one report asserted that their "arrival was hailed with 
enthusiasm. " 38 
But if Kinney thought his major difficulties were behind 
him, he had misjudged the situation ; in reality, he had walked 
into an imbr(XJlio of international and local conflict. In 
terms of international politics, the issue was between the 
United States and Great Britain over the interpretation of the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. From the American point of view, the 
treaty seemed to suggest the withdrawal of the British from 
36New York Times, June 18, 1855. 
37The Royal Standard and Gazette, July 7,  1855. 
38stout, Nicaragua, 176. 
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their Mosquito Coast protectorate. The British held, however, 
that the treaty was "prospective, " and did not apply to 
existing arrangements. As a result, the diplomatic--and 
sometimes open--battle was being joined with San Juan del 
Norte, or Greytown, as a microcosm for the entire Isthmus. 
Greytown stood on one side of the entrance to San Juan 
Bay, the mouth of the San Juan River, with the settlement of 
the Accessory Transit Company across from .it on a sandspit 
called Punta Arenas. Greytown was ostensibly a part of the 
Mosquito king's dominion, but in reality its inhabitants were 
largely British, Nicaraguan, American, and Costa Rican, with 
perhaps a few Indians for "seasoning, " and it enjoyed a 
separate existence under an elected city council � Although 
its raison d'etre was as a port city for the handling of 
Nicaraguan and Costa Rican products destined for European 
ports, it could in no way have been called thriving.  The Punta 
Arenas settlement, located at the Caribbean terminus of the 
transisthmian route, served as a barracks for workers and a 
warehouse for the equipment of the American-owned. transit 
company. 39  
Dissension between the two settlements had been building 
up since the opening of the transit route some four years 
previously. Generally, the Greytowners resented the company 
personnel's conducting their business independently and vir­
tually ignoring the town. Specifically, it meant loss of a 
39New York Times, April 2, 1853 . 
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substantial financial windfall. The British government--this 
time in accord with the Clayton-Bulw�r provision for free 
ports at each terminus--had directed the town council not to 
collect duties. The company had ignored the council's 
decree that transit steamers using the bay should pay port 
fees instead. Finally, the town fumed because transit passen­
gers were transferred directly from the ocean steamers to the 
river steamers, without setting foot in Greytown and thereby 
having the opportunity to spend some money in the local 
economy. 40 
The antagonism was exacerbated in February, 1853, when 
the council ordered the company to dismantle its settlement and 
move across the bay to Greytown. To aid in inducing the Ameri­
cans, a band of men rowed over from Greytown and demolished 
some of the company structures. When a company official 
protested, he was summarily incarcerate� for using "threat­
ening and seditious language, " and released only after posting 
a $7, 500 bond. The physical �amage could not have been much, 
as it was later revealed that the company property consisted 
of "three miserable shanties and one shed," but the affront as 
well as the menace was real. The company appealed to the 
United States government for protection, and the Navy responded 
by dispatching Commander George N. Hollins in the sloop-of-war 
Cyane. Upon entering the harbor on March 10, Hollins inquired 
as to which banner he should salute. When told he could 
4DFolkman, The Nicaragua Route, 60. 
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choose among the American, British, Mosquitan, or Nicaraguan, 
he professed amazement at "persons who did not know the flag 
under which they were enjoying protection. " On the following 
day, the commander landed a small contingent of marines to 
prevent further destruction. 4 1 
A year later, on March 10, 185 4, another crisis arose. 
Greytown deputies attempted to arrest Captain T. T. Smith 
aboard his river steamer Routh for having shot and killed a 
native in a canoe up river. Minister Solon Borland, who hap­
pened to be on board, intervened; but when Borland went to 
Commercial Agent Fabens' house in Greytown, a town mob held 
. . . 1 h f h . . h 
4 2 . 11 him in virtua ouse arrest or t e entire nig t. Fina y, 
on May 1 5  some Greytowners stole a boatload of merchandise 
from the transit company. 4 3 For all these "outrages, " the 
Navy Department again ordered Commander Hollins and the 
Cyane to San Juan harbor with these instructions: 
Now, it is very desirable that these people should be 
taught that the United States will not tolerate these 
outrages, and that they have the power and determin­
ation to check them. It  is, however, very much to be 
hoped that you can effect the purposes of your visit 
without a resort to violence and destruction of prop­
erty and loss of life. The presence of your vessel 
will, no doubt, work much good. The department reposes 
much in your prudence and good sense. 4 � 
Unfortunately, "a resort to violence and destruction of 
4 1New York Times, April 2, April 5, April 27, May 5, 1853 
4 2Ibid . ,  May 2 6 , 1 8 5 4  
43Ibid. , August 2, August 5, 185 4. 
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property" seemed unavoidable to the sloop commander. When 
the citizens of Greytown were unable to make a hasty rconetary 
restitution, the town was shelled (after proper warning to 
allow the inhabitants to escape with some baggage) for most of 
the day of July 13 . Marines were sent ashore to fire those 
buildings still standing to ensure that the destruction was 
complete. The only British ship in the harbor, the outgunned 
H. M. S. Bermuda, stood helplessly by. 45 
Even though the facts make it appear that the catas­
trophe was the result of local indigation and precipitous 
action on the part of a naval commander, ample evidence exists 
to indicate that it was a transit company-State Department 
affair. Colonel Kinney subsequently made public a letter 
(apparently provided him by Fabens) from Joseph L. White to 
Fabens: 
Captain Hollins, commanding the corvette "Cyane, " leaves 
on Monday. You will see by his instructions, which I 
have written on the margin, that it is .intended his author­
ity would not be so exercised as to show any mercy to 
the town or people. 
If the scoundrels are soundly punished, we can take 
possession, and build it up as a business place, put in cur 
own officers, transfer the jurisdiction, and you know 
the rest. 
It is of the last importance that the people of the town 
should be taught to fear us. Punishment will teach them . 
After which you must agree with them as to the organi­
_zation of a new government, and the officers of it. 
4SBritish and Foreign State Paoers, XLVI, 859-88. When 
advised of Hollins' intentions, the Bermuda's Lieutenant Jolly 
expressed regret that "the force under my command is so to­
tally inadequate against the Cyane, that I can only enter this 
my prates t." 
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Everything now depends on you and Hollins. The latter 
is all right. He fully understands the outrage , and 
will not hesitate in enforcing reparation. 4 6  
Further State Department involvement can be perceived by 
its negative response to British , Nicaraguan , and Costa Rican 
protests. 47 Apparently Washington felt the British should be 
convinced that the United States meant business in Central 
America , and the Greytown happened to be a pawn in the big 
power conflict. But aside from the implications of Clayton­
Bulwer interpretations , Kinney , at least , was convinced that 
the State Department was squarely unde� the influence of the 
transit company. 
Kinney claimed that he had a copy of a letter (again 
probably given him by Fabens) from White to Secretary Marcy 
explaining the event. It said in part , that "the transit 
company had been plundered to the amount of thousands of 
dollars by a camp of savages pretending to exercise authority 
over Greytown , and that the lives of citizens of the United 
States were imperilled by their cruelties. " Marcy , in turn , 
used virtually the same language in his letter of vindication 
to British Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon. Kinney also 
charged that "the object in these falsehoods was the overthrow 
46Henry L. Kinney , "Pronunciamento , "  New York Weekly Post , 
September 6 ,  1855. 
4 7London Times , August 14 , 18 54; Marcy to Jviarcoleta , August 
2 ,  1854 , National Archives , M99 , 10/62; Marcy to Molina , 
October 4 ,  1854 , Manning , Diplomatic Correspondence , IV , 61. 
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of the then existing government at Greytown, and the establish­
ment of a new goverrnent more pliable to the hands of the 
company. 11 4 8  
But in Kinney's eyes the real villains were White and the 
transit company. Kinney felt, Thayer wrote the Post, that "the 
sources of all his persecutions and troubles were Joseph L. 
White, whom he characterizes .with all the vigor of the Texan 
vernacular, and M. Marcoleta, 'who signs himself, ' the colonel 
says, ' (as in one sense he might justly claim to be) Envoy 
Extraordinary from Nicaragua. 1 11 49 Kinney accused Marcoleta of 
serving White for financial reasons (Marcoleta received no 
salary from the government of Nicaragua) , and charged that 
White and Marcoleta had used the courts "to delay his departure, 
. . . h . 
. 
d h b k h 
· 
"5 0  to dispirit is companions, an t us rea up t e enterpr�se. 
Apparently the transit company preferred to deal with 
Nicaraguans and Mosquitos rather than Anglo-Saxons; at least 
that is what Kinney thought was the true motivation for the 
company's actions. He maintained that the company knew it could 
not run roughshod over Americans as it had over Nicaraguans, . 
avoiding or denying its contractual obligations. (The company 
had pledged a percentage of the transisthmian transit profits to 
the Nicaraguan government, and had committed itself to build a 
canal across Nicaraguan territory. ) The company perhaps recognized 
4 8Kinney, "Pronunciamento, " ibid. 
49New York Weekly Post, September 6, 185 5. 
5°Kinney, "Pronunciamento, " ibid. 
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that--with a large permanent contingent--the Americans would 
gain influence in the government, and would "discharge the 
obligations of that government to others, then would exact 
the obligations owed it. "5 1  Conversely, perhaps that was why 
the Greytowners, thinking they had found a champion against 
the arrogance and inconsiderateness of the company, "hailed 
their arrival with enthusiasm. " 
At any rate, Kinney felt that he had natural allies when 
he arrived, and he issued an optimistic proclamation: 
I have • • •  the fullest confidence in the ooinion that 
not many months will elapse before Central Ame�ica will 
throng with industrious Anglo-Saxon farmers and artizans, 
who need only the enterprise and business habits of their 
native land to insure an ample reward for their labors 
in developing its resources. The climate has proved 
eminently healthy; and the disposition of the native 
races, notwithstanding the hostile decree of June 1st, 
which the government was inveigled into promulgating by 
the Transit Company, are ready, almost without exception, 
to give us a healthy welcome. 5 2  
With Kinney's arrival, the rebuilding of Greytown con­
tinued apace. "Houses were erected, stores opened, hotels 
built," and there was a general regeneration of the town. 53 
There was also a vacuum of government which he moved quickly 
Slrbid. 
52rbid. 
53stout, Nicaragua, 177. Independent reporting on the suc­
cess of Kinney' s  efforts was negligible. The State Department 
had dismissed Fabens from his post because of his association 
with the expedition. Minister Wheeler was absorbed in the 
swift-moving events in Granada following the intervention of 
Walker. The glowing reports sent back by the expedition were 
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to fill. It had existed since before the bombardment crisis, 
each succeeding council being unable or unwilling to deal 
realistically with the threat presented by the transit com­
pany's demands. On September 6, Kinney was "unanimously 
chosen Civil and Military Governor of the City and Territory 
of San Juan del Norte" by an assembly of Greytown citizens. 54 
According to Marcoleta, it was a rump convention consisting 
of members of Kinney's party along with renegades who were 
responsible for the problems with the transit company. The 
Nicaraguan minister contended that "the native born citizens, 
and other foreigners . . • energetically protested • • • •  
Even the British authorities who were invited, and also the 
Captain of the vessel of War 'Eurydice', refused to acknow­
ledge those proceedings. 11 55 
Nonetheless, Kinney's government issued a decree which 
provided that property owners--those with a "stake in the 
community"--would elect a governor and council. The governor, 
in turn, would choose subordinate officials and, with the 
advice and consent of council , establish laws and regulations. 
propaganda for the purpose of attracting settlers. Thayer's 
letters to the Post were virtually the only newspaper coverage, 
and even these might be considered suspect. The New York Times 
derided his deferential relationship with Kinney. "He is to 
the Colonel what Cromwell was to Cardinal Wolsey . . • whose 
chief pleasure is to magnify the virtues of his chivalric 
leader. " New York Times, August 2 9 ,  1855. 
5 4Ibid . 
55Marcoleta to Marcy, October 8, 1855, Manning, Diplomatic 
Correspondence, IV, 480-1. 
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The meetings of the governor and council were to be open to 
the public. This arrangement would continue until a consti­
tution could be drafted, ratified, and a new govern..�ent 
established under it. There would he no taxes without the 
consent of property owners, but ships must continue to pay 
existing tariffs. 56 Though particioation in the government 
was limited, there seemed to be general concurrence that a 
responsbile government had at last been established. One 
report claimed that "physicians, attorneys, merchants, land 
agents, and others flocked to support the new adminis­
tration. 11 57 
And things did seem to be going rather well. Thayer 
reported in a dispatch dated September 30 that 
the expeditionists, before thev had marked out their 
farms, ·- set to work at once in San Juan, in the line of 
their respective vocations. One of them, for example, 
is a doctor, and has quite a run of practice. Another 
• • • has opened a school, there being no other in the 
place, buckling down to the busines s of teaching with 
such succes s that hi s henches are filled with urchins 
and little misses of various races and complexions.  
The Californians have taken to gold-seeking, and others 
have made arrangements fnr beginning trade on their 
own account. S B 
The diplomatic relations with the new officialdom of 
Greytown was a different story. Needles s to say, the question 
of recognition of the independence of the new San Juan 
"colony" didn't need to be referred to the purported saver-
S6stout, Nicaragua, 17 9.  
5 7Thirl. , 1 8 0-8 1. 
58 Thayer, New York Evening Post, October 16, 1 8 55 .  
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eign, the King of the Mosquitos . But Kinney did "officially" 
notify the agents representing both the United States and 
Great Britain . Because  Fnbens had joined forces with Kinney, 
his designation as Consul and Commercial Agent had been 
revoked by the Department of State . Discharging these func­
tions was E .  F .  Mason, the Vice-Commercial Agent . 
On September 10, Mason acknowledged Kinney's announce­
ment . The vice-commercial agent chose--in the absence of 
instructions from Washington--to enploy the precedent estab­
lished in 1852 by James Geddes, his British counterpart . 
Geddes, in turn, had based his decision for recognition on 
the judgment made by Daniel Webster on that occasion: 
"Meanwhile a temporary recognition of the existing authori­
ties of the place, sufficient to countenance any well­
intended endeavors on its part to preserve the public peace 
and punish wrong-doers, would not be inconsistent with the 
policy and honor of the United States . "  Mason also quoted 
former Secretary of State Edward Everett's belief that Nica­
ragua could give the citizens of San Juan del Norte" a govern­
ment agreeable to them, and allow them to carry on their own 
affairs, according to the j udgment of their own elective 
municipal officers . "  The American agent maintained that this 
was what Nicaraguan President Fruto Chamorro had meant in 
March, 1854, when he "recommended that the frontiers, heing 
mostly occupied bv foreigners, should be allowed their own 
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local government. " For his own �art , �ason congratulated 
Kinnev and said that he had "seen this movement in favor of 
a government and the establishment of law with great satis­
faction , and am confident that it will be productive of 
great good to this place. 59 
But the Mason enthusiasm did not represent a chorus of 
diplomatic approval : . the initial response of the British 
consul was one of stern rebuke. This attitude changed to 
grudging a<:XIW-escence when Kinnev challenged the British agent 
to suggest an alternative. The consul's maj or liability in 
the maneuvering was his perculiar relationships with the vari­
ous governments , i. e. , Greytown , British , and �osauito. In 
1850 , when the people of San Juan del Norte first organized 
a municipal government , their right to do so was expressly 
recognized by the British consul general for Central America , 
acting as the agent for the �osquito king. When , in 1852 , 
the Greytowners framed a constitution , . the same counsul 
general , in behalf of the British government , withheld his 
sanction from the constitution and the government organized 
under it. Nevertheless , the British did not obj ect when 
Secretary of State Webster announced recognition of the 
government. Furthermore , the Grevtowners simply ignored 
59E. F. Mason to Kinney , September 10 , 1855 , New York 
Evening Post , Octover 16 , 1855. 
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Britain's tacit disaporoval and thereby effectively nullified 
. t . t 60 1 s 1mpac . Eventually , with a British consul in Greytown , 
the British recognized the government , and that gentleman even 
served at one time as chief of the city council in one of the 
pre-bombardment governments . 61 
The British consul's position was rendered even more 
tenuous because the Foreign Office failed to back him up in 
his initiatives against the transit company with resoect to 
collection of port fees and transfer of the company's opera­
tions to Greytown; in fact , the Foreign Office had specifi­
cally disavowed these acts . The British reaction to the 
bombardment of Greytown , presumably protected by the furls of 
the Union Jack , had been one of righteous indignation , but 
reparations had never been aggressively pressed desoite the 
fact that British property {including the consulate) had been 
destroyed . Finally , with the twenty-six gun H . � . s . Eurydice 
in port and not an American naval vessel in sight , Kinney 
and his contingent were allowed to land unmolested . 62 In 
truth , the British consul may have begun to feel a bit 
abandoned by the Foreign Office . 
60New York Times , April 2 ,  1853; New York Herald ,  
November 30 , 1855. 
61Folkman , Nicaragua Route , 60 . 
62New York Herald , November 30 , 1855 . 
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Nevertheless , when Colonel Kinney notified Consul James 
Geddes of the new government on September 12 , Geddes' reply 
was a formal protest. The consul claimed that Kinney's 
"assumption of authority was an infringement of the rights 
of the Mosquito sovereign , and in contravention of the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 11 63 He then appended a longer letter 
addressed to Geddes from Captain J. w .  Tarleton of the 
Eurydice. Tarleton requested Geddes tell Kinney that the 
government established under the 1 852 constitution , and 
rec�gnized by both Great B ritain and the United States , could 
only be dissolved by a najority vote of the citizens. Only 
about twenty persons--and those had "no legitimate qualifi­
cations to vote"--had attended Kinney's assembly which pur­
ported to erect a new government. Tarleton continued that 
even if he considered the Kinney election valid , he would still 
have to object to the title of "Civil and Military Governor" 
which would "confer powers inconsistent with the preroga-
tives of the King of Mosquito , and with the strictly provis­
ional arrangements heretofore sanctioned by the governments 
of Great Britain and the United States : 6 4  
Again the question arises : under- what authority were 
Geddes and Tarleton making the protest? The seal on the 
63Ibid. 
64 Tarleton to Geddes , September 13 , 1855 , Thayer Papers. 
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consul's letter displayed the British coat of arms, with 
the word "Mosquito" underneath, and surrounded bv the title, 
"H. B . M. Agent and Consul General. " With these impress ive 
credentials, why then did Geddes feel it incumbent to refer 
the letter to a naval officer, and use that reply as the 
bulk of his response to Kinney? The latter gently alluded to 
this apparent discrepancy in procedure when he, in effect, 
presented the British with a rather awkward alternative to 
recognition of his government. He would assent "with eaual 
cheerfulness" to the formation of a responsible government 
"by any duly empowered representative of Her Majesty ' s  
government. "  Judging from the correspondence, Kinney averred, 
it appeared that Tarleton was "clothed with special diolo­
matic powers. "  Therefore, "it would afford me pleasure to 
witness his efforts" to achieve that goai . 65 
At this point, Tarleton retired from the debate , and 
Geddes seemed to have wished he could do the same. The consul 
responded weakly that he still coul� not grant his imorimatur 
to Kinney as long as he theoretical ly recogni zed the previous 
government : however, he fully conceded the right of the people 
of Greytown to elect their own officers, and would not inter­
pose any obstacles to the popular wil1. 66 
' 65 New York Herald, November 30, 1855. 
6 6Ibid . 
141 
For a brief moment things seemed to be going in Kinney's 
favor. Reports from the Nicaraguan capital were encouraging 
as Minister Wheeler observed that "the prospect of their 
[Kinney's] undisturbed possession from this Government seems 
fair. 11 67 Thayer had returned to the United States on 
September 30 , and a friend in Grevtown wrote him on October 
18: 
Colonel Kinney yesterday concluded a grant treaty with 
the various Mosquito tribes of Indians and indeed it 
was a grand sight to see the weather-beaten Indians 
smiling and rejoicing in soirit , to think that the 
great deliverer had at last come and they called him a 
second "Penn. " The contents of the treatv was that the 
Indians shall occU?Y their lands peaceable and that they 
will in no wise molest any person connected with the 
Kinney expedition. 68 
Kinney's newspaper , The Central American , reoorted on 
September 2 9  that the Colonel had �een invited to Granada to 
confer with the Nicaraguan chief executive , Jose Estrada , and 
had even been sent a passport hv the latter. Kinney did not 
immediately take advantage of this because "his multifarious 
business operations . orevented his leaving the 
immediate vicini ty of hi s labors. 11 6 9  One chronicler went even 
67Wheeler to Marcy , September 2 1 , 1855 , Manning , Dinlo­
rnatic Correspondence , IV , 478. 
68J , R. Swift to Thaver , October 18 , 1855 , Thaver Paoers. 
6 9New York Evening Post , October 16 , 1855. 
further: 
Overtures were made him by the Nicaraguans through 
their then Provisiona} Chief, Don Patricio Rivas, 
by whom he was urged to visit the City of Granada. 
Had he desired to grasp the reins of Government, 
14 2 
ere Gen. Walker had been tempted to do so, Kinney 
would have occupied the position of Commander-in­
chief, by the unanimous consent of the nation. Costa 
Rica also sent deputies to confer with him, entreating 
him and his followers to settle in its province but 
he was wedded to his tract on the Mosquito coast. 70 
The assertion that Kinney could have played any role in 
Granada after October 12 seems unlikely. That was the day 
William Walker, another American adventurer, entered the city 
with his small army and assumed control of its destiny for 
more than a year. Patricio Rivas, a former customs official 
at Fort San Carlos, was Walker's hand-picked man, with Walker 
himself des ignated as "General-in-Chief of the Nicaraguan 
Army. " His fellow American's success �· pro mpted Kinney to 
attempt to take advantage of the new situation. Despite the 
glowing reports dispatched to New York, the San Juan colony 
was not prospering. Walker's domain--not Kinney's--was 
attracting the adventuresome from the United States, and 
Kinney felt an alliance would be in his interest. He there­
fore sent Fabens, J. R. Swift, and several others to Granada 
70stout, Nicaragua, 182. Apparently, Secretary Marcy had 
received information about the invitation to Kinney. "1arcoleta 
was still badgering the Department to intervene, even to the 
extent of forcibly removing the Kinney Expedition fr-om the 
Mosquito Shore. Marcy appeared to be losing patience with the 
importuning of the Nicaraguan Minister; in his reply he 
pointed out that Marcoleta still did not seem to under�tand 
the United States' relationship to Kinney. The United States 
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to make the proposal. Walker was unreceptive and replied 
"that Kinney should be distinctly informed, that if he was 
caught in Nica. (and he considered San Juan del Norte as a 
part of her territory) that he would treat him as a Traitor 
and hang him in five minutes. 11 71 
But the blow to Kinney's aspirations was even greater: 
His entire contingent defected to Walker without returning 
to Greytown. Walker then added a new dimension to the 
problems which had already beset Kinney. On February 8, 
1856, Walker's government issued a decree claiming and a�nex­
ing the whole Mosquito territory as an integral portion of 
the state of Nicaragua, and thereby nullifying the Kinney 
had tried to "arrest his enterprise against Nicaragua. " How­
ever, Kinney went from the United States not to Nicaragua, 
but apparently to the Turks Islands, and then to Nicaragua. 
He had subsequently declared his citizenship and allegiance 
to another sovereign--perhaps one of his own making--but 
thereby renounced United States citizenship. Therefore, the 
United States could have no interest or exercise no authority 
over him or the members of his expedition. The activity 
imputed to Kinney could not "injure the fair name of this 
country . • • •  The United States has not in any fashion 
countenanced or sanctioned their activity. I presume, from 
the tenor of your protest, that the rumors which have reached 
the United States that the Nicaraguan government is about to 
receive these usurpers and adventurers, as you call them, 
into favor, is known to you to be unfounded. " Marcy to 
Marcoleta, October 10, 1855, National Archives, M99, 10/93. 
71wheeler to Marcy, November 12, 1855, Manning, Diplo­
matic Correspondence, IV, 487-88. The Herald's version of 
Walker's reply was even more colorful: "Tell Governor Kinney, 
or Colonel Kinney, or Mr. Kinney, or whatever he chooses to 
call himself, that if I ever lay hands on him on Nicaraguan 
soil I shall surely hang him. " New York Herald, January 3o, 
1856. 
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purchase. The proclamation also stated that "the said 
Sheppard, Haley, and Kinney and all other persons claiming 
this unlawful acquisition, are declared guilty of an attempt 
against the integrity of Central Arnerica. 11 72 Strange talk, 
from one filibuster to another ! But the audacity of the 
approach encompassed even more. Walker's paper, El Nicara­
guense, editorially observed: 
With a single decree [the new government] set at rest 
a matter about which the United States and England had 
quarreled for years. Mosquito was annexed to Nicaragua, 
and there was no necessity for further protocols 
explanatory of the Clayton-Bulwer imroglio. Truly, the 
cabinet of President Rivas deserves credit for so easy 
an adjustment of so important a matter. 73 
The decree did not deal specifically with what to do about 
Kinney. Walker's strength was unquestionably far superior to 
that of the Texas colonel, but a foray down river to dislodge 
him might have seriously weakened Walker's forces in Granada. 
While Walker and his aides were still mulling over the ques­
tion, Colonel Kinney, much to the amazement of the Granadians, 
alighted from a lake steamer seeking an interview. According 
to El Nicaraguense : 
He almost forfeited his reputation for sanity, and today 
a great many point knowingly, and with a peculiar expres­
sion, to the head, when he is spoken of. He did not im­
prove this impression by his conduct after his arrival. 
72New York Evening Post, February 28, 1856 ; Wheeler to 
Marcy, February 26, 1856, Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, 
IV, 508. 
73El Nicaraguense, February 16, 1856, quoted in New York 
Evening Post, February 28, 1856. 
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The Colonel entered the city on foot, and after com­
posing his toilet, prepared for a formal visit to Gen. 
Wm. Walker
! 
or "Uncle Billy, " as he is known in this 
vicinity. 7 
In sharp contrast to Kinney's normal garrulity, Walker 
was usually rather laconic. This put Kinney at a disadvantage, 
considering that his position was somewhat awkward to begin 
with, and forced him into an opening gambit. It also re­
sulted in a somewhat truncated interview. The conversation, 
according to El Nicaraguense, was: 
Col. Kinney--The difficulties under which we labor in 
forming a peaceable government for Nicaragua, may be 
consummated by dividing the country and creating two 
states, one of which shall be called Mosquitia. 
Gen. Walker--If Nicaragua chooses to divide her terri­
tory, she will do so without advising with ?ny one, 
and last of all with Mr. Kinney. 
The visitor felt disconcerted, but he was not discour­
aged, as what follows will show: 
Col. Kinney--! have come to offer my services to the 
Republic, and feel confident my financial ability will 
be of great benefit in the procurement of money, the 
negotiation of loans, and so forth. I succeeded very 
well in such matters in Texas. 
Gen. Walker--Your antecedents preclude the possibility 
of the state's placing you in any official position. 
Colonel Kinney was dismayed, and the interview ended, 
with the impressive caution from Gen. Walker to his 
visitor, that he should be particular in his speech, 
or he might be guilty of uttering treasonable language. 75 
Apparently the colonel did not heed Walker's admonition. 
On the following day he was placed under arrest "for some in-
741bid. 
75Ibid. 
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discreet remarks on the conduct of government, " and was "ban­
ished from all the Nicaraguas. "  Subsequently, Kinney was es­
corted under guard back to Greytown, with the mayor of 
Granada, Theodore J. Martin, acting as custodian. 7 6  
As soon as Kinney arrived in Greytown, he began a journa­
listic counterattack. The March 3 edition of the Central 
American carried his defense of his claim, declaring that the 
proclamation that Nicaragua's title to Mosquito Territory was 
"notorious and incontestable" was a simple assertion, unsup­
ported by "a single proof or argument to ground a claim to 
the Territory. " He further pointed out that the grant to 
Sheppard and Haley had been in existence since 1839, and had 
not been publicly questioned by the government of Nicaragua 
until after a lapse of seventeen years. Then it was done 
"only when the ruling Government has been overturned and another 
substituted under the dictation and control of an invading 
military power. " 
With respect to Nicaragua's "notorious and incontestable" 
claim, Kinney retorted that Great Britain had maintained the 
authority of the King of the Mosquitos for two centuries and 
in 1848 had compelled Nicaragua to renounce formally any claim 
to the Mosquito Territory. Finally, he again pointed out that 
the highest legal authorities of the United States and Great 
76New York Evening Post, February 28, 1856. 
Britain had sanctioned the Sheppard and Haley grant, and 
denied that he or they were "guilty of any attempt against 
the integrity of Central America. "7 7  
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Later that month it appeared that Walker might not be 
too much of a problem. An augmented battalion of his army 
had been routed by the Costa Ricans at Santa Rosa, a planta­
tion near the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border. Then Walker 
himself was defeated in an assault on Costa Rican defenses 
at Rivas. In addition to the consequent scattering of his 
forces, Walker dismissed his French and German mercenaries, 
and all who could not speak English. 7 8  The New York Times 
chronicled the event: 
Deserters from Walker's army are hourly coming down 
the river, in a state of destitution. Most of them 
carry their arms and ammunition. They all say they 
were starved out, and for want of means to carry 
them to the states they are living on charity. Col. 
Kinney has given relief to about 2 2, all his house 
will hold; the rest are sleeping in sheds or on 
wharves, and make out a mouthful anywhere they can. 79 
The sight also bouyed the spirits of Kinney, as he wrote to 
Thayer: 
Walker has been badly whipped by the Costa Ricans. He 
richly deserved his fate. Now my Dear Thayer, our day 
is coming that soon. We will have a new Republic ·in a 
short time, and that American. I want you to come down 
as soon as you receive this, and help in organizing 
7 7The Central American, March 3, 18 56, quoted in New York 
Times, March 15, 1856. 
7 8william Walker, The War in Nicaragua (Detroit: Blaine 
Ethridge, 197 1 [ 1860J ·), 195-203. 
79New York Times, April 2 8, 1856. 
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a new government. I have some southern men interested 
with me that will make the enterprise certain to 
succeed • • • • I have had a hard time of it my Dear 
Thayer since you left but I think the day is dawning 
[when we] will have our labors reimbursed. 80 
But despite Kinney's momentary ebullience, the situation 
was inexorably deteriorating. The colony simply was not 
getting the recruits or the support from the United States 
that the founders expected. Kinney had begun to recognize 
the dilemma as early as the preceding November, when he wrote 
Thayer, "The old Central American Company has done nothing so 
far nor have I had any assistance from any quarter excepting 
that which came from my own immediate resources. " Then he 
added with his characteristic optimism, "If I could have a 
little backing up by parties interested with me I could come 
out triumphant. 11 81 
The best description of the degeneration of both the 
colony and the hopes of Colonel Kinney is found in the New 
York Times of April 28. The report observed that Kinney had 
been in Greytown over nine months, and notwithstanding all 
the inducements he had offered, and the several attempts made 
by different parties to cultivate the soil there were not yet 
ten acres under cultivation. Worse still, with the rainy 
season approaching, nothing more could be done for the next 
six months. The Times attributed this partially to the soil 
being low sandy bottom land that would produce nothing but 
BOKinney to Thayer, April 5, 1856, Thayer Papers. 
Blrbid. , November 14, 1855. 
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bananas and yams. Moreover, the title to the land was still 
precarious, claimed as it was by the "Mosquito King, Nicaragua, 
Sheppard & Haley, and finally Col. Kinney, who is willing to 
dole it out in lots of 1, 280 acres to anyone · who applies. " 
The reporter also saw the unsettled conditions on the Isthmus 
as a major contributing factor: 
Everything connected with the Central American continent 
seems to be in a complicated dispute that will require 
centuries of time or the intervention of some strong 
Government to settle. Hundreds of Americans who have 
come out here during the past six months under false 
hopes and misrepresentations, have all gone back to 
Uncle Sam's dominions, poorer but much wiser than 
they left. 
Finally, the expectations of Kinney himself may have been 
unwarranted all along. The Times correspondent described him 
as a "good-hearted, honest man" but "an enthusiast in this 
land speculation, and his anticipations never can be realized. " 
It was noted that the Colonel himself was discouraged when 
trying to clear an area near the city; after one month's labor 
he gave up in disgust. In the eyes of the Times correspondent, 
the situation was virtually hopeless : 
The inhabitants of San Juan del Norte present the most 
wretched appearance that animated nature is capable of 
being reduced to; and to acquire this phantom form 
every new comer must serve an apprenticeship of at 
least two years to chills and fever. 
The city can boast of about ten frame houses and a lot 
of bamboo native huts. There is one hotel, kept by a 
German, but the best and, indeed, all the other houses 
of accommodation are kept by gentlemen of color. The 
British Consul owns his own frame house, but the 
American Consul hires his rooms and dwells in the house 
with colored men. 
The population consisting, as it does, of English, 
Americans, Spaniards, natives and colored people, 
is said to be about 7 0 0. Yet there is no church, 
no minister, no school • • • • 
The commerce of the place is entirely in liquor and 
plantains. These two articles make the eating and 
drinking of the inhabitants, but they always savor 
their food with a large dish of hope that San Juan 
is soon to
8 �
ecome the greatest commercial city of 
the world. 
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This last sanquine observation was but a pious trust which 
might or might not precede the millenium. For his part, 
Kinney remained in Greytown for more than a year thereafter, 
clinging to his hopes and unwilling to admit failure. In 
July, 1857, he set sail for Corpus Christi where he expected 
to raise funds for the colony. His vessel was shipwrecked 
at Belize where, to add to his woes, he was briefly jailed 
for alleged non-payment of a debt to a local Englishrnan. 8 3 
Nonetheless, he was able "to interest some English Mormons in 
his grant, and one of their agents agreed to buy one-half of 
the territory. " With this commitment as collateral, Kinney 
borrowed money from some Panama merchants8 4and staged his 
last effort, a farcical tragicomedy which cast him in the 
uncharacteristic role of villain. 
On May 17, 1858, the barque Osprey arrived from Aspin-
82New York Times, April 2 8, 1856. 
8 3Ibid . ,  August 31, 1857. 
8 4 scroggs, Filibusters, 132. Another version was that 
the purchase price was two million dollars, of which the 
Mormons made a ten-percent downpayment. Stout, Nicaragua, 18 2. 
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wall, Panama, and Kinney and some other passengers debarked. 
The colonel proceeded to his former house (which had been sold 
some time earlier in foreclosure of a mortgage) and took 
possession of it by force. On the 25th, Kinney and his 
party hauled down the Mosquito flag, substituted their version 
of the "flag of Nicaragua," · and set a guard to prevent its 
being taken down. Afterwards, six armed men went to the 
residence of the mayor, presenting an order signed by Kinney 
for his arrest, and demanding that he accompany them to the 
Station House. The mayor declined to do so and slammed his 
doors, whereupon the party forced the doors open and compelled 
him to accompany them. At the Station House, Kinney informed 
the mayor that he must resign his office, and that Captain 
Kennedy, of the American sloop-of-war Jamestown (with its guns 
trained on the city) would support the takeover. The mayor 
appealed to the citizenry who intervened, allowing their chief 
official to return home unmolested. 
On the following day, Captain Kennedy responded to a citi­
zens' protest by emphatically denying " having aided, or 
abetted, or offered any assistance to Kinney. " On the third 
day, Kinney and his band were arrested by Greytown authorities 
and taken by Kennedy on board the Jamestown. Under the super­
vision of the British consul, the British flag was hoisted 
and saluted with a one-gun salvo, and then the Mosquito flag 
reappeared on the flag staff. Kinney and his contingent were 
then directed to sign a pledge accepting Kennedy's asylum 
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and agreeing not to return to shore. As soon as possible , 
they would leave "by bungoes or other Conveyance , for the 
interior of the country. " They further promised never again 
to return to Greytown "except with peaceable and friendly 
intentions to the local authorities. "85 
Apparently the Nicaraguan authorities, now back in 
control of their country after the Walker episode, did not 
want Kinney and his party either ; and shortly thereafter 
they quit the country for good. Kinney went to Aspinwall 
and from there to the United States. In the fall of 1858 he 
was back in Texas, where friends urged him to become a 
canidate for governor. Involvement . in a local feud in 
Matamoros resulted in his being shot and killed in 1861. 86 
The effect of the Kinney venture did not loosen the grip 
of the British on Greytown or the Mosquito Coast and did not 
entice American colonists or enterprise into the area, but it 
did along with Walker's escapades--serve to heighten the 
sensitivity of Nicaraguans to American ambitions on the 
Isthmus. It thus aggravated the difficJlties. of other 
Americans trying to establish and maintain a transit route 
through Nicaragua. The proposed routes are shCMil in Figure 6. 
85Mirabeau B. Lamar (United States . Minister to Nicaragua) 
to Lewis B. Cass (Secretary of State), May 26, 1858, National 
Archives , M219 , 11. 
B6scroggs, Filibusters, 132. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE NICARAGUAN TRANSIT ROUTE 
[Regarding] the completion of that enterprize which 
has heretofore engaged the attention of philanthropists 
and statemen for three hundred years without effect • • • 
tell the members. of the Company who have with the aid 
of the United States obtained the power to construct 
this work that if there be any mean spirit of specula­
tion indulged in by them, or any of them, to blight or 
disgrace so glorious an undertaking, they will merit and 
receive the execrations of good men, while on the other 
hand, if they be true to their own honor, their own 
interests and the best interests of their own country, 
and of the human race, their names will be handed down 
to posterity among those of. the noblest benefactors of 
man. 1 
The grandeur of these instructions given by Secretary 
of State John M. Clayton to his consul in Central America, 
Ephraim George Squier, indicates the hopes and expectations 
that were attached to the project of building a canal across 
the Central American Isthmus through Nicaragua in 1850. More 
than three centuries had passed since Charles I of Spain had 
entertained the same dream, but in neither the colonial nor 
the national period oid men or governments have the technology 
or the sense of purpose that activated Americans and some 
Europeans in the mid-nineteenth century. In global terms, 
the man who would become Napoleon III, Emperor of France, 
wrote in 1846: 
The State of Nicaragua can become, better than 
Constantinople, the necessary route of the great 
commerce of the world, and is d.estined to attain an 
extraordinary degree of prosperity and grandeur. 
1 Clayton to Squier, May 7, 1850, National Archives, M77, 27 /104. 
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France, England, and Holland have a great conunercial 
interest in the establishment of a communication be­
tween the two oceans, but England has, more than the 
other powers, a �olitical interest in the execution 
of this project. 
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Americans had a sense of urgency about canal construction 
for a more mundane reason. Before the ink was dry on the 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo whose terms ceded California to 
the United States, gold was discovered at Sutter's Mill on 
California's American River. This discovery, along with the 
long-range necess ity of settling California and Oregon to 
as sure their continued adherence to the Union, caused an almost 
overwhelming demand for some route--other than across the vast 
expanse of the American continent or the long and perilous 
voyage around Cape Horn--from the east coast to the west coast. 
Central America was the logical area in which to undertake 
the establishment of some sort of trans isthmian pas sage and, 
by 1850, a number of routes were already in some stage of 
operation. Two were in Mexico, one utilizing a Vera Cruz­
Mexico City-San Blas route, and the other making a water and 
land crossing of the Tehuantepec Isthmus. Another, and by 
.far the most popular, was the cros sing in Panama (then still 
a part of Colanbia) from Chagres on the Caribbean to Panama 
City on the Pacific. This route was served by a line of 
steamships with irregular schedules:  calling at Chagres was 
the United States Mail Steamship Company ; operating between 
2Napoleon Louis Bonaparte, Canal of Nicaragua, or a Pro­
ject to Connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by Means of a 
Canal (London, 1846) , quoted in Folkman, The Nicaragua Route, 
14. 
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Panama City and San Francisco was the Pacific Mail Steamship 
Company. Unfortunately ·for this route, the passage between 
the two coasts in Panama was both difficult and debilitating. 
Passing the night in the disease-ridden squalor of Chagres 
was so hazardous to the traveler's health that his insurance 
policy carried a cancellation clause in such an event. 3 
From Chagres, only canoes and mules were available for trans­
portation to the embarkation port for San Francisco. In 
addition, by 1850, this route was vastly overladen by the 
tide of humanity bound for the California gold fields. A 
railroad across the Isthmus at Panama, which a trio of Ameri­
can entrepreneurs had contracted to build in that year, would 
not offer relief until its completion five years later. 
A more salubrious route, and one that promised to be 
more feasible, was through the state of Nicaragua. A few ten­
tative efforts had been made· by American companies to incor­
porate this route into a through service from New York or 
New Orleans to San Francisco. Initially, the passage across 
the Is thmus at Nicaragua was not much more inviting than that 
of Panama, except for the beauty of the scenery, the attaction 
of the colonial city of Granada, and the tropical fruits that 
grew in abundance. The passengers debarked at the nondescript 
port town of San Juan del Norte and traveled by hollowed-out 
3Folkman, Nicaragua Route, 2.  
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log canoes called bungos up the 122-mile San Juan River to 
Lake Nicaragua. En . route, the passengers were forced to 
debark at least three times for passage of rapids while 
the bungos were either poled through or portaged around these 
cataracts : Upon reaching Fort San Carlos, where the San Juan 
flows out of Lake Nicaragua, larger craft were boarded for 
the crossing to Granada at the far corner of the lake. The 
trip across the lake could also become eventful, as an early 
traveler suggests : 
the rapacious shark fins his way along, and the timid 
mariner witnesses waterspouts, and experiences the most 
sudden
a 
dangerous squalls met with in any water on the 
globe. 
The last leg, from Granada to the Pacific port of Realejo, 
was accomplished primarily by cart pulled by either oxen or 
mules. The 134-mile journey was particularly difficult during 
the rainy season when the trail was turned into a quagmire. 
One other problem was that, as the Nicaraguan passage was not 
an established route, connections at both San Juan del Norte 
(for those traveling east) and Realejo were far from depend­
able. 
One solution to the arduousness of this passage which 
would later be implemented was the employment of river and 
lake steamers for the water portions of the journey, and a 
shorter and more dependable route from Lake Nicaragua to the 
4Peter F. Stout , Nicaragua: Past, Present and Future 
(Philadelphia : J. E. Potter, 1859), 19. 
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Pacific for the land leg. Another intriguing and more 
. challenging solution was the construction of a trans i �thmian 
canal connecting the Caribbean · and the Pacific, which would 
permit pas sengers to travel from the east ·coast of the United 
States to the west coast without debarking . Planners antici-
· pated that the canal would employ the San Juan River or its 
trough, Lake Nicaragua, and a channel which would be cut at 
some point between the lake and the Pacific Ocean. Original 
expectations were that the canal's western terminus would be 
Realejo, perhaps because Lake Managua, north of Lake Nicara-
qua , could be used to shorten the distance, and because this 
was the traditional outlet for Nicaragua to the Pacific . One 
major i�pediment was the neces sity of constructing a number of 
locks in order to utilize Lake Nicaragua. The lake level was 
128 feet above sea level, while Lake Managua was 156 feet, 5 
thus entailing the construction of at least one lock between 
the two lakes. By comparison , ·it should be observed that Lake 
, 
Gatun, created in the early part of the twentieth century by 
the impoundment of  the Chagres River to provide a channel for 
the Panama Canal, rises only eighty-five feet above sea 
leve16 and requires three locks to ascend there from either 
sea. 
Selection of a route and contracting with the state of 
5Folkman, Nicaragua Route, frontispiece map drawn by 
E. G. Squier. 
6The Panama Canal, 50th Anniversar 1914-64 {Panama : 
The Panama Canal Company, 196 4 ,  69. 
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Nicaragua to build a canal , with the necessary financing and 
technology , were not the only problems faced by prospective 
transportation magnates . A diplomatJc· impasse , long brewing 
in that region of  the Isthmus , made Louis Napoleon's allusion 
to the special British interest quite prophetic . A major 
portion o f  thi s problem could be attributed to one man , the 
British consul-general in Central America , Federick 
Chatfield , who had arrived in Central America in 1 834 like 
a human hurricane , determined to ensure that British interest 
in trade--and perhaps territory--would predominate in that 
area . For the next seventeen years , Chatfield was the domi­
nant foreigner in Central America , and so highhanded and 
overbearing were his tactics that a Salvadoran newspaper was 
moved to complain : 
The ravages of smallpox , cholera , civil war , tyranny , 
barbarism . . • all these pass away . • • •  But 
there is an evil � horrible and interminable , there is 
a living curse which corrodes the vitals of  Central 
America--and that is Chatfield , the eternal Agent of  
Engl and. 7 
· · 
Although Chatfield was unpopular in some quarters of 
Central Arrierica--and in Britain- -he was nonetheless · effective . 
Lord Palmerston ,  who was British Foreign Secretary for 
thirteen of  Chatfield's seventeen years in Central America , 
appeared on many occasions to allow his consul suf ficient 
rein virtually to set British foreign policy for that area . 
7cyril Hamshere ,  The British in the Caribbean (London : 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson , 1 972) , 177. 
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The two men were simi lar in their thinking with respect to 
the leverage Briti sh imperiali sm should a s sume in newly­
developing areas . The Royal Navy wa.s directed to make shows 
of force at Caribbean or Pac ific ports at Chatfield's 
behes t,  in order "to protect British nationals  from inter­
ference in their comrnercial exploits . n 8 
Chatfield's grand des ign , initially encouraged and 
endorsed by Palmerston , wa s Briti sh control of the Isthmus 
of Central America by supervis ion of the Mosquito Territory 
on the �aribbean coasts of Nicaragua , Costa Rica , and 
Honduras ,  and by occupation of i slands and ports in the Gulf 
of Fonseca , shared by El Salvador , Honduras , and . Nicaragua. 
This s cheme implied British control of at lea st one of the 
anticipated termini of the " inevitable " canal , San Juan del 
Norte , and perhaps the others . 9 
8 Ibid . 
9There seems to be some confus ion over the location of 
Realejo. One author states , " [ Chatfield] pointed out to Lord 
Palmerston that the ports of Realej o and La Union , both in 
the Gulf of Fonseca ,  were the most valuable ones between Peru 
and California. The former was the logical terminus of any 
interoceanic passageway through Nicaragua . • • . " Mario 
Rodrfquez ,  A Palmerstonian Diplomat in Central Americ a 
(Tuc son : The University of Arizona Press , 19 64) , 282 . Another 
identifies Realejo , the terminus of the early land trans it 
route and of the proiected canal as the present-day Corinto ,  
which i s  about fifty miles south of the Bav of Fonseca on the 
Nicaraguan coast . Folkman , Nicaragua Route , 5 .  Squier ' s  map 
also puts Realej o there. Rodri'guez ' s  map calls the place 
Cortina (perhaps a mi sprint) and does not have Realejo. 
William Walker also places Realeio · at the s i te of the present 
port of Corinto , when he refers to· the proximity of the island 
of Cardon . William Walker , The War in Nicaragua · ( Detroit :  
Blaine Ethridge , 19 71  ( 18 6 0 ] ) ,  36. 
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Chatfield ' s  opposition to Yankee expans ion, particularly 
after the amicable settlement of the Oregon question and the 
Mexican War, finally affected Whitehall .  The Bri tish occupied 
the Mosquito Coast early in 18 4 8  and quickly extended the "bound­
ary of Mosquito n down to the Colorado River, effectively control­
ling the three mouths of the San Juan River . They thus shut off 
any Caribbean outlet for a Nicaraguan canal not under British 
control. The British consul in New York, trying to interest 
American capital  in a British-bui lt canal, asserted, " From Machuca 
Rapids, . about 3 0  miles below Lake Nicaragua, to the mouth of the 
St . John, the navigation of that river belongs to Mosquito . 11 1 0  
Understandably, a degree of concern about British encroach­
ment in the Isthmus was mounting in Washington . During the Mexi­
can War, · President Pol_k had appointed Eli jah Hise as charge d '  af­
faires in Guatemala ,  instructing him to try to bring about a 
union of Central American states in order to resi :3t the further 
incorporation of the area as a British sphere of influence. He 
was also to report on British activity , and to negotiate treaties 
· 11  of friendship and commerce with the independent states . When 
Palmerston and Chatfield learned of Ilise ' s  mission , they were de­
termined to undermine and thwart it . Chatfield observed, " It 
will I think be necessary to take a high hand with the North Ameri-
. . ,, 12  
cans, if we are to hold our ground in Central America . 
lOM ' l . ' . i es P .  DuVal, Jr . ,  Cadi z to Cathay ( Palo Alto : 
Stanford University Press, 1940 ) ,  5 1. 
11Ibid . 
12Rodriguez, Palm
.
erstonian Diplomat, 2 9 5 .  
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Palmerston's instructions to his consul were to defeat the 
United States' policy "as far · as its .ob ject is hostile to the 
. 
f 
. . ,, 1 3 
interests o Great Britain. Upon Hise's arrival in October, 
1 8 4 8, he found considerable political confusion due to the e f-
f f . . f . 
. 14 
orts o British agents to ornent disruption. 
Probably the major reason the United States did not take 
more vigorous action and confront the British occupation of 
Mosquito with the Monroe Doctrine was that Washington hesitated 
as the Central American states were doing little for themselves. 
They seemed intent upon allowing their patrimony to be nibbled 
away by the British lion while b�ing preoccupied with internal 
dis sension and civil war . Nevertheless , Hise fel t  that it was 
neces sary to negotiate quickly a treaty with Nicaragua to block 
the British efforts to control the canal route, and he forthwith 
asked permission of  the Department of State to execute the agree­
ment. Despite the lack of formal approval he negotiated the 
Hise-Selva Treaty in accordance with Polk administration policies, 
15  
signing it on May 31, 1 849. 
Providing for a right of way for a canal , road, or ra i lroad 
in perpetuity, the treaty permitted fortifications and guaranteed 
the integrity of Nicaragua . Both Hise and his treaty were repu­
diated by the les s expansionist-�inded administration of Polk ' s 
succes sor, Zachary Taylor, and Hise was replaced by Ephraim George 
Squier. With the arrival of Squier on June 6, 1 849, the battle 
for hegemony in Central America between America and Britain was 
13 Ibid . 
1 4-
-
DuVal , CAdi z to Cathay, 5 2 . 
l S I.bid . , 5 3 . 
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under way. The main problems for Squier to solve were which 
of the major powers would supervise the area a s  a sphere of  in­
fluence , along with the capitalists and filibusters from the 
competing· nations , and how much the respective governments could 
and should back the claims of  their citizens. 16 
Secretary of State John M. · Clayton ' s , ins tructions included 
an account of the history of the British claim ·to · Mosquito , as  
well as the recent events and current situation , pointing out that 
Lake Nic�ragua was the key to the passage to the Pacific . In 
treaty negotiations , Squier could assure the Nicaraguans that 
the United States government would use all moral means to dis­
lodge the British from Mosquito . Squier was further directed to 
help acquire a canal contract for American entrepreneurs approved 
by the Nicaraguan government . He was not , however , to guarantee 
the independence of the territory of Nicaragua. The maj or thrust 
of  the canal negotiations should be equality of  transit for all : 
" Our obj ect is as honest as it is clearly avowed , to claim no 
peculiar privilege , no exclusive right , no monopoly of commercial 
intercourse , but to see that the work is dedicated to the benefit 
of mankind. " 1 7 . 
The problem of securing a treaty favorable to and supporting 
a canal contract was not Nicaraguan intransigence. I f  anything , 
the Nicaraguans were even more anxious than the Americans to see 
16clayton to Squier , May 1 ,  1 8 49 ,  National Archives ,  M7 7 ,  
2 7/98 . 
17
Ibi�. , M77,  2 7/ 6 4 . 
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the great dream brought to fruition. Their major concern was 
that the transit should benefit Nicaragua a�d not redound ex­
clusively to the benefit of a foreign power or company. Early 
in 1 849 , Nicaragua had rushed into a contract with Gordon's 
Pass enger Line of New York for the navigation of the San Juan 
River and for making a road across the I sthmus from Lake Nica-
. ,· 
ragua to Realejo. The peculiar situation in which the Secretary 
of State found himself in trying to remain disinterested was 
demonstrated by the fact that he himself had to caution the com­
pany thr-ough his consul. British interests had complained to 
Washington that the contract called for the company to have the 
privilege of maintaining four customs houses , a provision which 
would have conflicted with a contract for a loan made in 1 82 6  by 
a British banking firm , the House of Barclay , Henning & Co . , to 
the late government of Central America , by which the customs 
house revenues of that !�public were pledged for the . securing of 
the loan . Clayton suggested that a stipulation in the contract 
should provide for the assumption of a part of the payment of 
the loan. However , it seems that the customs question faded 
• I I 1 8  during the subsequent wrangling over transit contracts. 
The customs house issue became moot when the Gordon contract 
was abandoned or lost by default. The river steamer sent by the 
company proved defective , and passengers and crew were compelled 
to navigate upstream and through the rapids on the San Juan River 
by poling and paddling any serviceable craft they could obtain . 19  
1 8Ibid . , June 19 , ·  1 8 4 9 , National Archives , M77 , 27/97 . 
19 Folkman , Nicaragu a  Ro�e , · 5 • .  
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The Gordon fiascd provided an opening for Cornelius Vanderbilt, 
a giant among transportation magnates ,  to obtain a charter from 
the Nicaraguan government for the transisthmian transit . Along 
with associates Joseph L .  White and Nathaniel H .  Wolfe, Vander­
bilt organized the American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Com­
pany, on whose behalf the contract was signed on August 26, 1 8 4 9. 
The agreement granted to the company the exclusive privilege of 
constructing a ship canal acros s Nicaragua . The company agreed 
that the canal would be open to the transit of ves sels  of all 
nations,- subj ect to fixed and uniform tol ls. The immediate bene­
fits to Nicaragua would be an initial payment of $ 1 0 , 0 0 0  by the 
company, and a similar amount yearly thereafter until co�pletion 
of the canal . In addition, Nicaragua was to receive $ 2 0 0,0 0 0  
worth of stock in the enterprise , and ten percent of the net pro­
fits of any route which the company might establish. In the rnean­
time, in order to begin_ competing immediately in a realistic 
fashion with the Panama route, the company could install river 
and lake steamers, plus a carriage route for the Lake Nicaragua� 
Pacific portion . Finally, in the event the construction of the 
canal prov&d to be unfeasible or impos sible for engineering or 
other reasons , the company was committed to building a railroad 
across  the I sthmus , or a rail and carriage route which would in­
corporate the utilitarian aspects of the existing water transit. 20 
While these negoti&tions were in progress, Squier was en­
gaged in trying to negotiate a binational treaty that would 
2 Orb id. , 1 8  . 
1 6 6  
provide official protection for the American entrepreneurs. 
He continually found himself frustrated by British intrigue and 
diplomatic maneuvering , and felt that these problems were not 
fully understood and appreciated in Washington. For this reason , 
Squier proceeded to negotiate a pact which provided for the neu­
trality of the canal , as the Department· of State had directed , 
but also conceded a guarantee of Nicaraguan independence , which 
Clayton had specifically forbidden him to do. This latter in­
fraction was one of the reasons for Washington's rejection of 
the agreement. The other was that the treaty had only a twenty­
year duration , whereas the construction contract called for 
eighty-five years ,  and Squier's agreement was subject to ·�nnul­
ment by either party on twe J ve months noti�P- . In his  meRs�ge 
of rejection , Clayton advised Squier that more instructions 
would be forthcoming after the settlement of a treaty with the 
0 0 h d I 1 d f I I 
2 1  
Briti s to i s  o ge them rom the Mosquito Territory. 
But Squier was still on the move. He negotiated another 
treaty , this time with Honduras , in which that state agreed to 
cede Tigre Island in the Bay of Fonseca to the United States for 
eighteen months and to permit a naval station. on the Gulf of 
Fonseca for the protection of the Pacific end of  the canal. 
When the British received news of the Honduran treaty , Captain 
T. A. Paynter , on the advice of Chatfield , appeared at Tigre 
Island with a squadron on October 16 , 1 8 49. He seized the island 
and raised the British flag , thereby establishing British power 
21clayton to Squier , November 20 , 1850 , National Archives , M77 ,  27 /101. 
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on both sides of the Isthmus and presumably at the terminal points 
of the proposed canal. After Squier'� prot�st that they were oc­
cupying United States territory was ignored by the British, the 
American diplomat issued an ultimatum threatening to use American 
force if the island were not evacuated within six days ; the British 
. 2 2 
backed down and withdrew. Al though the Uni·ted 'States never sub-
sequen tly implemented the terms of the Squier treaty , this was 
probably the closest that the two nations came to armed hostili­
ties during the protracted conflict over transit and hegemony on 
the Isthmus . 
A welcome note of harmony was introduced when the United 
States Minister to Great Britain , Abbott Lawrence , addressed on 
2 3  December 14 , 1 8 4 9 ,  an eloquent appeal to Lord Palmerston. A 
canal built by "the two greatest conunercial nations on earth , " 
Lawrence said , would "perpetuate peace between Great Britain and 
the United States. " 
It is our mission to extend commerce , the pioneer of 
civilization and child of peace , to all parts of the 
world , to cultivate friendly relations with all , to 
bring the distant near ; and to illustrate by our ex­
ample the elevating effects of Christianity. 
The canal would be " given up to the use of the world , dedicated 
to peace, and [would bring ] incalcul�ble benefits to mankind. " 
The two countries should invite all nations to j oin in guarantee­
ing the canal's neutrality to avoid .the possibility of future 
friction 
2 2ouVal , Cadiz to Cathay, 5 5. 
2 3Ibid. , . 5 9.  
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To a large d.egree , this mes sage prompted Palmerston to 
instruct Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer , British Minister in Wash­
ington , to work out a satis factory agreement with Secretary 
Clayton . Clayton , who was taking time out from a distingu­
ished senatorial career to serve as Secretary of  State in the 
truncated administration of Zachary Taylor, was a commercial 
expansionist , but not an imperialist . In the Senate , he had 
opposed the annexation of Texas and the Mexican War ,  and he 
did not intend to see American sovereignty extended any further 
while h� was the nation's chief diplomatic officer . As a result , 
he ran counter to the tides of  Manifest Destiny that were sweep­
ing the nation . Although he regarded . the treaty he signed with 
Bulwer on April 19, 19 5 0 , as the crowning achievement of  his po-
litical career , it was probably "the most . persistently unpopular 
2 4  
treaty" in American history because o f  the constraints it im-
posed upon American activity in Central America .  Clayton was 
almost_  euphoric in his description to Sequier of  what the treat�{ 
was designed to do . 2 5  
The obj ect i s  to secure the protection o f  the British 
Government to the Nicaragua Canal and to liberate Cen­
tral America f,rom the dominion of any foreign power 
. • . •  [ It will ]  secure the passage across the I sth-
mus and any and every other practicable· pas sage whether 
by Canal or Railway at Tehuantepec , Panama · or elsewhere 
• . . •  All other nations that shall navigate the Gana! 
will  have to become guarantors of Central America and 
the Mosquito Coast . • • .  The agreement is not to erect 
or maintain any fortification commanding the canal or in 
2 4Alexander de Conde , "John M .  Clayton , 1 7 9 6- 1 8 5 6 , "  Ency­
clopa�dia Britannica , V { Chicago : Encyclopaedia Britannica , 
Inc . ,  19 7 0 ) , 8 9 3. 
2 5 Clayton to Squier , May 7 ,  1850 , National Archives, M77 , 27 /104 . 
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the vicinity· thereof nor to occupy , fortify , colonize  or 
assume , or exercise any dominion whatever over any part 
of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or Central 
America, nor to make use of any protection or alliance 
for any of those purposes . 
Clayton then addressed himself  to the effect the treaty should 
haveon Britain's Mo squito Protectorate. Warming to his subject, 
. ·)�, 
the Secretary betrayed a startling ingenuousness  and an interest-
ing insight into the attitude o{ the American government towards 
its own indigenous population. 
I trust that means will  speedily be adopted by Great 
Britain to extinguish the Indian title • • • •  We 
have never acknowledged • • •  the existence of any 
claim of  sovereignty in the Mosquito King or any other 
Indian in America . To do so would be to deny the title 
of the United States to our own territory . Having al­
ways regarded an Indian title as a mere right of occµ­
pancy, we can never agree that such a title should be ·  
treated otherwise than as a thing to be extinguished 
at the will of the discoverer of the country. 
Following the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty, the American Atlantic 
and Pacific Ship Canal Company made preliminary plans for carry­
ing out the requirements of  their contract with Nicaragua. The 
company sent retired Colonel Orville W. Childs to make the canal 
survey across  the I sthmus in Nicaragua . Starting work in August , 
185 0, he completed his report in March, 1 8 5 2, after a thorough 
investigation and systematic elimination of undes irable routes . 
Child s' recommendation adopted the familiar route via the San Juan 
River and . Lake Nicaragua, but deviated from the traditional version 
· on the Pacific side by selecting Brito as the best terminus . The 
Caribbean s ide would have twelve locks, with thirteen on the Paci­
fic s lope . The · cost .was estimated at $ 31,5 38,319 and the time 
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for completion at· six years. The Childs report , which was pre­
· sented to President Millard Fillmore ,· was checked by two United 
States Army engineers and found to be feasible. 26 
The report showed that a canal was technically and finan­
cially practicable , but the size  was an unresolv�d question . It 
was to be seventeen feet deep , fifty feet wide at the bottom , and 
2 7  
118  feet wide at the top. The fact that it would not meet the 
specifications in the charter accommodating vessels of all  sizes 
was brushed aside by Vanderbilt . Unfortunately , convincing British 
financiers of the feasibility of a limited-use canal proved to 
be more difficult . In  the early summer of 1 8 5 2 , Vanderbilt com­
missioned Childs to present his report to British enginee�s and 
Londo� capitalists . The engineers appointed by the British gov­
ernment approved the report , but those retained by the British 
banking firm of Baring Brothers were less sanguine. The latter 
examination prompted th� London firms to demur from financing 
the project .  They pointed out that while great advantage would 
accrue to the United States from such . a  proj ect , the limited size  
of the proposed canal would prevent nearly two-thirds of the East 
Indian and western American trade--the only trade in which the 
canal would prove serviceable to Europe--from passing through the 
canal . Also , the Orient trade would probably opt to continue us-
: ing the route around Africa as the distance was 1 , 500 miles shorter. 
In addition , the original plan for the Suez Canal had been drawn 
26nuVal , Cadiz to· Cathay, 6 7 . 
2 7The original locks of the Panama Canal could accommodate 
ships 110  feet wide and drawing forty feet in salt water . 
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up in 184 6, and tne possibility of this_ route would be far more 
attractive to British shippers . Finally, the heavy toll  of three 
dollars a ton proposed for passage would probably discourage even 
ships of  the proper size from using the Nicaraguan canal . On a 
ves sel  of 1,0 0 0  tons, the tol l would be $ 3,00 0--more than the 
average earnings of  such vessel-s · on their voyages. Increasing 
the size of the proposed canal to accommodate all ves sels would 
swell  the cost to about $1 0 0, 0 0 0,0 0 0, a sum beyond the private 
capabilities of any one country . As Vanderbilt and his associates 
felt they could not finance the construction alone, they were 
forced to abandon the project . 2 8 . 
In the meantime � however, Vanderbilt had proceeded with 
establishing an interim water and land route which ultimately 
became the only route . The traditional route on the Pacific 
side had been from Granada to Realejo, employing the only servi­
ceable road between the . lake and the ocean. Some Americans, 
early arrivals who hoped to get in on the ground floor of what 
they expected to be a bonanza, had already begun establishing 
businesses along this route. Several had married natives and 
had settled in to await inevitable prosperity . These  men were 
subsequently disappointed when the lake-ocean route was changed, 
and buildings and businesses were abandoned at a great los s. 
The British vice-consul at Realejo  reported in December, 
1 8 5 0, that the Nicaraguans treated the passengers going through 
quite well, probably because those from California, particularly, 
2 8Fo lkman, Nicaragua Route, 3 5 . 3 6 . 
1 72 
spent liberally . The Nicaraguans especially needed forebear­
ance because the Americans were a "turbulent set of  people 
interspersed , here and there , with some of  the most violent 
characters on earth . ". The commentator noted that the least 
respectable probably used the route as it was much cheaper than 
the Panamanian alternative. He then described the rest o f  the 
j ourney , across the lake by schooners because the transit company 
had been unable to get lake steamers up the rapids ,  and by bun­
gos down the river . Viewing the difficulties and hardships of  
this trek , he  was less  than complimentary in his remarks about 
the transit company leadership . 2 9 
The New York Company must have been much misled and 
ill-informed by their agents in this country ; American 
enterpri ze and their great experience in River Steam 
Navigation are so prominent , that one is astoni shed at 
their want of foresight in almost everything relating 
to this undertaking , as we ll in competent persons to 
direct, as in materials and money. 
· The vice-consul was equally indignant in his asses sment o f  
the Nicaraguan government : 
Amidst all the excitement , · the - government appears the 
only party who does not enter into the American spirit 
of go-aheadism. It gives not the least attention to 
matters of the most vital importance to its welfare and 
improvement , but squanders its time and money in idle 
disruptions and intrigues ;  whilst its Finances are in 
the most serious condition ; and in its blind compliance 
to certain parties at the commencement of the California 
traffic , omitted to obtain the slightest  privilege to im­
prove its revenues . 3 0 
2 9John Foster to Chatfield , December 3 1 , 1 8 5 0 . Foster made 
his report available to U. S .  Navy _ Commander William L. Hudson , who 
forwarded it on June 1 4 , 1 8 5 1 , to Navy Secretary William P:.. . Graham. 
National Archives , Tl52 , 1/19-26 . Foster ' s  report was out.dated by the time it . 
reached Chatfield ' s  hands , and certainly so by the time Gran.am received it . 
30Ibid . 
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The s ituation pictured in the latter obs ervation would 
continue to exist  throughout the life· of this transisthmian 
service . American financiers put tog�ther a serviceable and 
imaginative route, engaged in internecine s trife over the con­
trol of the enterprise, and then watched the route deteriorate 
in struggles with American filibus ters , and all without refer­
ence to the native Nicaraguan government. 
With respect to the vice-consul ' s  views on the route it­
self, problem solving had already begun when he submitted his 
report. A lake steamer was winched past  the worst  of the San 
Juan River rapids in November , 1 8 5 0 , and immediately went into 
service . A series of small river steamers were introduced to 
ply between the rapids , though passengers continued to disem­
bark to make the journey on foot around these cataracts. Later , 
a small railroad was built to carry the passengers and their 
bagg�ge around Castillo Viejo, the largest of  the river rapids . 
Vanderbilt himself  went down to oversee ·the progres s  in January, 
1 8 51. Under his direction , a new lake-ocean route was laid out 
which would utili ze the shortest  distance between the two points. 
From Virgiri Bay on the lake , to San Juan del Sur on the Pacific, 
the distance was only twelve miles, but forest and undergrowth 
had to be cleared to provide for passage of  oxen and mule-driven 
carts. 31  
31Folkman , Nicaragua Route , 2 6. 
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Located just a few miles south of  Brito , t�e site selected 
by the canal engineers for the Pacific terminus ,  San Juan del 
Sur had been an overlooked jewel on Nicaragua's Pacific coast . 
The · entrance to the bay was guarded by towering cliffs , .and 
though the tides were sometimes tricky , all the port needed were 
wharves and service areas ·. · ' 'The port, probably because of  its 
isolation , had been rarely used previously . American ships cal­
ling there had amounted to no more than four small brigs or 
schooners a year . 3 2  The service point on the Caribbean side 
was located at Punta Arenas , the sand pit which formed the bay 
o f  San Juan del Norte , and across  from the town of  San Juan del 
Norte or Greytown , as the British called it. The selectiop of  
these. sites completed the initial transit route design . The 
first east-to-west transit over the new route was made on August 
3 0 ,  1 8 51. 3 3  
In that same month , Vanderbilt turned his attention to a 
reorganization scheme for his company . A new corporate person­
ality , the Accessory Transit Company , , was grafted onto the ex­
isting organization , the American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal 
Company . The A . T . C .  would have the responsibility for carrying 
pas sengers across the I sthmus , while the Canal Company woul.d con­
cern itself solely with the construction of the canal ( the plan 
. had not yet been abandoned) . Finally , the Vanderbilt Line , a 
3 2Francis V .  Clark ( commercial agent at San Juan del Sur) 
to James Buchanan ( Secretary of State ) , September 8 ,  1 847 , Tl5 2 , 
1/1 . 
3 3 Folkman , Nicaragua Route , 3 2. 
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company operating· ocean steamers , . would carry passengers be­
tween ports in the United States and ·ports qn the Isthmus. 3 4  
Before Vanderbilt could turn his entire attention to the 
transit project , he had to face the problem of  the prior British 
presence. Although there would later be disagreements between 
Washington and London over .whethe·r or not the Clayton-Bulwar 
Treaty was retrospective in application , particularly with re­
spect to British occupation of the Mosquito Coast ,  Lord Palmer­
ston seemed initially to be conscientiously trying to live up 
to the spirit of the accord. The two countries had agreed 
jointly to support Vanderbilt's · company in its efforts to con­
struct a transit route through Nicaragua. In keeping with this 
commitment , the Foreign Secretary had encouraged British bankers 
to welcome Vanderbilt ' s request for financial support , and had 
promised the company that the authorities at Greytown would not 
interfere with transit construction. One o f  the provisions of  
the agreement was the establishment of  free ports at  the termini 
of the passageway across the Isthmus. For this reason , Palmer­
ston vetoed Chatfield ' s tariff schedule and made Greytown a free 
port. Unfortunately , this left Greytown without revenue for its 
garrison , so the citizens organiz ed _a municipality and began 
charging minor port fees . As fate would intervene , on November 21 , 
185 1 , the first ocean steamer to confront the new levies , the 
Prometheus , had carried Cornelius Vanderbilt on board. Vanderbilt 
ob j ected saying that these fees violated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
3 4Ibid. , 3 3. 
1 7 6  
and Lord Palmerston ' s  assurances. But when the British war­
ship Express, designated to enforce · the municipal regulations, 
fired across the bow of the Prometheus, Vanderbilt paid under 
protest. Subsequently, he complained to the State Department, 
and they referred the protest to the Foreign Office. On January 
1 1, 1852, the British government disavowed the action and apolo-
· gized . Repercussions were far-reaching, however, as Palmerston 
had resigned a month earlier, and Chatfield was recalled a few 
weeks later . 35 The only other major problem that Vanderbilt ' s  
company �incurred with Greytown was the one which had resulted in 
the bombardment of the town by the American sloop-of-war Cyane 
on July 1 3, 1854. Joseph L. White, a· director of the Accessory 
' t  C ' 1 ' d ' h t ' . d 3 6  Transi ompany, was 1.mp_1ca.te in t a 1nc1 ent. 
One other diplomatic issue remained with respect to the 
transit route between Lake Nicaragua and the Caribbean , the 
long-standing claim of Costa Rica to the south bank of the San 
Juan River. Apparently, at one time or another the transit com­
pany had entertained the idea of damming the Colorado River, the 
southern-most distributary of the San Juan, at its j uncture with 
the San Juan. Originally, this plan would have formed part of 
the canal-and-locks proj ect. Later, it was probably anticipated 
that this diversion would insure that the major flow of the San 
Juan would exit by the northern-most mouth, at San Juan del Norte. 
35Mario Rodriguez, Central America (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : 
Prentice-Hall, 19 6 5 ) ,  87 , 88 . 
3 6  Henry L .  Kinney, " Pronunciamento, " New York Weekly Post, 
September 6, 1855. 
177 
This  control of water flow would not only facil�tate naviga-
tion over the San Juan River rapids, but would serve to alle­
viate silting conditions in the Bay of San Juan. Felipe Molina, 
the Costa Rican minister to Washington , wrote a letter to the 
transit company president and other officers objecting to the 
plan, and forwarded a copy to the State Department . In addition , 
Molina alleged abuses of Costa Rican sovereignty at Punta Arenas 
(across the bay from San Juan del Norte) and at Castillo Viejo. 
He contended that these points were entirely within Costa Rican 
territory , and that Costa Rica had granted the canal concession 
to a competing American firm , the Costa Rican Transit Company. 
Molina called on the United States government to guarante� Costa 
Rican interests. The State Department advised him that adherence 
to his request was impossible. The United States , it replied , 
protected American companies and citizens equally , but had no 
warrant to protect the territorial integrity of another state , 
that being. the state's own responsibility. If Costa Rica could 
show that the transit company was clearly in the wrong , and could 
"legally claim and maintain" its title against the transit com­
pany , the United States would not interfere. 3? Under the cir­
cumstances , Molina was faced with a fait accompli , at least for 
the time being. 
Except for the problems associated with the juridical status 
of the British protectorate of the Mosquito littoral and the 
Costa Rican claim , the transition to a major transisthmian route 
3 7 Molina to Marcy, November 14, 1854, National Archives, M99 , 10/69. 
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at San Juan del Norte was made with relatively few impediments. 
The story was different on the Pacific side at San Juan del Sur. 
There the transformation from a sleepy fishing vill age to a maj or 
terminal caused serious dislocations , many of them the results 
of interference by local Nicaraguan officials who had no in­
structions or conflicting ones from their government. The Ameri­
can consul at San Juan del Sur seemed most distressed at the 
workload the confusion gave him , and complained to the Department 
of State in January , 18 52 . 
I am now too old to endure all  that I have gone thru 
here--and God knows--I have gone thru more since I have 
been here than all  the rest of my life put together .  
For I do not much admire the idea of dying here like a 
dog--and I am now rather too poor to leave without so�e­
thing else in view , while I do stay I wil l  endeavor to 
do my duty if Providence spares mv life . 3 8 
The major early problem at San Juan del Sur , and on the en­
tire East Coast-San Francisco transit , was one of numbers . The 
avarice of Vanderbilt combined with the pressure of  masses want­
ing to make the journey placed an overload on the system. One of 
the passengers angrily inquired of the State Department if 
it is not time that the government should pass an act 
of Congress restricting the proprietors of California 
steamers from crowding their vessels with human souls 
without comfort or proper accommodations . . • .  A 
conunercial agent should be appointed forthwith at San 
Juan del Sur to compel Vanderbilt to show mercy and 
j ustice to emigrants . 3 9 
38w .  F .  Boone to Daniel Webster ( Secretary of  State) , Janu­
ary 13 , 18 52 , National Archives , ' T152 , 1/17 , 18 . Boone seemed 
to experience difficulties in finding his proper geographical 
niche. He was originally named to Realej o ,  but when the transit 
company selected San Juan del Sur as the terminal site , he re­
quested _that the Sta te Department station him there , and give 
-1 7 9  
Meanwhile , according to one authority , Vanderbi�t was pocket­
ing a sizable fortune through manipulation of rates ; after two 
years of transit company operations , nearly two million dol lars 
--virtually . the entire earnings of the steamships--had found 
their way into the Commodore ' s  coffers . 40 
On February 14 , 1 8 5 3 , Vanderbilt sold his interest in the 
transisthmian pas sage to the Acces sory Transit Company directors 
in preparation for a long-awaited European cruise. Unfortunately 
for Vanderbilt , his legacy of busines s  acumen and ruthlessnes s  
fell  on two former colleagues : Charles Morgan , company manager 
in New York , and Cornelius K. Garrison , Morgan ' s  counterpart in 
San Francisco. Morgan and Garrison manipulated the company stock 
him the responsibilities of commercial agent for all of Nica­
ragua ' s Pacific coast. If  this could not be arranged , he sug­
gested to the Department that it find him another suitable port ; 
perhaps Antwerp. Boone to Webster , August 3 1 ,  1 8 5 1 , National 
Archives ,  Tl52 , 1/2 9 . After his complaint about San Juan del 
Sur ,  he requested trans fer to San Juan del Norte . Subsequently , 
he changed his mind when he heard that both climate and emolu- · 
ments were worse at the latter place , but unfortunately , the 
Department had already issued the directive for his trans fer 
and for the appointment of Loomis L. White as consul at San Juan 
del Sur .  Boone to Webster , April 1 6 , 1 8 5 2 , ibid . , 1/6 7.  White 
was not particularly popular among American transients at the 
Pacific port. One pas senger complained to the State Department 
that White was buying tickets of dead pas sengers and sel ling 
them at double the price to live ones. Bernard O. Kane to 
Edward Everett ( Secretary of State ) , January 2 6 ,  18 5 3 , ibid . ,  
1/8 4 . 
--
3 9Ibid . 
40Folkman , Nicaragua Route , 54 , 5 5. 
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on the New York exchange to gain complete control of  the Board 
of Directors . After Morgan was elected president of the Acces­
sory Transit Company on July 18 , the company charged Vanderbilt 
with indebtedness  to the company and suspended further payments 
on the purchase contract. 41  
When Vanderbilt returned· : 'froni Europe in September and learned 
what had transpired , he promised to "ruin " the Morgan and Garrison 
faction for "cheating"  him . His first move was to establish a 
competing line using the Panama route , and in a short time , both 
the Mail Steamship Company and Morgan and Garrison were compelled 
to buy him out . Part of  the agreement was that Vanderbilt pledged 
himself  not to open any more competing lines . The contract ,  how­
ever , did not provide for the cessation of  his efforts to regain 
control of  the Accessory Transit Company , which he continued 
attempting to do . 4 2  
Despite preoccupation with the Vanderbilt challenge , the 
company under Morgan and Garrison proceeded apace with improve­
ments to the transit route across  the Isthmus. Wharves were built 
at Virgin Bay , the lake port ,  and at San Juan del Sur , along with 
a macadamized ·carriage road between the two points .  New carriages 
arrived in �ebruary , 1 8 5 4 ,  and the caravan of twenty-five carri­
ages painted in the Nicaraguan colors of  blue and white was an 
impres sive sight as well  as a luxury to the transients. In addi­
tion , by the spring of  185 5 ,  new lake steamers with s leeping quar­
ters and dining facilities had been introduced. By then , the 
41Ibid. , 48. 
42lhid. , 56 .. 
1 8 1  
passage from New York to San Francisco had been reduced to 
· twenty-one days, with only twenty-one· and one-half hours of 
that time required for transit across  the I sthmus. In 1 8 54 
alone, over 13,0 0 0  pas sengers made the trip,43  and by early 
1 8 5 5, ·the number was still rising. 
The government of Nicaragua was also aware of the succe ss  
of the enterprise, and began to wonder officially what had 
happened to its share of the profits . The transit company had 
unfailingly submitted the $ 1 0,0 0 0  annual payment, but · had j ust 
as unfailingly reneged on the ten percent of the profits that 
the contract anticipated . The company claimed that there were 
no profits, that all income from the transisthmian route pad been 
reinv�sted in improvements on the line . The Nicaraguan govern­
ment maintained that either there � profits, or the company 
• <· 
had charged low rates through Nicaragua and high rates on the 
ocean to keep the profi�s down . 44 At any rate, the government 
sent two inexperienced agents to New York in June, 18 5 5, to nego­
tiate with the company regarding the �mount that the company al­
legedly owed Nicaragua . In a tacit admission that the percentage 
had, in fact, been illegally withheld, the company bickered over 
the amount, not the question itself. Eventually, the matter was 
referred to specially selected commis sioners to arbitrate, a move 
which was in accord with the provisions of the contract. It was 
at this point that the filibuster William Walker arrived on the 
43Ibid . , 5 7-59. 
44New York Herald, March 3 1 �  1 8 5 6 . 
scene in Nicaragua , and both the negotiations and the arbitra­
tion were subvertea. 45 
Walker and a number of men he recruited in the San Francisco 
area had been hired in June , 1 8 54 ,  as auxiliaries by the liberal 
faction in Nicaragua ' s  civil war. His ambitions ,  however , were 
far more grandiose than those · of  ··1nere·1y· helping weigh the con­
flict toward one of the competing sides. Though historians are 
not in complete agreement about Walker ' s  initial intentions , it 
appears that he planned from the very beginning to parley his 
role into mastery of Nicaragua and , subsequently , to establish a 
superstate in Central America and the Caribbean. The transit 
route would necessarily play a maj or role in these plans , and it 
would be largely responsible for . his early succe ss , as well as 
ultimately the cause of the demise of his project. 
Walker arranged with the liberal faction to have his Ameri­
can filibusters , along with a contingent of native auxiliaries , 
formed into a separate military unit , the American Phalanx. 
Rather than continue the liberal army strategy of frontal assaults 
on the conservative capital of Granada , Walker made his initial 
thrusts at the transit route , some seventy-five miles south of 
Granada . The primary reason for this strategy was that Walker 
realized it would be neces sary for him to control the route and 
provide for continuing reinforcements from the United States if 
his overall plan of conquest was to be successful . The move pro­
duced an unexpected and significant benefit : the conservative 
45scioggs , Filibusters , 1 3 6. 
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army moved south ·out of Granada to intercept the anticipated 
filibuster march toward the capital . This manuever left Gra­
nada virtually undefended, and Walker commandeered a transit 
company lake steamer to transport his troops north for an at­
tack on the city. By October 13, Walker and his Phalanx were 
in control of  the capital, · .and ·the,reafter used the families 
o f  the conservative leaders as hostages to bring his opponents 
to terms . The result was that, for the next year and a half, 
William Walker was the de facto chief of Nicaragua . 
In the meantime, although Morgan and Garrison were re­
peating the Vanderbilt story of
.
manipulating the company for 
personal gain, their control appeared to be  s lipping . Vanderbilt 
had obtained an inj unction against the issuance of more stock 
and against further contracts . between the company and Morgan 
and Garrison . This inj unction, plus reports of renewed hosti­
lities in Nicaragua, caused the company ' s  stock to decline 
severely . Vanderbilt and his friends were quietly picking up a 
large amount of  the floating s tock, and Morgan and Garrison re­
alized that it was j ust a matter of time until the old Commodore 
use� this leverage to regain control . They felt  that some dra­
matic move had to be taken in order _to put the company and its 
Nicaraguan contract beyond Vand�rbilt ' s  reach . 46 This move, they 
determined, could best be implemented in conj unction with the new 
Nicaraguan chief, William Walker. 
46Folkman, Nicaragua Route, 75. 
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Soon after Walker's coup in Granada , Morgan and Garrison 
dispatched agents to Nicaragua to discus s terms with him . 
The first of the agents , Charies J .  McDonald , advanced him 
$ 20 , 000 in gold bullion on the· spot . McDonald took the bul­
lion from a shipment in transit from California , and gave 
the owners drafts on Morgan - · in " ·lfew York , drafts that were 
subsequently honored . Walker secured the "loan " with the 
understanding that it would be deducted from the annual pay­
ments made by the company to the Nicaraguan government ac­
cording to the franchise contract. 47 In San Francisco , 
Garrison showed his good faith ·by ensuring that every company 
steamer that left that port carried a number of filibuster 
recruits . 48  
To capitalize on this larges se, Garrison sent his son , 
along with Edmund Randolph , to explain to Walker how the be­
nefactors were to be benefitted . Randolph , grandson of the 
Virginia statesman of the same name, was an old friend of 
Walker from their days as struggling young lawyers in New 
Orleans before 1 8 5 0 . The acquaintance had been renewed in 
San Francisco , and Randolph helped Walker plan his expedition 
and later secured recruits in California to be sent to Nicara­
gua . 49 Randolph urged Walker to nullify Vanderbilt's contract 
47scroggs , Filibusters , 1 2 5 . 
48rbid . , 1 3 3 . 
49charles Morgan to John P .  Heiss ,  June 2 0 , 1 8 5 6 , Heiss 
Papers , Tennessee State Historical Society , Nashville. 
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on the basis of  non-compliance wlth its provisions and to 
confiscate the transit company property . Walker would then 
negotiate a new contract with Morgan and Garrison in exchange 
for their continued . support of his operations . 5 0  While these 
negotiations were going on, a Walker agent, Parker H .  French, 
was in New York enlisting· - Morgan ' s · ��·pp�rt for an arrangement 
whereby recruits would be trnasported to Nicaragua by the 
company at twenty dollars a head . The transportation fees 
would then be  deducted from the amount the company allegedly 
owed because of its recalcitrance on profit percentage remit­
tance which its contract with the Nicaraguan government called 
for . Not suspecting the preemptory arrangements being prepared 
in Nicaragua , Vanderbilt �ct cnly acquiesced in the scheme, 
but actively supported it, apparently feeling that stabiliza­
tion along the route could be achieved by Walker and would 
eventually redound to the Commodore ' s  benefit . 5 1  Randolph ' s  
terms were even more persuasive, however . Not on ly would the 
Morgan-Garrison faction provide passage at company expense 
for filibusters, but it would actively engage in recruiting 
efforts for Walker which would include advertising for . " colo­
nists " (the euphemism employed to circumvent United States 
neutrality laws ) in New York and New Orleans newspapers . 5 2  
S OWilliam 0 .  Scroggs, "William Walker ' s  Designs on Cuba , " 
Mis sis sippi Valley Historical Review, I ( September, 1 9 1 4 ) ,  2 0 2 . 
5 1scroggs, "William Walker and the Steamship Corporation 
in Nicaragua , " Ame�J.can Historical Review, X ( 1 9 0 5 ) , 7 9 2-8 11 . 
5 2  Scroggs ,  Filibusters , 1 3 9 . 
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With all factions of the transit company at least 
temporarily supporting Walker in his efforts to introduce 
legions of Americans into Central America, hundreds o f  re-
· cruits began pouring into both terminals of  the Nicaraguan 
transit route. This movement aroused the concern of Central 
Americans outside of Nicaragua. Antonio Josl de Irissarri , 
Minister for Guatemala and Salvador at Washington ,  complained 
to Secretary Marcy that state authorities and the United 
State� government were doing nothing about preventing the 
departure of  the filibusters . Marcy advised Irisarri that 
the neutrality laws of the United States were quite adequate , 
and that they were being enforced in good faith . Unfortu­
nately, it was not always possible to identify eitheL the 
destination or purposes of  passengers embarking for the tran­
sisthmian route , and Marcy disavowed any responsibility of 
th� United States to �o beyond routine enforcement . The Sec­
retary conceded that some of  the miners returning from San 
Francisco to their homes in the Atlantic states might have 
been converted to filibusterism en route. Obviously , these 
passengers couldn't be distinguished from any others at _the 
port of embarkation . He deplored the civil war in Nicaragua 
and opined that peaceful changes in government were much to 
be preferred . Nevertheless , the United States did not feel 
constrained to interfere as long as the rights of  its citi-
5 3  
zens were not affected . 
53Marcy to Irisarri, December 6 , ·  1855, National Archives, M99,10/96 . 
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Apparently . not fully aware o f  the extent of  Vander­
bilt's cooperation and that Vanderbilt had recently regained 
the presidency of the company, Walker went ahead .with the 
charter cancellation decree . The steamer carrying word of  
the confiscation passed en route a steamer carrying two hun­
dred and fifty Vanderbilt- sponsored recruits. Many of these 
men were foreigners, particularly Cuban revolutionists, 
among them Domingo de G0icouria. Upon his arrival in Granada 
on March 9, 18 5 6, Goicouria was ama zed at Walker ' s  audacity 
in his challenge to Vanderbilt . Nevertheless , the Cuban 
subsequently served Walker in both military and diplomatic 
capacities . 54 
As soon as Vanderbil t received word of  Walker ' s  decree , 
he went into action . His first move--that of  requesting 
Marcy to intervene--was desultory . The irony was that 
Jos�ph L .  White, Vand�rbilt ' s  associate, had, only a few weeks 
earlier when his faction was supporting Walker, arrogantly 
disdained to recognize any United States ' j urisdiction in the 
entire issue . More appropriate and more e ffective was Van­
derbilt's move to withdraw his ocean steamers and thereby 
isolate the transit route entirely . Unfortunately for Walker, 
Morgan and Garrison were not yet ready to take up the s lack. 
When this news reached the stock exchange, company shares 
54 scroggs, " Walker and Cuba , 1 1  2 0 3  . 
plummetted precipitously, and Wall Street thought Walker 
a fool. �5 The New York Herald lamented: 
The great mass of the American people sympathize 
deeply with the present government of Nicaragua 
and will regret to find that its gallant head has 
perilled its hitherto bright prospects. It will 
· be seen that it is in Mr. Vanderbilt's power to 
kill off the new government by opening another 
route and thus cutting off Walker's communication 
with San Francisco and New York. 56 
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Not only did Walker need recruits, but also a massive 
infusion of capital in order to stabi�ize his embryonic re­
gime. He dispatched Goicouria to Great Britain to attempt 
to obtain a loan. The agent went by way of New York , and 
there initially monitored the activities of Randolph who was 
undertaking the same project with Morgan. Goicouria wrote 
to Walker that he didn ' t  think the Morgan-Garrison clique 
could handle the loan , and offered a counter-proposal. The 
San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua should become international 
waterways , Morgan-Garrison should have the franchise over 
only the land portion of the route and would pay the Nicara­
guan government according to tonnage and passengers, and the 
anticipated government income should be used to secure the 
loan in the open market. In the meantime, the peripatetic 
Cuban determined on his own to approach Vanderbilt, who agreed 
to reopen service. Still hoping to gain exclusive control , 
the Conunodore promised to advance the Nicaraguan government 
55s�roggs, Filibusters, 152-53. 
56New York Herald , March 15 , 1856. 
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$10 0, 0 0 0  on the ·  day his first s�ip sailed for Nicaragua, 
and $150,0 0 0  more during the following ye�r . Walker's  re­
sponse, probably because he found Vanderbilt ' s opportunism 
highly suspect, was an outright rej ection of the offer. Up­
on the strength of  rumors, Walker also accused Goicouria of 
being Vanderbilt's agent . The . Cu]:)an. , .. :vehemently denied it, 
excoriated Walker's imperious attitude, and resigned . " The 
filibuster leader thus threw away his last change to make 
friends with Vanderbilt and redeem the greatest blunder of 
his career . 11 5 7  
On another front, Vanderbilt took the issue to the 
courts. In New York, the company steamers were placed in 
his hands as trustee, but a number of stockholders sued in 
order to get a receiver to conclude the business  of the com­
papy and distribute its as sets. Vanderbilt asserted that the 
revocation decrees had no validity as they were not issued 
by any lawful authority. The New York Supreme Court found 
otherwise on November 3, observing that the decrees were 
issued by a de facto government, and that the annulment of 
the charter was an historic fact, regardless  of any consider­
ations of j ustice . 58  The steamers were therefore placed in 
the hands of a receiver and sold. In December, Vanderbilt 
brought suit in the United States Circuit Court in New York 
5 7scroggs , "Walker and Cuba, " 2 0 5-6. 
58New York Herald, November 4, 18 5 6. 
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in the name of the transit company against Morgan, Garrison, 
and · walker for the sum of $1,000,000, alleging trespass, 
conversion, and disposal of the company's goods, and fraudu­
lent conspiracy to .interrupt and molest the corporation in 
the discharge of its lawful business . 59 
The revocation decree that -caused the legal skirmishing 
was is sued by the Nicaraguan provisional government, which 
was under Walker's control, on February 1 8, 1 8 5 6, and published 
in the New York Times on March 1 5 . It pointed out that the 
original conces sion of September 2 2, 1 8 4 9, and subsequent 
modifications called for the transit company to build either 
a canal, a railroad, or a railroad-carriage road acros s  the 
Isthmus, ncr1G of which had been done . In addition ,. the com-
pany had failed to comply with the stipulated payments of 
$10,000- per year and ten per cent of the profits . Finally, 
the company had failed to respond to a request by Nicaragua 
on November 12, 1 8 5 5, to appoint commis sioners to arbitrate 
the differences as provided by the contract. Therefore, the 
privileges granted the company were dis solved and abolished . 
Cleta Mayorga, Edwar d J .  Kewan, and George F. Alden were 
appointed a Board of Commissi·oners, with full  powers 
to examine, liquidate, and ascertain the amount due 
by the American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Com­
pany and Accessory Transit Company to the State, with 
ful l powers . to send for persons  and papers, and to 
enforce respect and obedience to all their orders 
and decrees . 6 0  
59rbid . , December 22, 1 8 5 6 . 
60New York Times, March 1 5 , 1 8 5 6. 
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The commissioners were to notify the company's agents in 
Nicaragua to appear before the board to g�ve evidence and 
to defend the interests of the company. The company pro­
perty in Nicaragua was to be seized and held pending the 
determination of its value by board-appointed appraisers. 
In a lengthy despatch, •repi:ete with d�positions and 
letters, the American minister to Nicaragua, John H. Wheeler, 
provided the Department of  State with the history of the 
confiscation and the findings of the board. 61  Wheeler ' s  
report is largely the Nicaraguan government's version of 
the affair, as Wheeler had long since become identified 
with the fortunes of the Walker regime. 
/ 
On June 9, 18 5 5, Gabriel Lacayo and Raphael Garcia 
Tej ada were appointed by the conservative regime in Gra­
nada, at that time nominally the government of  ?�icaragua, 
as commissioners to arrange the matter in dispute with the 
transit company. The commissioners went to New York but 
were unable to reach an agreement with the officers of the 
company . Nonetheless, a proposal (re jected by the commis� 
sioners) by Joseph L. White on July, .18 55, indicated that 
the company was aware that it had . not ful filled the terms 
of the contract with respect to both construction and pay­
ments . The news of Walker ' s  occupation of  Granada reached 
New York on October 2 8, and the company informed the 
61Wheeler to Marcy, August 2, 18 5 6, National Archives, 
M219, 11/6 3 . 
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commissioners "that a change of Government had made void 
[their] authority and that [their ] powers to act were re­
voked unless · renewed by the new gov�rnment. " Nevertheless , 
on Noverr�er 14  the company sent the commissioners the names 
of proposed arbitrators , among whom was Nathaniel H. Wolfe , 
one of the original grantees of the charter ! The commis­
sioners replied that , under the circumstances , they could 
have no further relations with the company unless expressly 
directed by the new government. 6 2  On December 14 , Parker H. 
French , an agent for the Walker regime , arrived in New York 
with instructions to arrange with the company for new arbi­
tration commis sioners to be sent to Granada. On advice of 
counsel , the company declined , on the basis  that the matter 
was now out of the hands of both the co1npany and the govern­
ment as arbitration commissioners had already been appointed , 
and "a change of parties [ did not] invalidate any previous 
act of Government. 11 6 3  There the matter stood until the de­
cree of February 1 8 . 
Immediately after the publication of  the decree annul­
ing the charter , the board advised the pres ident of the com­
pany in New York of the ·proceedings they had instituted , and 
forwarded a copy of the instrument of authorization . The 
same documents were sent to all the agents of the company in 
6 2oeposition of Gabriel Lacayo , July 2 3 , 1 8 5 6 , ibid. 
6 3Joseph L. White { counsel to the Acces sory Trans it 
Company) to Thomas Lord (company president) , December 1 ,  
1 8 5 5 , ibid. 
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Nicaragua, and time was given to present any statement or 
evidence in defense of the company'� interests.64 Although 
the government could make the case that it was adhering to 
legal procedures ,  the lack of response on the part of  the 
company could undoubtedly be attributed to its . recognition 
that the outcome was a foregone conclusion , and its position 
that the act of  annullment and confiscation itself  was 
illegal. 
Vanderbilt ' s response ,  far from sending representatives 
as supplicants before the Walker government, was to dispatch 
an agent, Hosea Birdsall , to San Juan del Norte to take 
charge of company property in that port . Birdsall ' s  further 
instructions read : " I f  the Walker filibusters attempt to 
employ force to rescue the boat from your posses sion, you 
are authorized to ask for the assistance of  the Corrunander 
of  any Man of War of her Brittanie Maj esty ' s Navy in the Port 
of  San Juan to prevent such rescue . "  The ostensible pretext 
for the action was to protect Costa Rica , but it was apparent 
to all s ides that the real reason was to prevent recruits 
from reaching Walker : " Unless our Boats ar� seized by the 
Filibusters on the Orizaba and the Charles  Morgan [ocean 
steamers from New York and New Orleans ] ,  they cannot get into 
the Interior, and without large accessions, Walker must fail , · 
6 5 
and Costa Rica be saved . "  
64Report of the· board of  commissioners , ibid . 
6 5 r.ord to Birdsall , April 8 ,  1 8 5 6 , ibid . This was 
not a precedent , as Vanderbilt had resorted to the employment of  
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Although the company agent -refus.ed to surrender the pro­
perty , Birdsall applied to Captain Tarleton , the officer in 
command of the British frigate Eurydice , to prevent alleged 
filibusters aboard the Orizaba and the Charles Morgan from 
going up river. · After conferring with Captain Tinklepaugh 
of the Orizaba , Tarleton boarded :trra:t ship to examine the mani­
fest and talk with the pas sengers. He came away unconvinced 
of Birdsall's charges , and refused to interfere in what ap­
peared to be company internecine strife. 66 
In the meantime , the wheels of the confiscatory proceed­
ings ground on. The appointed appraisers , Joseph N. Scott , 
Dolores Bermudas ,  and Byron Cole , obtained from the various 
agencies on the Isthmus a schedule or inventory of the real 
and personal property on and connected with the line and busi­
ness  of the company Q Omitting the value of the roads and 
piers , the appraisers . submitted a report to the board fixing 
the value at $141, 12 9 . 0 5. The job of the board of commis si­
oners in trying to determine company profits was a much more 
frustrating and diff icult one. The corrunissioners observed 
that "the want of . • . neces sary data has been the fruitful 
source of _ afflicting perplexity and embarras sment. " The ori­
ginal grant had obligated the company to make and present an 
force during the previous year. On July 5 ,  1855 , sixty men 
and six officers , dressed as American soldiers , had been dis­
patched to guard the strategic points · along the San Juan River. 
The force was ineffectual , and many ended up in the Legitimist 
army. Marcy to Wheeler , September 1, 18 5 5 , M77 , 2 7/ 242. 
66vJbeeler to Marcy , August 2 ,  1856 ,  National Archives ,M219 ,ll/63. 
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annual report and account to the government, setting forth 
its receipts and expenditures. It �lso conceded to the state 
"the right through any commissioners it may appoint for that 
purpose to inspect and examine at any time the books of the 
company , to satis fy itself of the correctnes s of said receipts 
and expenditures. 1167 Not only did the company not submit re­
turns of the company receipts and expenses to the government , 
but no records were kept by the company on the Isthmus . The 
company agent at San Juan del Norte testified : _ 
The suppl ies were chiefly furnished from New York by 
Agents of  the company at that point--no invoices or 
account of purchases were ever furnished by the New 
York Agent,  consequently [ I ] could not , nor could 
any other person ever be able to estimate the net 
profits of the company on the Isthmus without said 
invoices. 68 
For whatever reason the company neglected to maintain or 
deliberately did not maintain records in Nicaragua , the omis­
sion did not long deter the commis sioners .  Information was 
obtained by interviewing recent agents of the company ; poring 
over private notes and memoranda of the employees , and examin­
ing a few official records accidentally preserved . One source 
was the agency at San Juan del Sur. There the com.p1issioners 
found memoranda of freight and pas sengers preserved in the 
office , not by authority of the employers ,  but as a private 
record. The statistics were obtained from waybills, and 
67Report of the board of commis sioners ,  ibid. 
68oeposition of Joseph N .  Scott , Agent and Receiver for 
the Acces sory Transit Company at San Juan del Norte , July 2 4 , 
185 6 ,  ibid. 
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accounts of the contractor who landed and embarked passeng­
ers and freight on the steamers in the port of San Juan del 
Sur. Ano.ther fount was the documentary evidence preserved 
by a Mr . Gettel , the transportation contractor for the Isth­
mus. Gettel testified that since 1 8 5 2, the average number 
of  passengers per month traversing the Isthmus would not fall  
below two thousand . As the charge per person had never vari� 
ed much from thirty five dollars, the monthly receipts for 
passengers alone would have amounted to $ 7 0,0 0 0. The esti­
mate of receipts from the transportation of specie and freight 
was fixed at $ 8 , 0 0 0  per month . There was also the accumulation 
of receipts from internal travel and transportation of local 
freight . J. A .  Ruggles ,  the company agent at Castillo from 
August, 1 8 51, until December , 1 8 5 3 , revealed that the expenses 
of that agency were more than defrayed by the sums received 
from this branch of the business of the company . The agent 
at Virgin Bay testified that no drafts had ever  been drawn on 
New York for expenses. · The receipts were sufficient to cover 
expenses  and pay for the improvements that were made there . 69  
After collecting this information, the commis sioners had 
to determine the cost of the operation in order to ascertain 
the net profit. Concluding that the complete establishment of  
the route by the grantees out of  their own capital was con­
templated in the charter, disbursements relating to the con­
struction of wharfs and piers , or construction and repair of 
6 9 Report of the board of commissioners, ibid . 
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roads could not be legitimately charged against the net 
profit from which the government would draw its percent­
age. 70 One of the considerations attendant upon this las t 
item was that it appeared that the company had written off 
enormous losses for construction and repair due to "ruinous 
contracts with favorites . 11 71  The company had also paid high 
salaries to employees and supernumerary officials , and dimin­
ished the ostensible receipts , and [ this ]  was to the extent 
of the percent.age , a robbery of the government. 11 7 2 With re­
spect to the salaries , the commis sioners observed : 
Considering the number o f  secretaries , clerks , and 
employees to whom also has been paid large s alaries 
that have been retained in the employ or service o f  
the company , i t  cannot but be admitted that the re- . 
compense to the principal agents has been not only 
liberal but characterized by an exhibition of even 
munificent prodigality . 7 3  
At any rate , the final determination with respect to 
valid expenditures for the operation of the route was $ 2 1 , 000. 
This  figure would leave a profit of $ 5 7 , 000 per month or 
$696, 000 per year. The government's share of ten per cent 
would then have been $ 5 , 700 per month or an annual sum of 
$69 , 600 from August , 1 8 5 1 ,  until March , 18 56. Added to this 
was a yearly interes t of six per cent , the receipts from spe­
cie shipments , and the annual payment of $ 10 , 000 provided in 
the charter . The final sum of company indebtednes s to the 
70 rbid. 
71.E!Nicaraguense (Granada) , March 12 , 1856. 
72Ibid. 
73Wheeler to .Marcy, August 2 ,  1856, National Archives , M219 ,ll/63 . 
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government of Nicaragua was determined by the commis sioners 
. 7 4  to be $ 4 12 , 589 , 96. 
The amount due the government , according to the commis­
sioners , was probably inordinately high. This could have 
been deliberate , in order to leave a buffer area between that 
figure and the estimate of the value of the company property 
which was confis cated , or it could have been · a matter of mis­
j udgment engendered by the paucity of information with which 
the commissioners had to work. Vande·rbil t himself estimated 
the accual value of the company ' s  property in Nicaragua to be 
between $ 7 00 , 000 and $ 1 , 000 , 000 (though this also could have 
been in flated) , so it is unlikely that an investment of even 
this amount would have amortized itself yearly ,  as the com­
mis sioners' report would seem to have indicated . 7 5  
For the next few months , events seemed to bode well for 
the Walker regime. The filibusters turned back in invasion 
by the forces of Costa Rican President Juan Raphael Mora , 
and service was resumed on the transit route under the auspices 
of the Morgan-Garrison faction. A sham election was held in 
which only a portion of the Nicaraguan provinces participated, 
and Walker became the nominal president of the country. On 
July 18, 1856 , Randolph met with Morgan and Garrison at Sara­
toga Springs , New York , and formally transferred the franchise 
74 rbid. 
75scroggs , Filibusters , · 156. The comnissioners set the profits at 
$696,000 , close to the lower figure of $700 ,0.00 invesment Vanderbilt 
claimed. 
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to them for a consideration of  $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . The confiscated 
Accessory Transit Company property in Nacaragua was later 
sold to the usurpers for $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 , with the understanding 
that every Morgan-Garrison dollar would be counted as five 
dollars. Added to the $10 , 0 0 0  already assigned were the 
$ 2 0 , 0 0 0  in gold bullion which McDonald had given Walker in 
October , 1 8 5 5 , and $ 7 0 , 0 0 0  from steamer fares of  recruits 
which the company had tran sported to Nicaragua . With this 
total of $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 , the credit assigned to Morgan and Garri­
son was $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . Deducting the $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0  cost  of  the com­
pany property , this left a balance of $ 10 0 , 0 0 0  which Walker 
covered by issuing government bonds bearing an interest rate 
of  ten per cent . Clearly , Walker ' s  major interests were to 
tie the fortunes of the Morgan-Garrison company to those of  
Nicaragua , and to ensure that the company could continue 
bri_nging fresh reinforcements for the filibuster army . 7 6  
Faced with this fait acompli , and realizing that neither 
the courts nor the State Department were inclined to s alvage 
his interests , Vanderbilt elected to pursue a more direct 
course. His correspondence with the presidents of other 
Central American states urged them to unite against Walker , 
but in view of the hapless  efforts of Cos ta Rica , he determi­
ned that they · would need more than moral support . By the fall 
of 1 8 5 6 , the Commodore had begun sending both soldier and 
agents t9 President Mora , and by December , Vanderbilt was so 
7 6Folkrnan , Nicaragua Route , 8 3 . 4. 
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sanguine about hi s chances of overthrowing Walker that he 
posted this  advertisement in the New . York Herald : 
Present appearances indicate a realization of my 
hopes that the company will be speedily restored 
to their rights , franchises , and property upon 
the Isthmus of Nicaragua , which has been so un-
justly invaded . 7 7  
On November 2 8 ,  under Vanderbilt's sponsorship , Engl ish­
man William Robert c .  Webster and American Sylvanus H .  Spencer 
arrived in San Juan , Costa Rica, to engage in secret talks with 
Pres ident Mora and to outline for the president the method of 
bringing about the capitulation of Walker . The key, they said , 
was to control the San Juan River ; after that , everything else 
w�uld fall into place . Spencer had formerly been an engineer 
on the transit boats , and knew both the river and the crews , 
so the details of the planning were left to him . Mora called 
for Costa Rican volunteers for an expedition down the Serapiqui 
River , an obvious obj ective and one the filibusters would have 
anticipated s ince that river was Costa Rica's maj or outlet to 
the San Juan. Cunningly , Spencer ' s  force clandestinely uti­
li zed the San Carlos River, twenty-seven miles  north of  the 
Serapiqui , floating on rafts and canoes into the San Juan on 
December 1 6 . Steathily descending the San Juan , the Costa 
Ricans quickly overpowered the surprised filibusters guarding 
the mouth of the Serapiqui . 
Spencer then took his force down river to San Juan del 
Norte and sei zed four river steamers there . The boats' crews 
7 7New York �erald, December 2 5, 1 8 5 6 . 
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joined the Costa Ricans on the promise that their wages 
would continue to be paid , and with Costa Rican flags fly-
ing at their masts , the boats began chugging upstream. The 
United States conunercial agent at San Juan del Norte , a 
Walker partisan , appealed to the conunander of the large Bri­
tish squadron in the harbor , but the Briton refused to inter­
fere in what he termed a business dispute. Spencer's boats 
picked up a Costa Rican force of about 800 men armed with 
Vanderbilt-supplied Minie rifles brought down the San Carlos 
by General Josef Joaquin Mora , Commander-in-Chief of the Costa 
Rican army and brother to the President. Mora's army continued 
upstream and systematically captured the strategic fortf along 
the San Juan River all the way to Lake Nicaragua , employing 
force and ruse. Utilizing a lake steamer commandeeered at 
Fort San Carlos , the fortress guarding the outlet of the San 
Juan River from Lake �icaragua , General Mora crossed the Lake 
and captured Virgin Bay. Along with another Costa Rican force 
that had occupied San Juan del Sur , Mora had now completely 
isolated the filibuster president. With no hopes for supplies 
or reinforcements , Walker. capitulated on May 1 ,  185 7 ,  and his 
force was evacuated by United States Navy ships at San Juan 
78 
del Sur. 
The rest of the story of the route during the period is 
a denouement as the transit across the Isthmus , for various 
reasons ,  was never reopened. Nevertheless , without the benefit 
78scroggs , Filibusters , 270-85. 
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o f  hindsight, the traditional competitors, joined by others, 
continued feverishly contending foi the f�anchise . The three 
maj or rival groups were tbe American Atlantic and Pacific Ship 
Canal Company under Joseph L. White and company president 
H. G .  Stebbins ; the Accessory Transit Company of Cornelius 
Vanderbilt; and the Mor.gan�Gar-:r-:!,sen .. combine. The latter duo 
pas sed virtual ly out of contention as they were discredited 
by having been so closely identified with the defeated filli­
buster . Vanderbilt ' s initial efforts were at least imagina­
tive : - working through Costa Rican General Jose Maria Canas, 
his proposal was to establish a new state out of  both Costa 
Rican and Nicaraguan territory that would encompass  the entire 
area of the transit route and which would do busines s  exclu­
sively with the Commodore . White appealed to Antonio Jose de 
Irisarri , who was now the Nicaraguan minister in Washington 
as well as that of  Costa Rica. On June 2 7 , 1 8 5 7, Irisarri 
s igned a contract with Stebbins and White which was subsequ­
ently confirmed by the new Nicaraguan government under Presi-
., / 
dent Tomas Martinez .  
One of the maj or problems preventing the reopening of 
the route was the revival of  the t�rritorial dispute between 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The latter had traditionally claimed 
the south bank of the San Juan River , and now bolstered its 
argument with the as sertion that it- was necessary for defen­
sive purposes . The Nicaraguans , their neighbors charged , 
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could not defend. that portion of the Isthmus· if the reopen-
ing· of the transit under Nicaraguan a uspices engendered ano­
ther invasion. Just such a n  invasion seemed imminent when 
Walker reappeared at Greytown in November, 1857, with a new 
brand of filibusters. Although the United Sta tes Na�y subse­
quently intervened and shipped Wa lker and his contingent ba ck 
to the United Sta tes, both of the Central Anerican countries were 
infu�ed with a sense of urgency ; As a result, Nicaragua 
largely capitulated to the Costa Rican demands , and a new 
bilateral treaty was signed on April 15, 1858. 
In the :rreantilne , Irisarri was negotiating a bilateral treaty with 
United Stat.es Secretary of State Lewis Cass; a treaty which would provide 
security for American invest:rrent in Nicaragua and particularly for any com­
pany which might obtain the transit franchise. In the United States Senate, 
the treaty becarre suspect when the exclusive contract Irisc:rrri had previous-
. ly signed with Stebbins and White was revealed. An alrrost insurrrountable 
impasse for the treaty developei in Nicaragua when it became clear that 
President Martinez did not want the route reopened. Although the presi-
dent sent the docurrent to the Nicaraguan assembly for ratification, he had 
ass'Llited that it would be rejected. When the assembly � much to the 
president ' s  chagrin , approved the treaty on March 26, 1858, 
Martinez at first refused to sign and then resorted to subter­
fuge in a n  effort to prevent the a c cord from becoming law. 7 9  
Some evidence indicates that Martine z  was more afra id 
of American sponsorship of the route than  the reopening of 
7 9 :tbid. , 354-58 . 
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the route itself. Despite his efforts to defeat the b ilat­
eral treaty with the United States, . the pres ident seemed at 
least reluctantly prepared to go ah�ad with a commercial con­
tract. The Englishman Webster had entered into a contract, 
in the name o f  Vanderbilt, with the Nicaraguan foreign mini­
stry for the reopening of the route. Martfnez was hes itant 
about confirming the agreement for fear of retaliation by 
Stebbins and White , so the concess ion was made that the latter 
would be allowed until June, 1856, to "have their boats actu­
ally on the route, or forfeit their contract; in which event 
Webster's contract [would ] be cons idered as valid. " President 
Martfnez felt the Vanderbilt contract would be more favorable 
to Nicaragua, and besides, 11 Webster [had] boasted that the 
old commodore is  determined to have the line either by fair 
or foul means. " Regardles s of  the commerc ial imbroglio, 1 1 The 
[Ni:caraguan] authorities seem resolved that [ the American ]  gov­
vernment should have .no voice in the matter. 1 180 
The feuding among the American entrepreneurs was tempo­
rarily superceded with the arrival on the scene of an extra­
ordinary . Frenchman, Felix Belly. Belly landed at San Juan del 
Norte on March 3, 1858, and although subsequently revea led to 
have been merely the agent of a few obscure Parisian speculators, 
the mysterious aura surrounding the man convinced local news­
papers that he was in fact the clandestine r:epresentatfve of 
80Mirabeau B.  Lamar (Mini ster to Central America ) to Lewi s 
Cas s (Secretary o f  State) , March 27, 1858, National Archives, 
M219, 11/6. 
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Emperor Napoleon III . When Belly was received by President 
Mora in San Jose his denials of official capacity sounded as 
if they were made for d iplomatic reasons , and Mora was as con­
vinced as the press of the legitimacy of Belly ' s mission. 
Mora signed a Costa Rican-Nicaraguan canal treaty which Belly 
conveniently had in hand , and then accompanied the Frenchman 
to Nicaragua to obtain the signature of President Martfnez . 
After Mora and Belly arrived in Rivas on April 2 4 , Mora and 
Mart{nez affixed their s ignatures to an international conven­
tion which gave exclusive canal privileges to a company to be 
formed by Belly . In addition ,  Martfnez and Mora signed a 
treaty of  limits making major conceisions to Costa Rica , but 
committing Costa Rica to aid Nicaragua in any controversy 
between that nation and the United States . 8 1  
Finally , , at the instigation o f  Belly , Martinez and Mora 
signed a joint Declar�tion placing their countries under the 
protection of France , England , and Sardinia , without the know­
ledge of the European governments concerned . 8 2  Included in the 
manifesto was an elaborate complaint against the United States 
government which was intended for European consumption . It 
charged the United States with sponsoring the preparation of  
a new invasion of Central America with the intention of annex­
ing the Isthmus to the United States by force. To underscore 
8 1cyril Allen , France in Central America, F�lix Belly and 
the Nicaraguan Canal (New York : Pageant Press , 19 6 6 ) , 2 1-14 1 ,  
passim. 
8 2aritish Foreig!!_ and State Papers , XLVII I ,  6 9 5 - 6 . 
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the irony of  the occasion, all the documents were signed on 
May 1, the anniversary of Walker ' s  capitulation. Secretary 
of State Cass was justifiably annoyed· with the mani festo, 
a,r1d through his representative, Mirabeau B. Lamar, compelled 
the two presidents to disavow the document . 8 3  
After the signing o f  the accords, Belly j ourneyed to 
Aspinwall in Panama, and then to New York, but upon his arrival 
at the latter port he was confronted with newspaper headlines 
that the French government had denied any association with him ., 
He went back to France thoroughly discredited and leaving $Orne 
very embarrassed Central American politicians in his wake . 
His chief accomplishment , if  such it can be termed, was to 
protect the efforts of Am�rican fi nanciers 
sit route. 8 4  
to reopen the tran-
Meanwhile, despite the grace period initially extended 
to Stebbins and White, · their contract was revoked on Janu-
ary 2 8, 1 8 5 8, and trans ferred to Vanderbi lt on March 8 .  Un­
fortunately for Nicaragua, it turned out that the Commodore 
did not intend to reopen the route but, on the contrary, to 
block its reopening . This actio� was in cons ideration of a 
sum of  $ 5 6 , 0 0 0  a month that the Pacific Mail Steamship Com­
pany was paying him to prevent the renewal of competition with 
the Panama route. In the fall of 1 8 5 9, however, Vanderbilt 
broke with Pacific Mail, and declared his determination to 
8 3J .  L. Cole to John P .  Heiss, June 2 0, 18 5 8, Heiss  Papers . 
84Allen, Felix Bel ly, 2 1-14 1, · passim. 
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reopen the Nicaragua route. Wall  Street was startled by 
this news , and rumors were rife that the Conunodore might 
even employ fi libusters if necessary. But when one of his 
steamers with a cargo of arms was prevented by the authori­
�ies ·from leaving the port of New Orleans for Nicaragua , 
Vanderbilt finally and definitively withdrew fran the field. 
85 
Stebbins and White were no more successful. Their ac­
complice Irisarri was replaced in Washington in October , 
1858 , by Maximo Jirez ,  the most powerful of the leaders of 
the liberal faction in Nicaragua. Jtrez had previously been 
in corresporrlence with Vanderbilt, and appeared to be a Vanderbilt par­
tisan, so the degree of influence that the old financier had in bo� Nica­
ragua and the Depart:rrent of State can be inferred by Jerez' appointnent 
and reception in Washington. His first rrove was to thwart the continuing 
efforts of Stebbins and White. When a Stebbins-White stearrer advertised 
a scheduled sailing to Nicaragua , J{rez published a warnir.g that the can­
pany had no river or lake steamers and that the journey across the water� 
ways of the Isthmus would have to be made in bungos. Although Secretary 
Cass rebuked the minister ·for this untoward affront to cliplanatic behavior , 
the damage· was already done. Nevertheless, the steamer Washington 
set sail  on November 7 ,  1858 , with three hundred and twenty 
passengers. When it arrived at San Juan del Norte , the Nica­
raguan government refused the transients permission to cross 
85 scroggs ,  Filibusters , 365-67. 
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the Isthmus , and the company was forced to transfer them 
to Aspinwall. Even though Stebbins-White were success ful 
in procuring another franchise from the Nicaraguan govern­
ment on April 12 , 1.86 0 ,  they never succeeded in reopening 
the route . 86 America ' s  attention was by this time turning 
toward a far more serious internal conflict. Nicaraguan 
turbulence , on the other hand , was placated for the next 
thirty years , a situation remarkably uncharac teristic for 
that u�happy nation. Civil war. had raged intennittently since 
independence , and when William Walk� intervened in 185 5 on the 
� �dde of the Liberals , that faction clung to a toe-hold in 
northwest Nicaragu� (Figure 7 } .  
86Gordon I reland , Boundaries ,  Pos sessions , and Con­
flicts in Central and North American and the Caribbean 
( Cambridge : Harvard Univers ity Press , 1 9 4 1 } , 1 91. 
Figure 7 .  Liberal-held Territory in June , 1855 . 
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CHAPTER VI 
NICARAGUAN POLITICS , 1821-18 55: FROM 
INDEPENDENCE TO INTERVENTION 
America is  ungovernable .  Those who have served the 
revolution have plowed the �ea. 1 
This  poignant lament by Sim6n Bolivar shortly before his 
death in 1 8 3 0 could have been echoed by those Central Amer i­
cans who were attempting to establish a federation of all five 
states following their declaration of  independence from Spain . 
Although during the colonial period the Central American 
sta tes  had nominally comprised the Captaincy General of Guate­
mala , an administrative unit of the Viceroyalty of New Spain , 
in reality comr:1c=cial and eccles i a sticRl t ies �mong the various 
c ities were of more irmnediate signif icance than of ficial admini­
strative entitie s .  The question then--and perhaps one that ha s 
never been sati sfactorily resolved--wa s what form of  union (or 
disunion) the I sthmus would take . When independence was de­
clared in Guatemala C ity on SeptemberlS , 1821 , an interim 
government for the former captaincy general was established 
consi sting of Brigadier Gabino Gainza as Governor General , 
and an advisory counci l  to aid in the new federation ' s  admini­
stration. However , the federation proved admini stratively im­
practicable and , , following the lead of the province of Chiapas , 
1sim6n Bolivar , quoted in Hubert Herring , A History of 
Latin America , 3rd ed . (New York: Alfred A. Knoph , 1 968 [ 1 9 5 5 ] ) , 
2 7 6 . 
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the advisory council voted on January 25 , 182 2 , for annexa-
tion to Mexico under General Jos� de Iturbide ' s  Plan of Iguala . 
There were a few liberals in Central America who had held 
out for independence and a republic ; however , they were round­
ly snouted down by two other political factions who agreed on 
annexation but for different reasons . The conservatives in 
Guatemala City felt that the Mexican connection would protect 
their privileges enjoyed during the colonial era . The provin­
cianos , the land owners from the provi�ces , '' hoped to shake 
off the onerous control of Guatemala City on the as sumption 
that this would permit them more self-rule . Mexico City , 
after all , was farther away . "2 To suppre s s  pos s ible dis�en­
sion , Iturbide sent General Filisola to Central America to 
consolidate Mexidan control . The exile of Iturbide inter­
rupted F ilisola r s mis sion , and he turned the administrative 
reins over to a Nation�! Constituent Assembly . 
The Assembly declared independence on June 2 9 , 1 8 23 , 
and on November 2 2 , 1 8 24 ,  adopted a compromise constitution 
which established a Federal Republic of five Central American 
states , with a provisional executive committee ,  a president , 
and five chiefs of state . A rupture between the Conservative 
forces ,  composed of the aristocratic element , and the Liberals , 
representing the new merchant clas ses , was already apparent . 
The Liberals controlled the first Federal Congres s  in 1 8 2 5  
2Rodr!guez ,  Central America , 61-62 . 
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and elected Manuel Jos� Arce as President of the Republic . · 
Installed in the Federal capital at 9uatemala City , Arce 
quarreled with his own party , overthrowing and reorganizing 
the state government of Guatemala with the help of the Con­
servatives . 
The Liberals in Guatemala , Honduras , and El Salvador 
. ' . 
joined under Francisco Morazan of Honduras and , after a period 
of armed conflict in 18 2 7-18 29 , succeeded in ousting Arce . 
Morazan was proclaimed President of the Federation in 1 8 3 0. 
The Conservatives gradually regained control of some of the 
state goverlli�ents and the alrea�y traditional conflict between 
the Conservatives and the L iberals culminated in the breakup 
of the Federation . ·The last Federal Congress in 1 8 3 8 declared 
Lh� titates free to govern themselves . 
In Central America as a whole , lines were drawn with the 
clergy , the remnants of the colonial aristocracy ,  and many of 
the great land owners and rich merchants on the Conservative 
side , and creole and mestizo professional men and other groups 
who had enjoyed a less-privileged position in colonial times 
forming the Liberal party . In Nicaragua , differences of 
political policy or principles were lost sight of in what 
largely became a regional feud between the cities of Granada 
and Le6n . The Granadinos pursued the Conservative ideal be­
cause of their traditional ties with old Spain and because 
of the vested interests of the large landholding and aristo­
cratic classes living there. The Leonese professed the Liberal 
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doctrine , better· suited ·to the economic and commercial am­
bitions of their small merchant and agricultural elements. 
During the period of the Federation , intermittent war oc-
curred between Granada and Le6n .  When Morazan was President 
6f the Federation , he sent Dionosio de Herrera as Chief of 
State to restore order in Nicaragua. Under de Herrera , the 
Liberal Party became firmly entrenched after 1 8 3 0 . Other 
Chiefs of State of the Liberal Party succeeded de Herrera , 
most of them being under the control of Casto Fonseca , the 
Commander of Arms (Army Commander-in-Chief ) . 
The destruction of the Liberal governments in other 
states made the Liberal government 1 s · position in Nicaragua 
precarious , and it was eventually overthrown in 1 8 4 5  by a 
Conservative uprising aided by armies from Honduras and El 
Salvador . Wishing to punish Le6n for having granted asylum 
to the Morazan followers , the Conservatives deepened the rift 
by sacking Le6n and slaughtering many of  the inhabitants . 
The Conservatives then moved the capital to Masaya and later 
to Managua in order to af ford better control of the administra­
tion by the important families of Granada . The Conservatives 
tried to restore order but Trinidad Munoz , the Commander of 
Arms , intrigued to increase his own power and influence , and 
finally betrayed the party , re-establishing the capital at 
Le6n. A new Conservative uprising , championed by Honduras 
and Costa Rica , overthrew Mufioz in 1 8 5 1 and agairi moved . the 
government to Managua . The Conservatives made an effort  to 
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conciliate their. opponents , this time by giving them minor 
posts in the cabinet. Liberal re jection of this o live branch 
spelled failure for the plan , and a period of attempted force­
ful suppression of the Liberals ensued . 
. Continual strife between Liberals and Conservatives in 
Nicaragua , during the period of the Federation and subsequent 
to the establishment of the Republic in 1 8 3 8 , had resulted in 
unbounded ruin and destruction. Although the country was 
capable of producing indigo , sugar , rice , coffee , tobacco , 
and virtually every produc� known to a tropical region , agri­
culture and commerce had so stagnated that only plantains and 
Indian corn were cultivated for bare · subsistence . Exploitable 
deposits of gold and silver in the district of Matagalpa in 
the Cordillera were ignored . Great tracts of corrunercial timber 
stood unused . 
Pre sident Fruto Chamorro , a member of one of  the leading 
Granadan families , re solved to halt Nicaragua ' s  plunge into· 
political anarchy and commercial impotence. His opportunity 
came in the election of 185 3 when he secured a second term by 
defeating Francisco Castell6n from Le6n , a well-educated Liberal 
and former Nicaraguan minister to England. William V. Wells , 
an as sociate of Wil liam Walker , later contended that neither 
candidate could muster the necessary two-thirds .vote as re­
quired in the 1 8 3 8  constitution ,  and that Chamorro claimed the 
3 
election by default. 
3
wil liam V. Well·s , Walker ' s  Expedition to Nicaragua (New 
York : Stringer and Townsend , 1 8 5 6) , 4 6. 
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In order to . organize a strong government and ensure 
order , Chamorro determined to rescind and replace the Liberal 
Party-dictated constitution of 1 8 38 which he regarded as an­
archical. Anticipating the convening of a constituent assem­
bly for the purpose of drafting a new constitution , Chamorro 
deemed it expedient to eliminate , insofar as possible , the 
maj or Liberal opposition. In November , 1 8 53 , . he charged Cas-
6 , , f , tell n ,  Maximo Jerez , Colonel Jose Maria Valle , Francisco Diaz , 
Manuel Cisneros , and Mateo Pineda , all- leading citizens of the 
Occidental Department (in which Leon was located ) with conspiracy 
against the government . It is reasonable to assume that some 
Liberal agitation probably resulted from dissatisfaction with 
Chamorro ' s  unprecedented bid for a second term , and from the 
questionable circumstances surrounding his re-election. Yet , 
the tangible evidenc� , which Chamorro purported to have , re­
mained in his " secl:et files" and was never subject to public 
d .  
'4 
isclosure. 
All but Castellon and Jerez escaped and went into exile 
in Honduras . After a short imprisonment , Castellon and Jerez 
were forceably exiled on November 2 8 , 1 853 ,  and j oined their 
co-partisans. Early in 1 854 , Chamorro proceeded to call a 
constituent assembly. A Conservative constitution was drafted 
and approved on April 30 , 1 8 54 ,  vesting more power in the 
executive , extending his term from two to four years , and 
4sofonlas Salvatierra , Guillermo , M�ximo Jerez Inmortal 
(Managua : Progresso , 1 9 5 0 ) , 4 0. 
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providing more latitude for centrally governing the republic. 
Chamorro was named Chief Executive by the assembly for the 
first four-year term. He was thus , in effect , the last Chief 
of State under the Central American Federation and the first 
President of the revised Republic of Nicaragua. 5 
Aside from the Conservative dominance that the new con­
stitution implied , the change from virtual political anarchy 
was perhaps too abrupt , causing restles sness  among the citizens . 
Encouraged by these disorders and smarting from political sub­
j ugation ,  the Liberal exiles in Honduras began plotting to 
return . They were aided by Liberal . Honduran President Jose 
Trinidad Cabanas ,  who furnished them · with arms and money . On 
May 5 , 1 8 54 ,  the political refugees sailed from Tigre Island 
on a vessel com.mantled by an American , Gilbert Morton . They 
surprised and overwhelmed a smal l garrison at Realej o . Marching 
inland through the Occidental Department , they invested the 
unres isting town of Chinandega , where new supporters adhered 
to their cause . At Chinandega , J�re z is sued a proclamation 
outlining the five-point Liberal program : 6 
( ! ) · Declares the principal obj ect for the army is  to 
take power from Chamorro and return it to the people . 
( 2 )  Promises to respect and honor property . 
( 3) Names as traitors tho se who give service to the 
tyrant , Chamorro . 
SRodrigo Sanchez , Panorama Politico de Nicaragua , 1 8 2 1-
1940 (Managua : Perez , 1940) , 3. · 
6sofonias Salva�ierra , M&ximo J�re z , 44 . 
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· (4) Does not recognize the political parties that previous­
ly existed ( constituting a call to all citizens ) .  
(5) Invites all government employees , even those under 
arms _, to join the crusade . 
' 
The Liberal contingent then proceeded to Leon , establishing 
its headquarters there and naming Caste116n Provis ional D irector 
of the Republ ic. On May 10 , 18 54 , Chamorro procl aimed a war 
to the death for the defense of " legitimacy, " or legal suc­
ces sion to power. After two inconclus ive battles , Chamorro's 
forces retired to Granada . The Liberal forces ,  or " Democrats" 
as they . styled themselves ,  swelled their ranks with sympa­
thizers and conscripts , and marched on Granada .  
The Democrats laid s iege to the · city , occupying the 
suburban part , but were unable to penetrate the fortified 
plaza in the center of town. Withstanding the s iege , the 
Legitimi sts had approximately one thousand men under arms . 
· Guatemala  was allied with them in their Conservative cause , 
but was unable to provide significant material a s s istance. 
At the height of the siege , the Democrats were able to muster 
one thousand five hundred men , including two hundred Hondurans.  
In addition , the Democrats recruited a dozen or so Americans 
in San Juan del Sur and Virgin Biy at the rate of $10 0  per 
month · to pepper the Granada plaza with rifle shot . 7 C. W .  
Doubleday , a California pioneer on his way to the east coast 
of the United States , threw himself in company with the 
711 Nicaraguan F ilibusters , "  Littell's Living Age , VIII 
(April  18 5 6 ) , 129-140 (reprint from Blackwood ' s  Magazine ) . 
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Democrats at San. Juan del Sur. He recruited among the 
American passengers and took thirty of them to the siege at 
Granada. The Leonese were well-impressed with the quality 
of American soldiery. 8 The siege proved a stand-off and after 
nine months , in February , 18 5 5 , the Democrats gave up and re-
' 
tired toward Leon. At Masaya , Chamorro's force s , imbued with 
new spirit and encouraged by Conservative priests , 9 overtook 
the Democrats and three hundred men were kil led in the en­
suing battle. The Legitimists then captured San Carlos and 
refurbished their shot and powder stores with supplies from 
Jamaica . They regained Managua and Rivas and finally the 
' 
whole state except Leon , Chinandega , · and Realej o along with 
the Bay of Fonseca . The state was now effectively divided 
between two fatigued and dis sipated forces , though intermit-
tent battlescontinued to oc cur . 
During the siege of Granada , Chamorro had died from a 
liver infection . The emotional and physical stress  he had 
undergone in an effort to maintain his position and his party 
in power had finally sapped his resistance . The Conservatives , 
fearing that news of the death of the strong leader might dis­
hearten their supporters , made an effort to conceal th1s occur-
. ' 
rence , and quietly names Jose Estrada as president . Subsequently , 
8James Jeffrey Roche , By-Ways of  War (Boston : Small , May­
nard and Company , 1 9 0 1 ) , 9 1 .  
9wells , Walker's Expedition , 4 9 . 
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efforts to effect a reconciliation by Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
mediators 1n August and by the Presbyterian Remigio Sala z�r in 
September were rejected by Estrada , who refused to negotiate 
with the Democrats on the grounds that it would compromise 
" legitimacy. " 
The increasingly untenable posi_tion of the Democrats , and 
the inability of Cabanas to continue supplying effective Hondu­
ran support for their cause , created a situation conducive to 
a search for other outside help. At this juncture , on August 
1 5 , Wells and Byron Cole of the San Francisco Mining Company 
arrived at San Juan del Sur with the intention of exploring 
the possibility of developing mining - resources in Honduras . 10 
Cole , formerly a Boston editor , had left his Sacramento paper 
under the editorial management of Wil liam Walker , recently 
reknowned for his filibustering expedition in Mexico . He 
suggested to Castellon that they should invite Walker to re­
cruit and bring to Nicaragua a number of expeditionists to aid 
the Democratic cause . Because of his earlier impressions of 
' 
American soldiery at the s iege of Granada , Castellon was amen-
able to the idea of securing a number of American auxiliaries 
for his ar.my. In addition , Walker's exploits in the ill-fated 
filibustering expedition to Lower California early in the year 
' 
were known to Castellon. 
There was ample precedent for the employment of foreign 
auxiliaries or legionnaires in the continual civil strife which 
Nicaragua had undergone since the initial Central American 
lOscroggs , "William Walker ·and the Steamship Corporation in 
Nicaragua ,"  American Historical Review , X (June 19 0 5) , 7 9 2. 
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declaration of independence in 182 1 .  Both the Liberal and 
Conservative causes had been augmented on occasion by, among 
others, American, French, and German soldiers of fortune. 
. , 
In fact, the Legitimists had recently sent Guadelupe Saenz to 
San Francisco in an ·unsuccessful mission to obtain foreign 
soldiers. 11 
The terms of the first contract which Castel lon offered, 
and which Cole took to California  to present to Walker, cal led 
for three hundred Americans at a stated monthly pay and the 
distribution of 21, 000 acres of land at the end of the campaign. 
Thi s contract was rejected in November by Walker as he, ac­
cording to his account, regarded it as contrary to the United 
States Neutrality L�w of 1818. 12 Walker outlined the terms 
for a new contract and Cole returned with these to Nicaragua 
to renegotiate with Castell6n, who agreed to the terms and 
Cole once more voyaged to C alifornia, reaching Sacramento in 
February, 185 5. The land grant was increased to 52, 000 acres, 
the �onthly pay was increased, the expeditionists were guaran­
teed the privilege of bearing arms even after the war, and--
of major importance--they were to be regarded as colonists. 
Walker took the contract to S .  W .  Inge, United States 
District Attorney for the Northern District of California in 
11sofon1as Salvatierra, M!ximo J�rez, 80. 
12william Walker, The War in Nicaragua (New York and 
Mobile: s. H .  Goetze! and Company, 1860 ) ,  2 5. 
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San Francisco , for a ruling on the validity vis-a-vis the 
neutrality laws . Inge agreed that no law would be violated 
by the implementation of the terms of the contract . Next , 
Walker took the contract to General John E. Wool , United States 
Army Conunander for the Department of the Pacific , who Walker 
believed had authority from Secretary of War Jefferson Davis 
and from President Pierce to suppress expeditions conflicting 
with the 1 818  law. Wool not only approved the contract and 
the aims of the expedition , but also wished Walker al l success  
in the venture . 1 3  It is  quite likely. that Wool was influenced 
by the private views of the Secretary of State , Wil liam L .  Mar­
cy , who perhaps felt that a successful expedition would ma­
terially contribute to his pre sidential aspirations , and those 
of Jefferson Davis , who had an intense interest in the eventual 
annexation of pro-slavery territories . 14  The stage was now set , 
as Walker believed , for the legal recruitment and transferral 
of the expeditionists/colonists to Nicaragua. An American pre­
sence , quite different from that of Commodore Vanderbilt (Fi­
gure 8) was about to de scend on that country , one which would 
shortly invest the capital (Figure 9 ) . 
13 rbid . , 2 1 . 
l4Albert H .  Carr , The World and William Walker (New York : 
Harper and Row , 1 9 6 3 ) , 111. 
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Figure 8. Cornelius Vanderbilt , 
Figw-e 9 .  Walk.er ' s Granada Attack Route . 
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CHAPTER VII 
WILLIAM WALKER :  THE MASTER OF 
NICARAGUA 
"From such facts I reach the conclus ion : If 
[Walker] doesn ' t  drink , smoke , or have any devotion 
to Bacchus or Venus , it is clear that the only thing 
he desires is the sensuality of power ; and for that 
reason a man without other passions , has turned 
into a filibuster . Lieutenant Lewis,  forgive my 
frankness, but I have always distrusted men who do 
not render some homage to vtce . " 
Upon returning to Granada , I told General 
Walker what the cra zy Zavala--for that ' s  what his 
own friends call him--had said , and saw a certain 
ironic smile sketched on his sphinx-like face . 1 
William Walker was born in Nashville , Tennessee , or;i. May 
B i 1 8 2 4 . He attended the Univers ity of Nashville , obtaining 
a degree in 1 8 3 8 and subsequently securing a med ical degree 
from the University of Pennsylvania in 1 8 4 3 .  After living 
abroad , Walker returned to the United States and went to 
New Orleans, where he stud ied law and was admitted to the bar . 
While in New Orleans , he experienced his first exposure to 
the journalistic trade and after going to California in 1 8 5 0  
continued working in that field , editing a newspaper in San 
Francisco and later in Marysville ,Yuha County . It  was there 
that he organi zed an expedition to sei ze and coloni ze Sonora 
1Gustavo Alema�-Bolanos , Centenario de la Guerra Nacional 
de Nicaragua Contra Walker (Guatemala : Imprenta Litograf{a , 
1 9 5 6 ) , 57 . Frederick Lewis was sent as a Walker emissary to 
Felix Zavala , Democratic Army Genral . 
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and Lower Calif6rnia. 
By January, 1854 , Walker had proclaimed Lower Cali­
fornia and Sonora and independent republic with himself as 
president. American authorities, concerned about apparent 
neutrality infractions , prevented food and supplies from 
reaching Walker ' s  band , forcing him and the remaining members 
of his expedition to return to the border and surrender to 
officers of the San Diego army garrison. Walker was acquitted 
in a Federal court in May , 185 4 , of violating the neutrality 
laws . 
It was at this juncture that Byron Cole presented him 
with the contract drafted by Francisco Castellon leader of 
the Democratic party at Ledn and Walker agreed to serve in 
the Democratic army . He immediately proceeded to San 
Francisco and set about recruiting men and seeking financial 
support for his expedition. He received financial assistance 
from Joseph Palmer and Colonel John C .  Fre�ont . 2 Walker 
rented the brig Vesta , loaded it with men, supplies, and 
ammunition , and was ready to sail on April 2 0 ,  1 8 55 .  How­
ever , the sheriff seized the ship on behalf of a creditor 
of the owner , posted a guard, and took the brig ' s  sails into 
custody. While Walker was attempting to resolve this problem 
2walker , War in Nicaragua , 2 9. Walker himself signifi­
cantly - in view of his later repeal of abolition in Nicara­
gua--remarked that Palmer and Fremont were not fully aware of 
all the views he held on slavery. 
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a United States . marshal served a writ for the same reason , 
and posted a cutter to prevent the sailing of the Vesta. 
With the help of a friend , Henry A. Crabb , Walker persuaded 
the creditor to grant easy terms and to let the brig sail. 3 
With the dismi s s al  of the state and federal suits , the 
obstacle remained of .the .sheriff ' s  costs _ for maintaining 
the guard over the brig , which the sheriff ins isted Walker 
must pay . The sheriff , unaware of the dismis sal of the 
suit , generously agreed to release the sails when Walker 
indicated he might take this portion of the matter to court. 
Walker persuaded the crew of the cutter to re-rig the Vesta 
and invited the sheriff ' s  deputy , who was still posted as 
guard , below to his cabin. The deputy was advised by Walker, 
" There , sir , are champagne and c igars . "  From his pocket he 
drew a pair of handcuffs which he placed alongside the 
bottle. "And there are handcuffs and irons . Pray take your 
choice. 1 14 The deputy remained below partaking of Walker's 
hospitality , and after midnight early on May 4 ,  the steam .tug 
Resolute came alongside to tow the Vesta . out into the harbor. 
3Ibid . , 29-31. Walker observed in hi� narrative that 
he had pointed out to the creditor - that he might find him­
self in an . uncomfortable pos ition should the troops aboard 
be forced to dehark and abandon the mis sion , knowing that 
the creditor �as responsible for its failure. · 
4New York Times , June 2 ,  1 8 5 5. 
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The deputy returned ashore aboard the tug. A voyage followed 
which was laden with enthusiasm but ·otherw�se uneventful. A 
pilot was taken aboard at Tigre Island and the Vesta reached 
shore in the Bay of Fonseca near Realej o on June 1 6. 
When the Vesta arrived , the Ledn provisional govern­
ment (Democrats) was · . G!Dn.£.i.ned-vto , ... ·the· -Occidental Department . 
The Legitimists held all  of  the Oriental and Meridional depart­
ments , and the departments of Matagalpa and Segovia , though 
not occupied by Granadan troops ,  were under Legitimist sway. 
In addition , the position of Cabanas , the Democratic ally , 
was weakening in Honduras. 
' 
A force under General Lopez , 
aided by Guatemala , had invaded the Department of Gra cias in 
the northern part of  Honduras. Honduran General Santos 
Guardiola (known to Central Americans as "The Butcher ")  had 
sailed from I ztapa for San Juan del Sur aboard the Costa 
Rican schooner , San Jos l, to help the Legitimist. He had 
arrived with his forces in Granada a few days before Walker 
landed in Fonseca. General Mufio z ,  the old Nicaraguan war­
horse , had come out of  retirement in Honduras and had replaced 
' 
Jerrez as Commander-in-Chief of the Democratic forces . It was 
rumored that Muno z wanted to c ompr�mise with the Legitimists 
in order to perpetuate himself . in a national government. 
Castellon received the news of the arrival o f  the Amer-
cans in Chinandega with relief and optimism. He sent a 
' 
personal emissary to escort Walker to the capital at Leon and , 
2 28 
in a burst of exuberance , named the contingent o f  fifty-
eight bearded , barefooted , robust yankees ,  11 the American 
Phalanx" (Falange Americana) . His enthusiasm appeared to 
be unmixed with concern or suspicion over pos sible ulterior 
motives that Walker might entertain concerning the mission. 
With apparent justification he was imperceptive to the 
pos sibility that Walker ' s  forces might develop into some­
thing more than mere auxiliaries serving in the ranks o f  
the Democratic army. 
Subsequent chroniclers have severely criticized Castellon 
for the Walker invitation. One obsered : 
It i s  somewhat difficult to understand , on the supposi­
tion that Cas tello'n was a man of intelligence , why he 
should have cons ented to take such a step . He ought 
to hRVP �nnwn that it  wa s the �ost  fatal po licy he 
could pursue. He ought to have known that by calling 
in th�se men , who could not pos s ibly come to fight his 
battles merely for the purpose of helping him or his 
cause and who could not possibly be satisfied with olay­
ing any mere subordinate part in the public affairs 
of the state , he was introducing an enemy incalculably 
more dangerous · than any native antagonis t. 5 
However , the lessons to be learned from Walker ' s  previous 
efforts in the filibustering field were not lost on General 
Munoz. With ambitions of achieving national pow�r himself , 
he readily recognized the threat that this "Grey-Eyed Man of 
Destiny" represented. 
5Theodore H. Hi ttell , " History of  ·the Filibus ter , 
William Walker , " unpublished ms ·. ·, . 1 9 15 , Sutro· Library , San 
Francisco. 
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The initial meeting of Walker with Munoz resulted in 
mutually penetrating and chilly apptaisal. At the first 
' 
opportunity afterward, Walker made it clear to Castellon that 
neither he nor his troops would serve under Munoz' command, 
' 
to· which Castellon agreed. Walker probably determined this 
course both from his _.ini_tial .. ,personal ·. dislike ·of  Munoz and 
because of his immediate recognition that the general might 
thwart him in his ambition. There seams little doubt, in 
view of Walker ' s  subsequent actions and testimony, that his 
intended service on behal f of the Democratic forces was to 
be but a stepping stone to greater political rewards . He 
was little concerned about the relative merits of  the Liberal 
and Cons ervative causes, nor did he feel that the financial 
and territorial awards agreed upon under the contract were 
sufficient inducement for such a bold and dangerous undertak­
ing. It is unlikely that Walker had a concise and prede­
termined plan for the political reorganization of Nicaragua ; 
however, his flexibility on this question did accomodate the 
pos sibility that he would eventually become Chief of State . 
Walker had seen enough of his new friends to convince 
himself that his ambition had nothing to fear fran such 
rivals. Castellon was an amiable and irresolute gentle­
man ; Munoz was ambitious and vain, but incapable . The 
native soldierv were ill-trained and feeble-minded . 
Faction had stifled any faint sparks of patriotism in 
their breasts . 
6James Jeffrey Roche, By-Ways of War, The Story of the 
Filibusters (Boston : Small, Maynard and Company, 1 9 01 ) .  97.  
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Some write�s have obliquely alluded to the possibility 
N 
that Munoz' real quarrel was his je�lousy of and his antago-
nism for Castellon. Though this remains conjecture, certain 
it is that Munoz had always been opposed to American aid on 
the grounds that it would lead to foreign domination. 
Walker, who aimed at such domination , instinctively knew that 
Mu6oz would try to block him. 7 Although Walker himself left 
no written record of his grand design for reorganization of 
Nicaragua and adjacent territories, there are indications 
that the design extended east to Cuba, and C. W. Doubleday , 
one of the Americans who participated in the siege at Granada, 
said that Walker planned to make himself emperor of a mighty 
slave-holding empire stretching from Texas to the Isthmus 
of Panama. 8 
Although Castellon was primarily concerned about the 
security of the Democratic position at Leon an 0. "1arned 
Walker to keep his troops as a defensive force, this strategy 
did not coincide with Walker's plans. He convinced Castello� 
that the. war stalemate had to be broken and the quickest, most 
assured way of achieving these ends was to occupy Rivas and 
the transit road. This move would provide, he contended, 
revenue for the Democratic cause , lighten the tax burden of 
the citizens in the Democratic area, and add new spark to the 
7Merri tt Parmalee Alle·n, William Walker,· Filibuster (New 
York : Harper and Bros. , 1 9 3 2 ) , 60. 
8rbid. , 5 9  
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now feeble tore� of resistance against Granadan domination . 
, 
His private design, which he did not. divulge to Castellon, 
was to occupy the transit route and thereby be in a position 
to recruit more American adventurers who would be traveling 
between the coastal · areas of the United States. 
The plan was authorized by Minister of War Buenaventura 
Selva , who also appointed Walker a colonel in the Democratic 
army on June 2 0 , and offered commis sions to other Americans 
whom the latter chose to recommend . Under the Cons titution 
of 18 3 a ,  a simple declaration by a person born in one of the 
American republics was sufficient to establish citizenship 
and most of the Phalanx immediately became naturalized 
citizens of Nicaragua. 9 
For his part Castellcin provided for a civil governmental 
organization in the event the expedition wa s a succes s and 
gained a foothold in the Meridional Department. Maximo 
Espinosa , owner of a cacao plantation near Rivas and a Demo­
cratic sympathizer , was to be Minister of Government while 
Franciso Vaca would be appointed Prefect of the Department 
and Commissioner of Revenue. 
While General Munoz remained with the major part of hi s 
force to guard Leon , Walker's forces , along with 2 0 0  native 
' · 
troops under General Ramirez , embarked on the Vesta and s ailed 
down the coast . Mu;oz now turned his open resistance to 
9walker , War in Nicaragua , 4 1 .  
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Walker into treachery, and sent word t o  General Guardiola, 
commanding the Legitimist garrison at �ivas, that Walker 
intended to attck . In addition , it is· highly probable , 
judging from Ra mirez' subsequent action , that he had been 
influenced by Munoz' determination to see the Walker forces 
destroyed. 
On June 20, Walker landed at Agua Callito (above San 
Juan del Sur) and the next morning marched toward Rivas. 
His forces encounted General Bo sch.a , commanding 4 8 0  men , on 
the pl�in outside of Rivas . The native troops , who had been 
continually lagging behind on the march , deserted en masse 
at the first sound of gunfire. Walker ' s band was forced to 
take refuge in and made a citadel of  a nerby house. Though 
Boscha'a troops could not carry the stronghold during the day , 
they succeeded in setting fire to the house under cover of  
darkness , and Walker's men were forced to fight their way out. 
Ten of  the Walker band were killed in the battle, but the 
skilled American riflemen accounted for 1 8 0  Legitimist 
casualties. 
The · Walker contingent was not pursued and arrived at San 
Juan del Sur , hoping to find the Vesta waiting. When Walker 
found that the Vesta had not arrived , he decided to commandeer 
the San Jose , a sloop commanded by Captain Alvarado. When 
Alvarado pleaded neutrality , Walker pointed out that the sloop 
which had brought Guardiola from Guatemala to Nicaragua , was 
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· alr�ady deeply involved in the cortflict . A . short way up the 
coast , the San Jose fortuitously rendezvoused with the Vesta , 
to which the _ filibusters trans ferred . 
The Vesta arrived at the Bay of Fonseca on July 6 ,  and 
the Walker contingerit remained aboard . Walker sent a 
message to Castello� , charging that the desertion of Ramfrez 
was ordered by Munoz , and threatened to leave Nicaragua if  
retribution were not directed . 
I 
Castellon , desperately try-
ing to hold hi s forces together , urged Walker to overlook 
this possible malfeasance , Walker rej ected Castellon ' s  
entreaties and remained aboard the Vesta . Actually , Walker 
later confessed that hi s refusal to debark was partly strat­
egy to ga in more leverage in the use of hi s men and partly 
to give his wounded an opportunity to recover . In the mean-
I 
time , Mariano Salazar , a brother-in-law of Castello'n , came 
I 
aboard and urged Walker to return to Leon because of an 
imminent attack by Granadan General Ponci ano Corral . 
I I 
Finally , Ca stellon came to Realej o with Salazar and per-
suaded Walker to return to Ledn . 
The .next meeting among Walker , �astellon , and Munoz saw 
no discussion of Walker ' s  charges ; however ,  future utili­
zation of the American Phalanx was the subj ect of heated 
di s agreement between Walker and Munoz . The latter wanted the 
Phalanx divided into squads and scatter�d among the various 
units of the army . Walker insisted on keeping hi s command 
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intact and launching another attack against the transit road. 
Further to confuse the conference, ·cabanas was now in deep 
trouble against his conserva tive foes and calling for help 
from his Democratic allies. The negotiations in relation to 
the eisposition of Walker ' s  troops spanned the period from 
July 6 to August 2 3. Munoz , trying to arrange an armistice , 
sent Dr . Roasa.lio Cortez to Granada , pleading· that there 
was still time to derail Walker before he beat Guardiola 
and marched on Granada . General Corral made no reoly to 
the communication. 10  On July 19 , news of the battle of 
Saouci in Segovia transformed the situation. Though the 
forces led by General Munoz had routed those of Guardiola , 
Munoz  had been killed in battle. 11 
Walker almost unilaterally commissioned himself for a 
second attempt at the transit road. An Indian named Jose 
I 
Mar!a Valle , Subprefect of Chinandega and a warm friend of 
the Arnericans1 agreed to help .  Castellon wrote Valle , asking 
him and then ordering him , not to j oin the expedition , point­
ing out that the Democratic capital was sti ll  threatened . 
Valle forced his faltering chief to withdraw the order when 
he indicated that he would alternatively ignore it. 12 
Walker's band , with Colonel Mendez and 13 6 native sol-
lOsalvatierra , Maximo Jerez , 8 2. 
11wheeler to Marcy , September 2 1 ,  18 5 5 , National Archives , 
M2 1 9 ,  1 0/23. 
12walker, War in Nicaragua. 8 0 .  
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diers , set sail . on the Vesta and the schooner Esperanza .  
Arriving in  San Juan del Sur on August 2 8 , they made 
preparations until September , when they began marching for 
Virgin Bay. Shortly after arriving at an unoccupied Virgin 
Bay , .  the Democratic forces heard fir�ng about one mile from 
town . 54 0 Legitimi st troops under Guardiola swarmed across 
the plains . With the native contingent of the Democratic 
forces performing as brilliantly as the Americans , Guardiola ' s  
forces wer� routed. The Democrats , while suffering only 
fourteen wounded , inflicted about a hundred casualties on 
the Legitimists and captured arms , ' armnunition , baggage and 
the papers of Guardiola himself. W�lker ' s  forces then re­
turned to San Juan del Sur where many Legitimist deserters 
joined them , indicating that the opposition armies were either 
becoming demorali zed or scattered . However , Corral and 
Guardiola , with 6 0 0 troops , fell back on Riv �s on Sept-
ember 12 . 
From September 13 until October 3 ,  Walker remained in 
San Juan del Sur, receiving new recruits from San Francisco. 
During this time over six hundred Nicaraguans died of cholera . 
The epidemic had begun in Granada during the siege and had 
inexorably spread north . Among the victims was Castellon , 
who was replaced by Nazario Escoto. In addition to this news , 
Walker learned that Corral and Guardiola _had quarreled and 
that Guardiola had returned to gonduras. Adding to his 
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American reinforcements, Walker recruited native troops and 
attended to further financing. He ievied "contributions" of 
$ 10 0-$150 on resident Americans and other foreigners in San 
Juan del Sur. United States Consul John Priest was forced 
to pay when Walker ' s  troops seized his house a�d took him 
prisoner . In reply. :to ·Priest ' s  protest, Walker said he 
neither recognized Pries�, who was accredited to the Legiti­
mist government, or his protest. 13 
On September 10, Walker took his ·reorganized and rein­
forced troops again to Virgin Bay, presumably to con solidate 
control of the transit route. H9wever , upon reaching there 
he intercepted despatches and letters to Corral from Co�ral ' s  
adjutant general, Fernando Chamorro. The interceptions 
di sclosed a rather destitute condition of the government at 
Granada and its inability to assist its commander-in-chief 
at Rivas with more men. In addition, they indicated that 
Granada was almost entirely undefended, that the spirit of 
the people was drooping, and that the chiefs of the party had 
begun to despair of maintaining the war much longer if 
vigorously pressed by the Democratic forces. 
Walker ' s  first reaction to this intelligence was to 
. advise Corral of the interception and to intimate that an 
armistice would be good for both. Corral merely acknowledged . 
receipt of the message and rather mysteriously included some 
l3pries t to Marcy, September 11, 18 55, National Archives, 
Tl52, 1/6. 
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some penned sign·s . According to Walker's advisors , the signs 
were Masonic and indicated that Corral was willing to nego­
tiate with another Mason. At this point , the correspon­
dence ceased . 14 
· It is possible that Walker actually had no intention of 
negotiating with Corral.: then , .. because it would have been 
impossible to negotiate from a position of sufficient strength 
to have obtained his desired goa ls. It is likely that he 
merely wished to confirm the validity of  the intercepted 
reports- by determining whether or not Corral would be willing 
to negotiate an armistic e . Although the transit road had 
been Walker's number one obj ective , its occupation was merely 
a means to an end , the end being the subjugation of the 
Legitimist forces . With the knowledge of the weakened condi­
tion of Granada , he probably perc eived a shortcut to this 
goal . Therefore , when the Accessory Transit Company ' s  
steamer Virgin anchored close to the Virgin Bay pier on Octo­
ber 11 , Walker took a party and boarded it . For three hours 
on the afternoon of October 12 , he embarked his men for 
Granada . · 
It is possible that Walker had earlier anticipated 
utilizing in some fashion the services of the transit company 
to supply his troops and conduct his campaign . Before leaving 
14walker, War in Nicaraqua ; 104 . 
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Leon on the second expedition �o occupy the transit route, 
Walker had unrealistically been authorized. by the government 
at Leon to settle the differences between the Nicaraguan 
government and the transit company. On October 3, while 
Walker was still at San Juan del Sur , the steamer Cortez 
arrived from San Francisco .• . . . Aboard .the steamer ·was C. J. 
McDonald , a confidential agent of Corn�lius K. Garrison , 
the San Francisco manager of the transit company. McDonald 
appar ently proposed a scheme to Walker whereby control of the 
transit company would be wrested by Garrison from Vanderbilt. 
Garrison would see that men and supplies were shipped to 
Walker aboard the company ' s  ships arid that the lake steamers 
were made available for Walker's campaigns in Nicaragua. 
Walker ,  in turn , upon assuming ascendancy in the republic , 
would revoke the company ' s  present charter , presumably on 
grounds of failure to .pay the contractual profit percentage ,  
and then re-award the charter and the nationalized capital 
equipment to Garrison . 15 It is in this light that Walker's 
commandeering of the Virgin for an attack on Granada must 
be viewed. 
Actually the transit company was already involved in 
transporting mercenaries , but hot to fight for Walker . On 
July 5 ,  18 5 5 , a9out fifty men had left New York bound for 
Nicaragua aboard the company's ste.amship Star of the West . 
15scroggs , "Walker and the Steamshi:P Corporation" , 792-811 
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They had been hired as soldiers by White, company counsel in 
New York, and by Jose de Marcoleta, ·the Nicaraguan Minister 
to the United States , with the transit company paying the 
expenses. The band had been organized in .a military company 
to protect the interests of  the transit company. Minister 
Wheeler added that it was " for the furth�r purpose of aiding 
the present government of Nicaragua ,  as- will appear by a 
letter from the commanding general of the Nicaraguan army 
[presumably Corral] to Colonel Gazynski" .  Shortly after 
their arrival , according to Wheeler , - the group disbanded. 
Some (with Gazynski) returned to the United States , some 
stayed on as laborers working for the transit company , some 
joined a colonizing expedition on the Caribbean side , and 
others enlisted as soldiers in the Nicaraguan army. 1 6  
Despite the reference in Corral ' s  letter to Gazynski 
concerning services in the Nicaraguan army , White , surpris­
ingly enough , seemed to be unaware of  the entire nature of 
the expedition. Writing to Colonel Gazynski on August 6 ,  
he reminded Gazynski that he had been sent to Nicaragua in 
the services of the transit company and for no other reason � 
"Your place is on the river , " he pointed out and threat�ned 
to replace· Gazynski . 1 7  
l 6whee'ler to Marcy , September 2 1 , 1 8  5 5 ,  National 
Archives, M21 9 ,  1 0/2 3 
1 7Joseph L. White to Colonel Titus Felix Gazynski , 
August 6 ,  1 8 5 5 , Ibid : 
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Wheeler's reference to a letter from Corral to Gazynski 
is confusing. In a letter written August 28 by Corral to 
Gazynski , Corral turned down Gazynski's offer of services , 
protesting that Gazynski ' �  price was too high. 18 It appears 
that Gazynski had an agreement with Marcoleta about which 
White was not aware. Either .the terms under which Gazynski ' s 
troops would serve the Legitimist banner were not firm , or 
he raised the price upon arrival. It is also pos sible that 
Corral knew nothing of the deal before the Star of the 
West docked at San Juan del Norte. In any event , when 
Gazynski encountered the rebuff , he packed up and returned 
to the United States , leaving his er·stwhile companions on 
their own. A significant result of this episode was that 
Walker later used Gazynski ' s  offer as part of his pretext 
for fulfilling his part of the bargain with Garrison . 
At 12 : 0 0  midnight on October 12 , Walker , with 2 0 0  
Americans and 2 5 0-3 0 0  native troops under General Valle , 
disembarked two miles northeast of Granada. After a short 
battle early the follc:wing day , the city fell and the 
dent fled. 1 9  Walker calmed the citizens by issuing a 
clarnation for the protection of persons and property , 
18corral to Gazynski ,  August _28 , 18 5 5 , Ibid. 
Presi-
pro-
and 
19wheeler .- s account listed the American troops as ninety­
two and estlmated battle time as fifteen minutes . Wheeler 
to Marcy , October 14 , 18 5 5 , Ibid . , 10/25. 
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kept strict discipline , in contrast to traditional ravages 
by · conquerors in the long civil war . According to the 
account of t�e battle in the first edition of El Nicara­
guense , Walker's fledgling newspaper , the Walker forces 
released eighty prisoners--men , women , and children--chained 
in the San Francisco Church. 2 0  Walker , in turn , imprisoned 
the maj or leaders of the Legitimist party who had not escaped 
during the confu sion and the initial occupation. 
The next day , October 14 , was a Sunday , a traditional 
day in �Granada for political activity. The day opened with 
a sermon in the main cathedral by Padre Vij il which exerted 
the citizens to peace , moderation , and the putting away of 
revolutionary passions. According to William V .  Wells an 
early chronicler of Walker's adventures , . efforts were made 
by prominent Granadinos to persuade Walker to accept the 
presidency � A resolution to this effect was signed by 
Rosario Viva , Sebastia'n Maranco ,  Pedro Quadra , the Lacayos , 
and others. "A Proposition of peace has been made by which 
Walker .is appointed provis ional ?res ident for one month and 
an election to be ordered by the people , and the President­
elect to take office at .the end of one month. " 2 1  Walker 
2 2  
declined the office in favor of Legitirnist General Corral , 
20El Nicaraguense , October 2 0 ,  1 8 5.5. 
21 
Wheeler to Marcy , October 1 4 , 1 8 5 5 , National Archives , 
M219 , 10/2 5 
2 2wells , Walker ' s  Expedition , 66. 
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but it appears that Walker's rejection of the offer was not 
as magnanimous as it was pragmatic. · Rather than become a 
temporary figurehead , Walker perceptively surmised that his 
best course was to obtain control of the armed forces and 
this· wield the ultimate weapon in the jockeying for power. 
At this point , John H. Wheeler , the United States Minister 
resident in Nicaragua , was persuaded by the Gran�dinos to 
offer Walker ' s  peace terms to General Corral at Rivas. 
Wheeler had been commissioned by · the Dep�rtment of 
State to secure the adherence of Nicaragua t6 the interna­
tional neutrality laws then being sponsored by the United 
States 2 3and to re-negotiate a treaty of peace , amity , 
corrunerce , naviagtion , and protection which in its initial 
form had been unacceptable to the United States Senate. 2 4 
After arriving in Nicaragua on December 2 2 ,  1 8 54 , and after 
an interlude at San Juan del Sur , Wheeler left for Granada 
from Virgin Bay on January 2 6 ,  1 8 5 5. Because of internal 
strife he regarded the trip by steamer as too dangerous and 
arrived at Granada via horseback on January 2 9. 
Upon his request , the besieging Democrats allowed him 
twenty-four hours to enter the city and retrieve the American 
2 3Marcy to Wheeler , October 1 8 , 1 8 5 4 , National Archives , 
M77 , 27/2 
2 4rbid � , October 2 3 , 1 8 5 4 , ,  M77 , 2 7/3. 
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Ministry's archives. While in the city, Wheeler promised 
Chamorro neutrality on the part of
.
the United States and said 
that he would dissuade any Americans from taking part in the 
war. He indicated that he would retrieve the archives and 
return to Virgin Bay until the war had ended and new orders 
were received from the DP.partment of State. Chamorro agreed 
that this was the proper course. 2 5  
When the Democratic siege was lifted and the Legitimists 
were advancing on Ledn , it appeared to Wheeler that the war 
was drawing to a close . He therefore advised the State 
Department that he would go to Granada on March 2 6  and added , 
"If justified by circumstances , I shal l present my creden­
tials to the President (Estrado [ sic ] ) " 2 6  On March 3 1 ,  Wheeler 
arrived in Granada and on April 7 ,  he presented his creden­
tials to the Legitimist government , congratulating the govern­
ment that the war was about to ena. 27  
Wheeler never seemed to take the Democratic threat 
seriously until the surprising fall of Granada, and he carried 
on normal , diplomatic intercourse with the Legitimist govern­
ment up ·until that time. However , he was well aware of the 
devastation and anarchy resulting from the war , and the 
2 Swheeler to Marcy, February 3 , 18 5 5 ,  M2 19, 10/ 6  
2 6rbid. , March 2 0 , 18 5 5 , M219 , 10/9 
2 7 Ibid , April 11 , 18 5 5 ,  M219 , 10/10 . 
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possibility of peace at last arrived like a millennium. In 
addition , though there is no writte� indication of it , he 
was undoubtedly influenced in his later support of the fili­
buster government by the strong and determined will of 
Walker. Therefore , he accepted the commis sion to carry 
Walker ' s  offer of peac e negotiations to Corral at Rivas. 
Wheeler , accompanied by his private secretary , Thomas 
F. Van Dyke, and by Juan Rui'z , Minister of War under Estrada 
(who had given his "parole of honor" that he would return), 
left af midnight on October 1 5. They reached Rivas about 
2: 00 p . m. on October 1 5  and found that Corral was not there . 
Wheeler waited a few hours and when he announced that h� 
int�nded to return to Granada he was placed under house 
arrest by the Legitimists. After two days , the steamer 
Virgin forced his release at cannon point and Wheeler returned 
to Virgin Bay to await Corral ' s  response. 
Corral ' s  mes sage of October 1 7  accused Wheeler of inter­
ference , advised him that he intend�d to inform the Secretary 
of State and the newspapers in New York , and disclaimed any 
responsibility for the American minister ' s  future safety. 
Wheeler rejected the accusation in his October 1 8  reply and 
informed Corral that he would wait two more days for the 
Legitimist chief ' s  response to Walker ' s  offer . After the two 
days were up , Wheeler returned from his unsuccessful mission 
to Granada . 
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The reverberations from Wheeler's trip were felt in 
Washington , and he was reprimanded for interference by 
Secretary of State Wi lliam L. Marcy . 2 8 . Wheeler attempted to 
explain the situation and the reason for his action : "No 
other course could be taken than that which was pursued by 
me • • . • I feel a,ssured , therefore , that the President 
and you , on a full  knowledge of the facts and . history of the 
case , wil l j ustify and approve · of my course . "2 9  Later , 
Nicaraguan historians berated Wheeler • s  action , call ing him 
"the fi libuster minister . 11 3 0  
An event again involving the transit company assumed 
significant stature in the developments . On October 15 , 
the stramer Cortez arrived at San Juan del Sur from San 
Francisco with Colonel Birkett D .  Fry ' s  Nicaraguan battalion 
of sixty men , recruited and accompanied by Parker H .  French . 
The band was under the misapprehension that a s,1ift and 
unexpected blow might topple Legitimist resist�nce , and 
believed that consolidation of command of the transit route 
was still of maj or importance . On October 18 , they boarded 
the Virgin at Virgin Bay , along with other passengers and 
cargo , with the intention of forcing the surrender of Fort 
San Carlos at the eastern entrance to the lake. Their 
28Marcy to Wheeler , November 8 ,  18 5 5 ,  M7 7 , 2 7/13 
29wheeler to Marcy , December 15 , 18 5 5, M2 1 9 , 10/ 32 
30salvatierra , Maximo Jerez , 8 5 .  
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demand for surrender was rej ected ; the Virgin f ired upon , and 
an attempted landing by riflemen repulsed. The other pas sen­
gers now had . to content themselves with returning to Virgin 
Bay. 
An hour after the attack ,  the transit steamer San Carlos 
arrived at Fort San Carlos from the Toro Rapids with pas sen­
gers from New York . The fort fired on the steamer , damaging 
the engines and killing a woman and her child. After the 
misunderstanding was cleared up , the steamer was allowed to 
proceed to Virgin Bay . The next day , Fry's troops entered 
Virgin Bay , attacking and killing some of the detained 
passengers . When no Walker troops were found , the remaining 
pas sengers were allowed to go to Granada to be put under the 
protection of Wheeler . 31  Mateo Mayorga ,  a Legitimist cabinet 
minister who had been in asylum in Wheeler ' s  house , was 
delivered up by Wheeler to Walker , who arranged for his exe­
cution under the pretext of reprisal against the attacks on 
American citizens . Walker determined on this course because 
the Legitimist threatened to throttle the transit road , and 
Walker could abandon Granada to prevent it. He felt he had 
to aid the transit company to assure its support , and he 
31Affidavits of George B .  Slocum , Captain of the steamer 
San Carlos , and others , given to Wheeler , October 2 3 , 185 5 , 
Wheeler to Marcy , December 15 , 1 855 , National Archives , M2 19 , 
1 0/32. 
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could not punish French and Fry without risking encouraging 
the enemy. 3 2 
The Legitimist threat to isolate Walker in Granada 
neces sitated a dramatic move. This move was the execution of 
Mayorga and a mes sage to Corral that the remaining prisoners 
would be executed if Corral continued to refuse to negoti­
ate. The Legitimists then · faced 'the '· pos sibility that Walker 
might effectively decimate the ranks of the leaders of the 
Legitimist party and might even execute members of the 
families of the Legitimist leaders outside of Granada . In 
addition , Corral probably expected the peace terms to name 
him chief executive in a provisiona� government . He per­
suaded Estrada to authorize negotiations by pointing out that 
the release would mean that Walker woul� henceforth col labo-
rate with the Legitimists . 
Corral arrived to negotiate on October 23 and agreed on 
some general terms with Walker . Hostilities would be sus­
pended and the two governments which had existed since the 
beginning of the revolution would disappear . Selected pro­
visions of the Constitution of 1838 would be respected . The 
governmental seat would be in Granada ,  with Patricio Rivas , 
customers officer in San Carlos, who was Legitimist 
but actually almost a political , as provisional president for 
fourteen months . Four ministers of state would be appointed 
32Allen, William Walker , 84 . 
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by the President , with Corral serving as Minister of . .  War. 
A general amnesty was proclaimed and plans were made for the 
reduction and disarmament of both armies. 
Walker actually allowed Corral to take the initiative 
in the negotiations· and virtually dictate the terms of the 
treaty ; thus , "nearly all clauses were of Corral's author­
ship. " Walker then trapped Corral by qu1etly insisting on 
being named Commander-in-Chief of Arms . 3 3  · From t.his T?Oint on , 
Walker as he had anticipated , was virtual master of the 
situation . The treaty was formally signed by Walker and 
Corral on October 2 3 and consecrated in a solemn Te Deum in 
the cathedral in Granada a week later . 
Walker represented himself as acting on behalf of the 
Democrats , and declared he would subdue them if they did not 
agree to the convenant . When the news of the settlement 
reached Leon , there was surprise and consternation . A meet-
ing was cailed among the . Democratic leader� to determine 
what attitude should be assumed in the face of these events. 
Many wanted . to disavow Walker , but Norberto Ramfrez , a 
former chief-of-state , declared that the choice was two abysses, 
one soon and the other later. Therefore , the Democrats 
approved the provisional government and sent a delegation to 
Granada which arrived on October 3 1 . 
3 3Laurence Greene , The Filibuster {New York : Bobbs­
Merrill , 193 7 ) , 12 3 . 
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Corral, who had expected a unilateral cabinet, was 
angui shed at the introduction by Rivas (at Walker's behest ) 
of the Democrats into the ministries . 34 Jerez was named 
Minister of Public Credit. Ferrer was a wealthy Granadino 
who, · like Rivas had taken no part in the revolution . 
Even before the new government could be established, 
an unsettling event occured . Corral, brooding over what he 
regarded as a betrayal by Walker, wrote letters to Legitimist 
General Pedro Xatruch and to General Guardiola, both at 
Tegucigalpa. The letters obliquely requested intervention 
by these generals with troops before Walker's control could 
be solidi fied. They were intercepted, and General Vall� 
delivered them to Walker . 
Walker immediately had Corral arrested and, at his subse­
quent court martial, Corral admitted authorship. The court 
sentenced Corral to execution, but recommended that the 
Commander of Arms {not the President ) 9rant mercy. Even 
Corrall ' s  wife and daughters formally called on Walker and 
begged reprieve in tearful wails. "But upon the countenance 
of Walker, there was not visible a particle of emotion. His 
features were calm and placid, and his cold, pas sionless  gray 
eyes relaxed nothing of its [ sic ] ordinary frigidity . 11 35 
34salvatierra, Maximo J;rez, 91-94. 
35J. C .  Kewen in the San Franci sco Herald, December 14, 
1855. 
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According to Walker ' s  own testimony , he felt compelled to 
sustain the sentence to avoid further conspiracies by either 
Corral or other Legitimist leaders . Corral was executed at 
2: 00 p. m .  on November 8 ,  1 8 5 5 , in the main plaza . 
. walker's action was exceedingly �npopular , and cost him 
much of the support he had enjoyed from his initial moder­
ation . 11 Whichever way he turned , immediately there aros e a 
cry from the Legitimists or the Democrats , the transit 
company or its rivals , the northern states or the southern 
states ,* the Central American republic s or England , that he 
should have turned some other way . n·3 6  Buenaventura Selva 
was named to replace Corral as  Minister of War . 
With his apparent imperturbability and his single­
mindedness  of purpose , Walker rode out the storm of protest . 
He perhaps felt that respect for his new government was far more 
important than ephemeral popularity and the good will of the 
rank-and-file Granadinos .  He now turned his attention to 
two major tasks at hand : the organization of the government 
and the recognition of its legitimacy . In addition , Walker 
had to address  himself to organizing the political divisions 
of the state (Figure 10) . 
3 6Allen , William Walker , 9 3 . 
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CHAPTER VI II  
WALKER'S FILIBUSTER GOVERNMENT 
Perhaps American influence will tend to purify Nica­
raguan businessmen's principles and elevate their · 
conduct . With this  idea it will  prove a blessing 
if the whole of Central America becomes Americanized 
by the industrious and-··enterprizing from the North . 1 
On October 2 3 , 1 8 5 5 , Wheeler informed Secretary Marcy 
of the peace treaty between Walker and Corral which had j ust 
been signed and said that he would await · instructions from 
the Department regarding recognition. The observation , how� 
ever , that this was the first apparent peace in thirty �ears , 
and that El Salvador , Honduras , and Nicaragua would for� a 
federal republic, indicated something of his feelings vis-a-vi s 
the new g�vernment. 2 On November 6 ,  Wheeler advised the De­
partment of the constitution of the new government and the 
execution of Corral • . Quoting from Wheaton ' s  Elements of Inter­
national Law concerning de facto recognition , he observed , " I . 
shall feel authorized to present myself to the Pres ident of the 
provisional government , believing that this course wil l  meet 
your entire approbation. 113 Two days later , he presented his 
credentials to the new government and, according to an account 
!wheeler to Marcy , June 1 5 ,  1 8 56 , National Archives , 
M219 , 10/57. 
2 Ibid. , October 2 3 , 1 8 5 5 , · ibid. , 1 0/27. 
3Ibid. , November 8 ,  1 8 5 5 , ibid. , 1 0/2 8.  
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in Walker's ne�spaper , "acknowledged on the part of the 
government he so ably represents , the independence and sovereign­
ty of the government established by the treaty of 23d ultimo. 114 
Shortly afterward, Wheeler told the Department that the new 
government would be permanent, and that El Salvador and Hon­
duras sent their congratulations. 
Costa Rica must fall in. Guatemala ,  the determined foe 
of Nicaragua , will seek and find ready cause of Quarrel 
and will attack her--in which aided by San Salvador and 
Honduras and the adventurous spirits from the United 
States and elsewhere , Guatemala will  be badly whipped. 
Then will  come a confederated union of the five repub­
lics and with it , I trust Peac� , Science and Civilization . 5 
The Department's reply was delayed in arrival , and demon­
strated a major difference in as sessments of the situation : 
It has more the appearance of a succes s ful marauding 
expedition than a change of government or rulers . 
Should the mas s  of people of Nicaragua be unwilling 
or unable to repel this inroad or shake off this usur­
pation , and ultimately submit to its rule , then it 
will become de facto a government and responsible 
for the outrages which have been committed upon the 
rights and persons of American citizens. Then this 
· ·government will demand and exact, ample indemnity 
and satis faction from it. 6 
This exchange brings dramatically into focus the cross­
purposes  between Wheeler and Marcy. Wheeler had experienced 
the trials  of the savage civil war and had seen the devas-
4El Nicaraguense , November 1 0 , 1 8 5 5. 
5wheeler to Marcy , November 12 , 1 855 ,  National Archives , 
M2 19 , 1 0/29 • 
. 6Marcy to Wheeler , November 8 ,  1 855 , ibid. , M77 ,  27/13. 
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tation it was causing . . He was caught up i n  the prevailing 
spirit of optimism that , hopefully , a final settlement had 
been found . To this end , he wanted to lend the prestige o f  
h i s  office to the consolidation of the armis tice .  Marcy was 
concerned about neutrality and about identifying a legal 
government on which damages could be asses sed . Nonetheless , 
Wheeler acceded to the instructions from his superior : 
"Since the reception of  this  despatch . • •  I have abstained 
from all official intercourse with the persons now exercising 
�ontrql over this republic and will  not establ ish diplomatic 
intercourse until instructed. 11 7 
In addition to addres sing himsel f to the routine problems 
of organizing a revolutionary government ,  Walker turned his 
attention toward two other efforts : co�onization and recogni­
tion . In· order to s timulate colonization , he issued decrees 
guaranteeing li fe and property , and attempted to attract Ameri­
can scienti fic and industrial talent . J • . W .  Fabens was appointed. 
Director of  Colonization , and on November 2 8  he i ssued a home­
s teading decree which provided two hundred and fifty acres for 
a single person , with an additional one hundred for each person 
with a fami ly . A non-trans ferable title would be granted after 
s ix months ' occupancy ; the colonizers would be free from import 
duties , taxes , or public service except in emergencies . 8 As a 
result of this  decree , American colonists began arriving in 
7wheeler to Marcy ,  December 24 , 1 8 5 5 , ibid . , M21 9 , 10/35 . 
8wells , Walker ' s Expedition , 9 8 . 
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in Nicaragua on· both sides of the republic. 
As important as recognition by" the other Central American 
nations was recognition by the United States. French resigned 
as Minister of Hacienda ( finance) and was appointed minister to 
the ·united States. He left San Juan . del Norte on December 3 
for New York, carrying a letter of introduction from Wheeler 
and the trea.ty ¼1heeler had negotiated, for the purpose of ex­
changing ratifications. 9 
From New York French went directly to Washington and sent 
a note- to Marcy on December 12. The note said French was the 
accredited Nicaraguan representative to Washington and requested 
an early interview before presenting his credentials. Marcy ' s  
I 
note of December 2 1  said that the Pres ident "has not yet seen 
reasons for establishing dip lomatic intercourse with the per­
sons who now claim to exercise political power in the state of 
Nicaragua. " Marcy al�o charged that those who �verthrew the 
former government were not citizens and that citizens had not 
had an opportunity to expres s their will. Unti l such time, the 
Pres ident would not receive French or anyone else from that 
governm�nt. 10 
As a result of American non-recognition, Guatemala, Hon­
duras, and Costa Rica refused even to correspond with the new 
government o Friendly efforts to establi sh conunerce with other 
9Wheeler to Marcy, November 30, 18 5 5, National Archives, 
M219, 10/31 .  
lOWells, Walker's Expedition, 9 9. 
2 56 
Central American states were rebuffed with unequivocal in­
dications of hostility. 11 
In the meantime , Walker was still  receiving support 
from the Garrison faction of the transit company. McDonald , 
the company representative , had taken $20 , 000 in gold bullion 
from a shipment crossing the Isthmus and had given the owner 
drafts on Charles Morgan , Garrison" s accomplice and company 
manager in New York. The bul lion found its way into the cof­
fers of the new government , and the government , in turn , agreed 
to dequct the amount from the transit company's annual payment. 12 
In addition , French , wit� Morgan's support , proposed in 
New York that the transit company transport inunigrants to 
Nicaragua and deduct twenty dollars a person from the debt. 
Neither Vanderbilt nor White suspected the ulterior motives of 
the Garrison-Morgan faction , despite Wheeler's caution to Marcy 
concerning the situation: "The Government will  early institute 
an inquiry by what warrant the transit company owns their char­
ter , and the inquiry may result in it being declared forfeited 
so far as the transit over the isthmus is concerned. "13 It  
is likely that Vanderbilt suspected nothing concerning the con­
spiracy. At · any rate , from December , 185 5 ,  to Februa.ry , 185 6 ,  
about one thousand immigrants. were transported by the transit 
company. 14 
llibid. , 147. 
12 scroggs , "Walker and th3 Steamship Corporation , " 7 9 5. 
13Wheeler to Marcy , December 15 , 185 5 , National Archives ,  
M2 19 , 10/32 . 
14scroggs , "Walker and the Steamship Corporation , "  7 96. 
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On December 3 ,  General Cabanas arrived from Costa Rica 
where he had been in exile s ince being deposed in Honduras. 
He now requested .a return on his investment in helping the 
Liberals mount the May , 1854 ,  revolution. There still re­
mained two months 'in Cabanas r pres idential tenure in Honduras ,  
and he wanted help to overthrow Guardiola , now in power , in 
order to as sure Legitimist succes sion. Wal��r refused the 
aid because he regarded Cabanas as old and useless :  
The very obstinacy with which he asked to be restored 
before the expiration of his time was proof of the 
tendency of his mind to dwell on unimportant points . 
Incapable of looking at the affairs of Central America 
with general views , he seemed a MorazAn Federalist , 
dwindled by age to a Honduras officia1. l S  
Walker also claimed that he did not help Caba�as because he 
�anted more time to prcp�re £0� the inevitable blow that the 
other states would strike. It was later alleged that Walker 
actually refused because he saw he could not manage the old 
warrior. 16 
, . 
Both Jerez and Buenaventura res igned from the 
.-v 
cabinet in disgl;lst when Walker refused to cooperate with Cabanas . 
Wheeler's view of Caba�as was more sympathetic than that 
of Walker . He referred to the old Honduran as being "esteemed 
as one of the most liberal and honorable men in Central America." 
Probably .for that reason , and because it  befitted his role as 
a " diplomat � " he was more patient with Cabanas. The latter 
15walker , War in Nicaragua , 162. 
16Ricardo Duefias Van Severen , La Invas i�n Fil ibustera 
(El Salvador: Director General of Publ ications , 19 6 2 ) ,  84. 
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wanted to know . whether the United States approved o f  its 
citizens coming to Central America, or whether it would pre­
vent the attempt to "destroy the nationality of Central Ameri­
ca? " - Wheeler replied that American policy since President 
Washington had bee·n non-interference in domestic difficulties 
of other nations . He pointed out that . the United States had 
stopped Colonel Kinney , and had indicted _ _  officials o f  the 
British government for recruiting for the Crimean War . But 
if American citizens left that country and enlisted in a foreign 
service, the United States was no longer responsible--either 
to restrain or protect them .  
Wheeler assured Caba�as that the United States would not 
intervene to aid Walker if Guatemala--j oined by other states-­
made war on him . Cabanas then observed that if Walker did not 
get reinforcements, Guatemala led by Carrera, and Honduras, 
with Guardiola at the helm ( "both uns crupulous and unprinci­
pled, desperate and bloody " )  would run the filibuster out or 
kill him . This was ominous--and eerily prescient--but Wheeler 
remained sanguine . He asserted that they would get whipped if 
they tried, for every steamer brought more people--farmers , 
merchants, miners--but mostly soldiers . The American · govern­
ment was not involved , he continued ,  but the spirit of enter­
prise and adventure was strong i.n the American character . 
. . 
Then Cabanas changed the sub j ect s lightly, expressing ad­
miration for the Monroe Doctrine and saying that he hoped the 
United States would ·force out of  Central America the British, 
2 59 
whom he styled as "oppress ive , arrogant , and insulting . " · 
He observed that the British had tust taken Roatan Island , 
which commands the Honduran coast , and were extending their 
control in other parts of Central America . 17 
Cabanas ' feelings about Great Britain were agreeable to 
both Wheeler and Walker . Wheeler said that the United States 
was aware of British activities ,  and would either make Britain 
conform to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty or unilaterally abrogate 
the agreement . 1 8  A recent article in El Nicaraguense had said : 
England , the ever grasping and never satis fied , has 
iong looked with lustful eyes on our republic , and 
the collection of States which formed the Central 
American Confederation ; and has more than once un­
blushingly asserted her desire to promote British 
interests at the expense of North America . 19 
Even if this were--as the Walker apologists seemed to 
contend--the official policy of  the British government , there 
were still  some thoughtful men in England . The . Times of London 
proposed that Great Britain give up its c laims to Belize , 
Mosquito , and Roatan , if  the United States would force the 
filibusters out of  Nicaragua . The article referred to Walker 
and his colleagues as "murderers , robbers ; and pirates . "  It 
further contended that European--especially English--enmity 
and interference had prematurely forced the United States to 
17wheeler to Marcy , December 2 4 , 1 8 5 5 , National Archives ,  
M219 , 10/3 5 . 
1 8 rbi·a .  
1 9El Nicaraguense , Noverober 1 7 , 18 5 5. 
2 6 0  
action , for example in · the cases of Califbrnia and Texas. 
Europe , it said , should welcome a strong Central American 
Confederation as a counter-balance to United States expansion. 
Nonetheless , it mourned , all e fforts by Nicaraguan leaders 
to establish relations had been rebuffed , and the consequences 
would surely be that "General Walker will  build up a strong 
American auxiliary to the United Stat'e s on the I sthmus . 11 2 0  
Unfortunately for Walker , the reality seemed otherwise ,  
and with the rebuff of his minister to Washington , he was 
tentatively looking elsewhere for financial  and perhaps moral 
support. El Nicaraguense , Walker ' s  paper , editorialized that 
Nicaragua had two traditional courses , American and European , 
and as the United States had virtual ly shut the door on one 
of them, the only al terna ti ve was England and Europe . The prob­
lem had always been that English capital usually took over once 
invited in. The editorial cited as an example Mexico , "which 
is in debt slavery , [and ] can ' t  make a move without consulting 
England . "  Nicaragua , however , was now strong enough to have 
no fear , and it needed European capital . The state was too poor 
to build the things it needed : a ship canal , railroads , quartz 
machines , and saw mills . Why shouldn ' t  Nicaragua trade directly 
with the manufacturing source , Liverpool rather than Boston? 
Nicaragua ' s  coffee , sugar , cotton , cocoa , indigo , and rice 
didn't need transshipment . The merchants of  Hamburg , LiverJ:X)Ol , 
2 0Quoted in ibid . , March 15 , 1 8 5 6 .  
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Antwerp , and Bordeaux would buy as readily from Nicaragua 
as the merchants of New York , and the cost�  and commissions 
to New York agents would be saved. Perhaps as a result , the 
tide of industrious European immigrants might be diverted from 
the United States ·to Nicaragua , as the latter would offer more 
promising inducements of resources to . be developed and forttm.es 
to be made . Finally , Nicaragua was not bound by the Clayton­
Bulwer Treaty , and that should prove to be a maj or advantage . 21 
But there was still the Mosquito problem with the British 
government .  On February 8 ,  1 8 5 6 , Walker ' s  government had i s­
sued a proclamation affirming· that the Mosquito Coast was an 
integral part o f  Nicaragua. This was presumably to nullify 
the formal renunciation forced upon Nicaragua by the British 
in 1 8 4 8 . The decree was largely ignored by the British , so 
Walker sought other measures to gain Briti sh acceptance .  In 
June , General Domingo de Goicouria was dispatched to England 
as Nicaraguan minister with full powers to settle the Mosquito 
question , in addition to negotiating treaties and loans. 2 2  
Unfortunately , his mi ssion came to little . It was not until 
18 6 0- - long after Walker ceased to play a role in Nicaraguan 
affairs--that a treaty was signed with Great Britain ·which pro• 
vided for nominal incorporation of the eastern coast with the 
nation , under the form of an autonomous re servation . And it 
2 1Ibid . , March 2 2 ,  1 8 5 6. 
2 2wheeler to Marcy , June 2 2 , 1 8 5 6, National Archives ,· 
M2 19 , 10/58 . 
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was not until the end of the century that full Nicaraguan 
j urisdiction over the Mosquitos was ·  estab�ished . 
Investment , however , was not the mos t  immediate of 
Walker's foreign problems . His first priority was securing 
men , and the authorities in the United State s were impeding 
his efforts in this . respect. - The Mew . York "Herald reported 
that on Chris tmas Eve , 1 8 5 5 , Captain Faunce of  the revenue 
cutter Washington had received orders from the New York Dis­
trict Attorney to forestall the sailing of  the Accessory 
Transit Company ' s  Northern Light . At the Battery , Captain 
Faunce took off two hundred men from steerage who had no 
tickets ; these were apparently bound for Nicaragua to help 
Walker , and were characterized as "stowaways . "  ( I t  appears 
that the company initial ly disavowed them , despite the earlier 
agreement . )  The men claimed to be colonists  who had been 
promised two hundred �i fty acre s for cultivation upon their 
arrival in Nicaragua . About twenty-five in cabin class  did 
not have tickets either , but Jo seph N. Scott , the company 
agent at Greytown , explained that these men were being trans­
ported down to work on proj ects of  the company , �. , build 
fences , make stone walls , work the _ stone quarries ,  build .a 
coal depot ,  and build a wharf on the Pacific side . He opined 
that the natives would not work , and that all the "whites " 
were either. with Walker or headed · for California as  soon as 
they got the money . As a result ,  the company cons tantly 
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needed resupply. The men would be given tickets as soon as 
the ship cleared the bay. 
But Joseph L. White, the attorney and one o f  the direc­
tors of the company , was still fighting Walker's battles. 
In a letter to District Attorney John McKean at New York , he 
declared that the company .�did .not'  wittingly carry mercenaries 
to Central America , but anununition and other supplies as paid 
freight to a duly-constituted government was another question . 
In response to McKeon ' s  assertion that the Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty forbade colonists ,  White denied it. The treaty said 
that the United States and Great Britain as " corporate enti­
ties " could not colonize , but it did not refer to individuals. 
This , he continued , was up to rhe Ni�araguan gover��ent , �nder 
whose laws the company was incorporated. The company would 
continue to operate in this fashion no matter what the posi­
tion of  the United States might be with respect to recognition. 
He did concede that the company had made a deal with the 
non-accredited Nicaraguan minister ,  Parker H .  French , for de­
livering colonists at nominal rates . But McKeon ' s  assertion 
that French ' s  _activities were illegal on the grounds t�at the 
United Staies did not recognize the Nicaraguan government was 
rebuffed. 
It will  be new to them--it is · to me--that the United 
States held any supervisory or other control over 
their political action. Whenever a government may be 
established in Nicaragua , and of whatever kind , and 
however the same may be changed or modified , are ques­
tions which affect only that state , and which are to 
be decided by them alone. 2 3  
23 New York Herald , December' 2 6 ,  1 8 5 5 . 
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Besides , White continued , the _ company had no choice. 
It was not a government it had helped establish , but no oth­
er was in prospect , and the company could not operate in a 
state with no government to recognize rights and protect 
concessions. Finally , he dis sembled , the company did refuse 
transit to Colonel Kinney when he seemed to be mounting an 
invasion , and would do the same to prevent others going to 
Nicaragua for " soldiery , "  but not for colonization. 2 4 
About two weeks later on January 5 ,  according to El  
Nicara�uense , French had a confrontation with McKeon . The 
District Attorney went to French ' s  quarters at the St. 
Nicholas Hotel in New York. He accused French of violating 
American neutrality laws , asserting that he had proof of 
French's "criminality. " The latter steadfastly maintained 
he was only the Minister from Nicaragua , his country had ad­
vertised for colonist� , and the transit company had agreed 
to transport the prospects for twenty dollars a head. Be­
yond that , he had done nothing. He dared McKean to arrest 
him, and then showed him the door . 25 
After the frantic exchanges of letters and words over 
the larger is sue of Amer1can re sponsibility versus the pre­
rogatives of its citizens ,  the actual trial of the Northern 
Light " stowaways "  was somewhat of a denouement . It was first 
heard on February 7, but was continued until the first Monday 
24Ibid . 
2 5El Nicaraguense , January 12 , 18 5 6. 
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in April . E l  Nicaraguense  claimed that nearly all  those ar­
rested had given up prominent positions to go to Nicaragua, 
and that most were heroes of the Mexican War . For example, 
"Colonel Hall was a captain in the New York Volunteers--who 
on his return was breveted Maj or by the Legislature for his 
bravery, and since then has served as Colonel of the Brooklyn 
Militia . 11 2 6  Having cut themselves off from their former oc­
cupations, and being lightly overseen, many simply preceded 
to Nicaragua. The more prominent ones assured the American 
Minister in Nicaragua that they would request furlough to 
return for the trial, but the case was e ffectively closed, 
and the District Attorney ' s  efforts to stop Walker reinforce­
ments were even less effective than his moves against Kinney. 
Nonetheless, the action--or inacticin--of the United 
States government made itself felt in another fashion . It 
is . unquestionable that in Central America, recognition of a 
government which claims de facto existence is of  ma j or signi­
ficance. It was perhaps even more crucial to Walker ' s  regime, 
given its precarious political balance and the predilection 
of  other Central American states for intervention .  In this 
respect, the new government was in immediate trouble, as 
evidenced by Marcy ' s  response to Wheeler ' s  announcement of 
its formation. The Secretary directed his minister to have 
2 6 rbid., March 1 5, 1 8 5 6 . 
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to have no intercourse with the new government_, as the De­
partment did not regard it as legal . 
It appears to be no more than a violent usurpation 
of power, brought about by an irregular self-organi­
zed military force , as yet unsanctioned by i�e will 
. or acquiescence of the people of Nicaragua . 
If those holding power should establish themselves as a de 
facto government, Marcy advised, the United States govern­
ment could then hold them accountable for claims the Ameri­
can government might make on behalf of its citizens. 2 8  
Marcy wanted . a government to berate, while Wheeler wanted 
one to support, believing--as did most Americans in Nicaragua-­
that the Walker adyenture was, in the long run, in the best 
interest of the United States. Marcy did later concede that 
Wheeler ' s . role in maintaining some sort of  informal contact 
with the government in Granada was of  vital  importance . The 
United States government needed "the most accurate information 
in regard to the actual political condition of  the State of 
Nicaragua . "  Marcy acknowledged that the reports which had 
been received at the State Department were of  a conflicting 
nature : · "Whi le some of  them represent that the present politi­
cal organization is satisfactory to the people • • .  others 
[ say ]  it has no foundation in the hearts of the people . 11 29 
2 7Marcy to Wheeler, November 8, 1 8 5 5, National Archives, 
M7 7, 2 7/1 3. 
2 8 Ibid. 
29Ibid . ,  January 8, 1 8 5 6. 
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The major popular support in the United States for 
Walker's efforts (among those Americans wno were aware of  
the filibuster's activities ) came primarily from the South 
and the West. Southerners continued to harbor interest in 
the extension of the slave-holding areas , and Westerners 
particularly were still ·caught up .. , in - t�e 'impetus from Mani­
fest Destiny .  An example o f  this latter feeling was an 
Oakland ( California) Leader editorial : 
Walker is the Government of Nicaragua • • •  his is  
not the vain ambition of  lording it over the narrow 
territory and native population of Nicaragua . Cen­
tral America may limit his aspirations--a federal 
government composed of independent , sovereign states , 
with a system of laws similar to our own , and a popu­
lation invited from all quarters of the world , to 
give force , dignity , and character to his government , 
and infuse somewh2.t of enterprise  intc the present 
effeminate native population must be his ultimate 
hope . 3 0 
The British did not seem as reluctant to recognize the 
government at Granada · a.s was the Department o f  State . Thomas 
Manning , the British vice-consul at Leon and a res ident of 
Nicaragua for thirty years , discussed the situation with Whe­
eler in Granada . He assured Wheeler that "the present condi­
tion of political affairs in this Republic meets their. hearty 
approval and acquiescence . " 31 Manning subsequently conceded 
recognition in an official note to the Nicaraguan government . 3 2 
He may , however, have been acting on his own judgment , as 
3 0Reprinted in El Nicaraguense , January 2 5 ,  1 8 5 6 . 
31Wheeler to Marcy, January 15 , 1856 , H219 , 10/40 . 
32�. , January 22 , 1856 . 
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Wheeler had done previously. Or it may have been that the 
British were accustomed to Central American governments with 
foreign advisors who were, in reality, the powers behind the 
throne . At any ra�e, it was at most a recognition of  the 
government o f  President Rivas, and did not commit the British 
to recognition of the later government under Walker without 
the pressure of a native chief executive . 
Nevertheless, the main problem remained with Washington � 
El  Nicaraguense, sarcastically commenting on the American re­
fusal to accredit French , observed that the same standards 
would have left the United States a part of Great Britain , 
" after the filibusters Dekalb, Lafayette , . von Steuben , et al 
had come over . " Instead ! Great Britain immedia te l y :rect=d.vAci 
John Adams as minister . 3 3  In a different tone, El Nicaraguense 
called Marcy ' s  note to Wheeler " a  model o f  ministerial ignor­
ance, official rudenes s ,  and reckless  violation of public law 
and international usages . "  Accordingly , President Rivas direc­
ted �inister General Ferm{n Ferrer to cancel French ' s  commis­
sion and order him to Nicaragua "to report . "  The government 
also suspended official intercours e with Wheeler . 3 4 
In a note to the Department, Wheeler complained that self 
respect would normally have made him demand his passport , but 
his explicit instructions from the President were to " stay and 
3 3El Nicaraguense ,  January 12 , 1 8 5 6 . 
3 4 rbid . ,  January 2 6 ,  1 8 5 6 . 
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report. " In the · same communication, he subtly raised the 
specter of a Nicaraguan-British "understanding" (perhaps 
seeing Nicaragua in the role of  another Mexico ) . Finally , 
he closed the despatch by berating the British for their  
35 
opportunistic diplomacy. 
One more problem was the continued recognition by Wash­
ington of Marcoleta as Nicaraguan Minister. Walker's news­
paper again resorted to sarcasm : to whom did he send his �-... 
despat�hes , or from whom did he get his �instruments ? Mar-
coleta , the organ asserted , had "invented " a government , 
cabinet, and army at the ancient city of  Segovia . It would 
be embarrassing for the United States government if the 
Unifed s�ates-Nicaraguan treaty pending before the Senate 
were sent to this imaginary government to exchange 
ratifications. 3 6  
The impasse ·was temporarily broken when the Walker­
Rivas government replaced French with a native Nicaraguan . 
Wheeler broke the news by announcing that he had learned 
"incidentally " that the government was sending Padre August{n 
Vijil as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary , 
and that the friar would leave in a few days. Wheeler called 
Vijil a n distinguished ornament of the Church , "  and assured 
35wheeler to Marcy , January 2 2 , 1 8 5 6 , National Archives , 
M2 19, 1 0/4 1 . 
36El  Nicaraguense, January 2 6, 1 8 5 6 . 
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the Department that he would fa�thfully represent Nicaragua 
and would be acceptable to the diplomatic corps. 3 7  The ap­
pointment was apparently enough to as suage the sensitivities 
of  officials in Washington , and Marcy notified Wheeler that 
the President had decided to recognize  the Nicaraguan govern­
ment and to receive Vij il. 3 8 In addi tion , . it appears that 
pres sure may have been brought upon the government from other 
sources. Sympathy in the Senate had apparently been aroused 
by the.. letter K.J.ker wrote Senator John B. Weller of califa.,rnia ,  
apprising him of the situation. 3 9  
Finally , from Marcy ' s  note i t  appeared that Commodore 
Vanderbilt had been urging President Pierce directly to recog­
ni ze the government in order to have leverage with respect to 
the transit problems. Marcy advised Wheeler : 
The interest of the United States as well as that  of 
many individuals has been inj uriously affected by the 
interruption of the transit  through Nicaragua across  
the Is thmus . It .i s alleged that the proceedings by 
which this result was brought about are in disregard 
of the rights granted by Nicaragua to the Accessory 
Transit Company in which the citi zens of  the United 
States had made large investments . This government 
has been called on by its citizens who have been in­
j ured by these proceedings to make reclamations for 
the losses they have sustained . • [ Report on 
this . ] 4 0 
3 7Wheeler to Marcy , April 1 7 , 1 8 5 6 , National Archives , 
M2 19 , 10/4 8 . 
3 8Marcy to Wheeler , June 3 , 1 8 5 6 , ibid. , M7 7 ,  2 7/1 8. 
3 9El Nicaraguens e , June 14 , 1 8 5 6 . 
4 0Marcy to Wheeler , June 3 , 1 8 5 6 , National Archives ,  
M7 7, 27/1 8 . 
2 71 
. These happier circumstances were short- lived , however , 
as events in Nicaragua were outrunn.ing the capacity of Wash­
ington to respond to them. By the time Wheeler acknowledged 
Marcy's communication on July 7 ,  a political trans formation 
had taken place. As Provis ional President , Rivas had ordered 
national �lections to .be he.Ld.,..' ;but ·:·owing partly to the de­
fection of viable candidates , only Walker was a realistic 
choice. When Walker consequently won the post of chief execu­
tive , Rivas refused to acquiesce in the results. He , in turn , 
defected to an invading coalition army on June 17 . 4 1 In ad­
dition , on .. Tune 2 3 ,  Padre Vi j it--after only s ix weeks in 
Washington--notified Marcy that he would be absent from the 
country , and that John P .  Hei s s , another American , would be 
Charge d '  Affaires. 4 2  These two events were more than the 
State Department could countenance , and recognition until the 
end of the Walker interlude became a moot issue. 
Of more immediate concern to Walker was the prospect of 
a Central American coalition putting an army into the field 
against him . After Walker had refused to aid Cabanas in re­
gaining power in Honduras ,  the latter went directly to El 
Salvador to incite the government of  that country against the 
Americans. Cabanas was reported to have proc laimed a fierce 
war of extermination against the army of Walker , and to have 
4 1Wheeler to Marcy , August 2 5 , 1 8 5 6 , ibid. , M21 9 , 1 0/67.  
4 2vil j il to Marcy , June 2 3 , 1 8 5 6 , John P. Heis s  Papers , 
Tennes see State Historical Society , Nashville. 
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expressed the belief that in its destruction lay the only 
safety for Central America . 43 In addition ·, it appeared 
that the other Central American states were preparing to 
join in an alliance to make general war against the Ameri­
cans . Walker ' s  paper, El Nicaraguense, feigned perplexity 
at these developmsitts. · I t  -notea· ' t.hat . a · 1eague had been 
formed among Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, 
and that--contrary to custom--Nicaragua had not been included. 
All the people o f  Nicaragua, the editorial intoned, were of­
fended by this and felt " their government is required to have 
the incivility rectified or apologized for . " Nicaragua had 
always tried to maintain a correct posture toward these states 
d 1 n h .. h · f · dl · 44 an cotL . . . not ... ut :r.egaro t: 1s  a s  an un rien y action . 
Then the newspaper went on to treat separately the ad­
herence of each of the countries to the "ill-advised league. " 
El  Salvador, it asserted, had hitherto been considered the 
inveterate foe of  the Conservative Party, and at the same time 
a staunch friend of democratic principles. Its position had 
been so well understood that contemporary writers ( called it) 
the " Switzerland of America, "  because it was hemmed in with 
rocky mountains, "in whose fastnesses were firmly protected 
the liberal ideal of its people . "  Moreover, El Salvador had 
previously expressed a sympathy for the existing government 
4 3El Nicaraguense, February 1 6, 1 8 5 6. 
44 rbid . 
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in  Nicaragua , and had made offers of peace and friendship. 
How strange that it would then lend its name and influence 
to an alliance against a government which was "founded on 
the theory her people have sustained with so much fidelity. 1 1 4 5 
Neither Honduras nor Guatemala had responded to the 
formal proposition submitted. · by ·· Nicaragua ·. to the other four 
powers for a convention of al l the states to adopt measures 
to provide for the general good and to guarantee the independ­
ence of the contracting parties. It was perhaps hoped that 
this proposal {and the subsequent convention ) might allay 
the fears of the other states of an.expanding Americanization 
of the entire Isthmus . They were aware , of course , that 
dHU cun-
tractual arrangements ,  therefore , always seemed to redound 
to his benefit. But it was Costa Rica--the most immediate 
and most formidable threat--for which El Nicaraguense reserved 
its most potent invective. The loss of Costa Rica's friend­
ship was " a  doubtful inj ury. " That state had allowed to con­
gregate on its borders Nicaraguan political refugees who 
continually attempted to foment discord within their native 
country. ·The Costa Rican gove�nment had never made any effort 
toward establishing friendly relations with the current gov­
ernment in Nicara gua. 
45Ibid. 
All these faults , heretofore disregarded , will 
rise up to condemn her present suicidal policy; 
and when the long account i s  settled , i f  they 
force us to hostilities , all these defalcations 
must be answered for . We have toad to the faith 
of nations ; we have acted honorably and with a 
most conciliatory spirit to all the republics 
of Central America , and will still pursue the 
same unequivocal policy ; but yet we are prepared 
for the desperate alternative ;  and should dis­
contented politicians inflame against us the ig­
norant people of adj oining states , we can only 
adjudge them , as it has been done s ince the be­
ginning , "thosi who draw the sword , shall perish 
by the sword . 11 � 6 
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Unfortunately , threats , cajolery , and appeals avai led 
the Americans nothing . On March 1 ,  Costa Rican Pres ident 
Juan Rafael Mora declared war , taking e_special pains to make 
it clear to native Nicaraguans that thi s action was aimed at 
the American contingent only .. And it was to h� (1 w.=i r. tn th� 
death , as Mora decreed that "all prisoners taken with arms 
in their hands were to be shot . 11 4 7  When the news reached Nica.;.. 
ragua on March 11 , Walker announced plans  for an immediate in­
vas ion of Costa Rica--perhaps an almost instinctive effort to 
avoid fighting a two-front war . He acknowledged that his coa­
lition effort had failed , and that the " Servile " parties all 
over Central America were declaring their enmity . As the Legi­
timists in Nicaragua seemed to be joining the allied cause ,  
Walker ordered that hi s troops should thenceforward wear the 
Red Ribbon , emblematic of the Democratic (or Liberal) Party in 
Nicaragua . An editorial in El  Nicaraguense as sured the Costa 
4 6rbid . 
47walker , War in Nicaragua , 17 5 .  
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Rican people that the Nicaraguan army was com�ng "to regen­
erate rather than destroy " ( perhaps hoping for a repetition 
o f  the Nicaragua story ) . 4 8 
With arrival of 2 5 0  more men on March 9 ,  Walker's- army 
rose to 8 5 0 , with about 5 0 0  more Americans " capable of  bear­
ing arms engaged in civil business  either at Granada or along 
the line of the Transit . 11 4 9  Wheeler put the total figure at 
1 , 3 0 0 .
5 0  
In contrast , Mora had put out a call  for 9 , 0 0 0  
men , 5 1  though his active force was probably far below that . 
Mora ' s real strength came from oth�r quarters according to 
Walker . He maintained that his rival's audacity was result 
of encouragement by the policies of both the United States 
and- Great Brit.a in p 5 2  WhPP.] 8:r:- p�. rt .i � l  ly ("!0nfi rrned this  ,.1ie�,._7 
in a report to Marcy that a Nicaraguan blockade of  Costa Rica 
had resulted in the seizure of  British mail . " I  beg your 
patient attention to all these letters , "  he said , "they are 
genuine , and completely unmask the j esuitical policy of Great 
4 8E l  Nicaraguense , March 15 , 1 8 5 6 . 
49walker , War in Nicaragua , 1 7 5 . 
S Owheeler to Marcy , March 17 , 1 8 5 6 , National Archives ,  
M2 19 , 10/4 4 . Wheeler indicates that he is including · " capi­
talists , merchants , farmers ,  mechanics , laborers , [and 
millers ] . "  
51Folkman , Nicaragua Route , 8 1 . 
52walker , War in Nicaragua , 16 5-76 . 
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Britain. 11
5 3  
The "mail "  included Costa Rican diplomatic des­
patches from their consul general in Great Britain, E. Waller­
stein, to the Costa Rican foreign minister, Joaquin Beru de 
Calvo. A letter of February 16, 1856, from Wal lerstein to 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon acknowledged a pre­
vious note from tae,\B�itish· ministry telling Wallerstein (on 
Clarendon's direction) that the British Admiralty on the Paci­
fic station would send cruisers to protest British interests. 
Wal lerstein's letter requested that the British navy also pro­
test Costa Rica's interests as the filibusters were threaten­
ing that country . He pointed out that the United States had 
stationed a warship at Greytown , and therefore must be con­
spiring in the action with the intention of annexinq Central 
America and introducing slavery. 
A note from the Foreign Office to Wal lerstein dated Feb­
ruary 9 advised that the War Department had approved the sale 
of two thousand muskets to Costa Rica . A letter from the 
consul general to President Mora asked for instructions regard­
ing this purchase . He indicated that he had already asked 
permi ssion to examine some of the weapons. Wal lerstein also 
said that_ when he mentioned to Clarendon that Costa Rica had 
eight hundred troops on the Nicaraguan frontier, Clarendon had 
replied that " that was the right step . " Wallerstein j udged 
that Clarendon had approved the small arms sale because Costa 
5 3wheeler to Marcy, March 3 1 ,  1856 ,  National Archives, 
M2 19, 10/46. 
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Rica was doing something about Walker. He also expres sed 
the opinion that there would be no war between the United 
States and Great Britain because the United States recog­
ni zed that Britai n was "determined to punish the Yankees 
very severely for the least insult to the national honor. " 
He added, however, that such a war would be in Costa Rica ' s  
best interests. 
Also bolstering Costa Rican courage was a February 24 
despatch from their mini ster in Washington, Luis Molina, to 
Calvo. He said that news from Paris indicated that there 
was interest there in helping Central America maintain its 
independence, but no action would be taken unti l those coun­
tries affected did something to help themselves. Referring 
to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Molina said that Britain had 
told the United States that it had given all  the explana­
tions and apologies it planned to with respect to the acti­
vities of its consuls in Central America. The Briti sh would 
be willing to submit the question of treaty interpretation 
to arbitration, but apparently the United States did not want 
th . 
54 
l. S  • 
The Costa Rican mobilization and declaration of war was 
only partly due to the support and encouragement of foreign 
governments. Mora and his government probably genuinely 
54Molina to Calvo , February 24, 18 5 6 ,  ibid. 
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feared that Costa Rica , lying hard by the heartland o f  
Nicaragua , would be the next target for the northern fili­
busters . Perhaps it would be more prudent to move now , 
before the Americans could become firmly entrenched and or­
ganized ,  than to wait to be plucked at a later date . Per­
haps Mora wished to:-·· c.reate ·: confusion in . Nicaragua , and under 
this veil ,  seize more territory along the San Juan River in 
an effort to control the transit route . At any rate , war 
had been declared , and Walker had to addres s  himself to it . 
Walker himself appears in Figure 11  and the maj or battle 
sites of 1 8 57- 18 6 0  are shown in F igure 12 . 
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Figure 11. William Walker. 
Figure 12. Major Battle Sites, 1857-1860. 
2 8 0 
CHAPTER IX 
WALKER ' S  DREAMS OF EMPIRE CRUMBLE 
The course of Genera1 · walker in rererence to Costa 
Rica and his honest , frank , and manly manifesto 
seems to have been general ly received with favor 
throughout the state , and I understand it has drawn 
to his standard many wavering adherents of other 
and hostile facti.o:ns • .. -When wi·11 they _pegin to learn 
that he is the chosen instrument of - a manifest des­
tiny , and that though by their puny efforts they 
may for a moment stem the current , it wi ll  eventual ly 
but render the torrent more dreadful in its ravages 
and engulf them in its onward course . ! 
Walker wasted no time in ordering his army to march 
south in an invasion of Costa Rica . By the midd le of March , 
a battalion of three hundred and fifty men under the command 
of a Germa n Jew , Colonel Louis Schlessinger , marched out of 
Virgin Bay with banners streaming , intent upon the first ob­
jective , the capture of Guanacaste. The force included two 
companies of Americans and one each of French and German 
mercenaries . Some of the French were old Chasseurs de Vin­
cennes , " bronzed with the sun of Africa , and familiar with 
the use of that most deadly of weapons , the Minnie Rifle ; 
these bringing with them musicians • and the air was 
soon resounding with songs of home and fatherland . 112 El  
Nicaraguense reported that no problem was anticipated in 
the capture of Guanacaste. The sp irited army , mounted on 
" fine , - captured horses , 11 was moving so rapidly , Costa Rica 
l " corporal Pipeclay , "  in El  Nicaraguense , March 22 , 18 56 . 
2El Nicaraguense ; March 15 , 18 5 6 .  
2 81 
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[wouldn't] even ,have time to muster the militia. " The govern­
ment organ confidently speculated on which direction the army 
would move after the conclusion of the initi al stage of the 
campaign. 3 
Unfortunately , Colonel Schlessinger had been selected 
more for his linguistic ability than for . . his knowledge of 
military science. On March 2 0 , he called a halt in the march 
at the plantation of Santa Rosa , about eighteen miles north 
of the capital of Guanacaste. Schlessinger failed to post sen­
tries , and when an alarm announced a surprise Costa Rican at­
tack , general confusion reigned. The Costa Ricans poured in 
a murderous volley of fire ; one witness testified that they 
fought "like tiger�. 11 4 The German and French companies were 
told to fall back to better positions , but they apparently 
misinterpreted the command as an order to retreat. Colonel 
Schlessinger followed the withdrawal , as he later characterized 
it , "to rally the fugitives. " The engagement was over in about 
fifteen minutes. The retreat became a general rout , and for 
days stragglers struggled back to Virgin Bay in on�s and twos. 5 
Schlessinger was subsequently court-martialed for his role in 
the fiasco , but the damage was already done and the myth of 
the invincibility of the Yankee long-rifles had been shattered. 
3rbid. , March 2 2 , 185 6. 
4Philippe Egan Toohey , an Irishman , who was pardoned by 
Mora after be ing captured in the battle when he got written 
confirmation from the New Orleans Delta that he was a corres­
pondent and not a filibuster. Wheeler to Marcy , April 17 , 
185 6 ,  National Archives , M219 , 10/48. 
5 lbid. , April 14 , 1856 , 10/47 , and New York Tirres, April 21, 1856. 
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One of the most untoward events of the war fol lowed 
on the heels  of the Costa Rican victory. Mora moved north 
and entered undefended Virgin Bay on April 7 ,  His troops 
surrounded the office of the Accessory Transit Company and 
fired a volley of about one hundred rounds , kil ling nine 
Americans , most of them employees of the company. A witnes s 
reported that the Costa Ricans " systematically bayoneted and 
stabbed with swords the wounded on the ground , robbed the 
dead , and broke in and robbed the Transit Company office , then 
burned -the wharf . " 6 
Wheeler irorrtediately sent a letter to Pre sident Mora 
prote sting this " s laughter of unarmed and inoffensive" American 
citizens. Wheeler pointed out that this atrocity was an im­
plementation of Mora's twin proclamations of death to filibus ­
ters and elimination of all Americans from Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica. He reminded Mora of Molina's December letter to Marcy 
giving assurance that Costa Rican laws would grant land and 
protection to American immigrants. He also pointed out that 
Article XII of the 18 51 United States-Costa Rican tre aty 
guaranteed protection of persons and property of American 
citizens in Costa Rica . 7 Satisfaction , however , was not 
forthcoming , and claims for indemnity and restoration-­
processed through the Department of State--dragged on for years . 
6Deposition of Charl es  Mahoney , engineer for the Transit 
Company , taken by Wheeler. His statement was corrobated by 
other survivors. Wheeler to Marcy , National Archives , April 
17 , 1856 , M219 , 10/4 $ .  
7 Ibid . 
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Along with .information from Le6n that a coalition army 
from Honduras-El Salvador-Guatemala ·Was poised on the northern 
border and that invasion was inuninent , Walker's intelligence 
reported that Mora's army numbered eight thousand. This dire 
news . made Walker decide to barricade himself in Granada. How­
ever , neither of the reports proved to be well-founded (Mora ' s  
army was probably somewhere between two and four thousand) , 
so Walker decided to attack Rivas , which had been occupied by 
Mora upon the withdrawal of the filibusters. On April 11 , 
Walker �ed this assault himself , and his troops--some five 
hundred strong--attacked with fervor , catching the enemy off  
guard. The plaza was taken in five minutes , but the Costa 
Ricans had to be rooted out of barricades and fortified 
houses . As the day-long battle raged , it became clear to 
Walker that he occupied an untenable . position. As a result , 
he was compelled to order his troops to slip out under cover 
of darkness , conceding a somewhat pyrrhic victory to the Costa 
Ricans (considering their losses and the subsequent events} .
8 
The Costa Ricans retained the town , but they were also left  
with a severe . epidemic of  cholera . Within a few days , the 
remaining five hundred Costa Ricans were forced to withdraw , 
and the war temporarily went into a state of suspended ani­
rnation . 9 
8El Nicaraguense , April 14 ; 1856. 
9Allen , William Walker , 114 � 
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Taking advantage of the lul l in the fighting--due as much 
to the rainy season setting in  as to Costa Rican exhaustion 
and the dilatoriness of the other governments--Walker · aeter­
mined to put the government on a more permanent footing. 
Provisional President Rivas , along with his cabinet , had been 
in Le6n since March 1 ,  but before leaving he had entrusted the 
southern and eastern departments to the care of Walker under 
a kind ot martial law . A decree had been issued over the 
Preside�t ' s  writ cal ling for national elections on May 1. 
Delegates would be elected from each of the departments , and 
they . in turn would elect a president , .  senators , and represen­
tatives. The two candidates for president were Rivas himsel f , 
and Mariano Salazar , both [...: ont wha L was fcrrr�erly the Liberal 
or Democratic Party. 10 The forty-one delegates assembled in 
Managua on May 2 5 , and began their bal loting. With the city 
locited in one of the departments under Wa�ker ' s  jurisdiction , 
and the oral voting conducted in front of the assembled dele­
gates and observers , there was some basis for concern about 
coercion. At any rate , Walk_er was nominated from the floor 
for president , and it appeared that he might be "swept" into 
off ice. 
To forestall any charges of coercion or collusion , the 
balloting was temporarily suspended , and Walker made a "courtesy 
lOwheeler to Marcy ,. May 3 ,  1856 , National Archives , 
M219 , 10/51 . 
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call" on Rivas in Leon. There Walker apparently advised 
Rivas that he would be willing to accept the presidency only 
on the basis of a direct popular election. On June 11, Rivas 
is sued a proclamation cancelling the previous elections and 
calling for a new one on the basis of Walker ' s  recommenda­
tion . Feeling that the situation was well in hand , Walker 
rode south, only to be startled the next day by news that 
Rivas and his cabinet had abandoned Leon for Chinandega. In 
addition , Secretary of War Maximo Jerez had ordered the forti­
fications at both Realej o  and Le6n dismantled , and the small 
American contingent at Ledn to abandon the city. When word 
reached Walker of this turn of events , he ordered his tro'ops 
, . I ' ' 
1.n Leon to oLey because he "was net di sposed to have the coming 
struggle occuron any such is sue [i. e . , disobedience to lawful 
authority ] . "  He determined to have the contest conducted on 
11 
more formal grounds . In addition , he was concerned about 
having his forces strung out--in increasingly hostile terri-
/ 
tory--from Leon to Fort Castillo, and felt it more prudent 
to congregate them in the vicinity of Granada and perhaps in 
the immediate area of the transit route.
12 
Upon the American 
withdrawal, Rivas returned to Letn and apparently invited in 
the troops from the northern states which had been poised on 
the frontier. 13 
11walker , War in Nicaragua , 22 6. 
12 Ibid . 
13Whee ler to Marcy , June 30, 1 8 5 6 , National Archives ,  
M219, 10/5 9 .  
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Although Walker's visit probably had caught Rivas by 
surprise, and merely precipitated a course which the presi­
dent· had already decided to pursue , El Nicaraguense explained 
it  in a more exotic fashion . It had been tradition in Nica­
ragua, the paper averred, for defeated candidates either to 
flee or to be summarily executed . The impending election had 
undoubtedly aroused an atavistic dread in the former president. 
This circumstance convinces us that the approach of 
an election , and an invading army at the same time 
so frightened President Rivas that he hardly knew what 
he was doing ; and in a moment of partial insanity and 
chronic deceitfulness , he left the Presidency and thus 
lost all hope for the future . 4 
Despite this turn of events , Wal�er proceeded with the 
elections on thefollowing bases : ( 1 )  the elections had been 
leg ally called by the provi s ional pre sident, even though that 
gentleman had subsequently forfeited his right to govern ; { 2 )  
the October 2 3  agreement between Walker and Cabanas , which 
Walker regarded as the ·foundation of all su�sequent Nicaraguan 
government, ceded the right to the commander-in-chief  (Walker ) 
to organize a new government upon the dissolution of the existing 
one; (3 )  the departments which would be subject to the elections 
were also legally under Walker ' s  authority through the martial 
, 
law concession made by Rivas upon his departure for Leon on 
March 1 . In the interim , Walker appointed as provisional presi-
� 
dent former Minister of Hacienda Fermin Ferrer , the only member 
of Rivas • cabinet who had remained loyal to the filibuster . 
government . 15 
14El Nicara9U;ense, June 21 , 1856. 
15Ibid. 
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The candidates for the new election were still  Rivas and 
Salazar, as well as Ferrer and Walker . Not surprisingly, Wal­
ker swept all five provinces which participated in the voting, 
16 
getting three times the vote of Ferrer, his nearest rival . 
If the election was arranged, probably no candidate could 
have been honestly elected. The ��gitimists did not vote 
and the natives in the outlying district� did not even know 
about it or feared to · go to the polls . 17 Provisional President 
Ferrer issued a decree declaring Walker president, and the lat­
ter was duly inaugurated on July 12. 1� Ferrer was named Secre­
tary of State in the new government. 
As reported by El Nicaraguense, the toasts at the inaugural 
dinner presaged an auspicious £uture for the infant reg ime . 
A Mr . Deshields waxed eloquent with: "General Wil liam Walker, 
President of the Republic of Nicaragua--the scholar, gentleman, 
and soldier, responding to the cal l of down-trodden and op­
pressed humanity, entered Nicaragua at the head of his invin­
cible fifty-six, and establ ished the nucleus of a great Repub­
lic ! " Not to be outdone, Ferrer responded after the band 
played " See the Conquering Hero Comes" with : "Our Brethren 
from the United States who come here to teach the art o·f self-
l6rbid . ,  July 12, 18 56. 
l7Allen, William Walker, 118 . 
18El Nicaraguense, July 12, 18 56. 
government, in company with William Wnlker, our champion 
in war and protector in peace. 11 19 
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Perhaps to reassure itself of the legality of the elec­
tion, El Nicaraguense editorialized that there was no sove­
reign law in the country except the treaty of October, 1855 .  
The ul tra-democratic· · constitution of 18 3 8  had been wiped out 
by the revolution of 1854, and the ultra-conservative consti­
tution of 1854 was never implemented. In addition , the treaty 
specifically had lifted only certain articles from the 18 3 8  
constitution , thereby indicating that the whole constitution 
was not intended . In essence , the paper maintained , the law 
was William Walker, elected under the provisions of 1855. The 
editorial also emphasized the duty and responsibility--not to 
mention the necessity--of foreign nations ' recognizing de facto 
governments for legal and practical reasons . 2 0  
Perhaps unfortunately for Walker, h i s  sense of urgency 
to achieve reforms and to put things in order impelled him 
toward acting like� a monarch. He overhauled the constitution , 
revised the tariff laws , annulled inoperative statutes , and 
changed the flag design among other things , �11 by executive 
fiat . He seemed to sow confusion in the ranks of his supporters : 
he appeared to be for and against slavery, Nicaraguan indepen­
dence , annexation to the North American union , and conquest of 
19 1bid � , July 19 , 1856. 
2 0 rbid . 
· 2 9 0  
Central America. Perhaps there was method to his madness , 
and all the feverish activity was either a �fog or smokescreen 
• for his true purposes" which may never have real ly come 
to light. At any rate , he created suspicion and alienated his 
f . d t . . t  t ·  2 1  rien s a an inoppor une ime . 
Walker ' s  enemies ·w.er.e. '. :.c\,gain '.  �assing. 
/ 
At occupied Leon 
hundreds of troops from Guatemala and El Salvador j oined a 
large contingent of Necaraguan Legitimists. The filibuster 
forces held a line from Managua to the transi t route , and 
from San Juan del Sur to Fort Castillo down the San Juan River . 
Only sixty mi les separated the poised , contending armies in 
the north . Of some concern to Walker was the arrival of a 
British naval squadron at San Juan del Norte. The fleet 
consisted of thirteen ships of war , al l steamships except one ; 
among them was the Orion . of ninety-six guns , making the total 
force two hundred and sixty eight guns and two thousand five 
hundred rnen v 2 2 Further , American · fears of British interven­
tion were exacerbated by a rather peculiar stroke of fortune . 
Walker had issued a decree on August 4 declaring al l Cen­
tral American Atlantic and Pacific ports blockaded (except the 
21Allen , William Walker , i 'l 9 , 1 2 0 . One of Walker 's  projects 
that excited both approbation and resentment was the Confis­
cation Decree of July 1 6 , 1 856 , which provided that all persons 
who had "assisted the known enemies of the state" since October 
23 , 1 8 5 5 , or who had been . declared traitors since April 22 , 
1 8 5 6 , should have their property confiscated and inheritances 
forfeited. Within ten days of confiscation , an account of the 
confiscated proper ty would be published ; . thirty days after 
that--save the possib i l i ty of a successful contest of the action-­
the property would be sold ,  with the proceeds going to the 
Ministry of Hacienda . E l  Nicaraguense , July 1 9 , 1 856 . 
22wheeler to Marcy, August 16 , 1856 , M219 , 10/66. 
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· 23 Nicaraguan trans it route) .  This was a paper blockade , 
s ince the Nicaraguan navy cons isted of one outfitted schooner. 
Good use was made of this craft , however , when it captured a 
Salvadoran launch carrying General Salazar , who was credited 
with having persuaded Rivas and hi s cabinet to defect. The 
general carried a letter from Thomas Manning , long-time Briti sh 
vice-consul in Le�n , to a Salvadoran busines s acquaintance. 24 
The letter left no question about the way Manning must have 
been advising hi s government about affairs in Nicaragua. 
The vice-consul expressed the fear that Walker had a 
persona l vendetta against him , and that all Leonese were appre­
hensive that the filibuster might attack the city . Walker 
would be very difficult to drive out of Nicaragua , Manning . said , 
if he received money and reinforcements. Cons idering the way 
troops were dribbling in from the other Central American states , 
the al lies might be delaying too long , "and the · expenses and 
sacrifices are made in vain. " 
I am much afflicted to think that , under these circum­
_stances no more activity is used in so serious an af­
fair. At the present there are 5 0 0  men from Salvador , 
5 0 0  from Guatemala , and 8 0 0  belonging to thi s  place , 
and according to my judgment double that number is  
required. 2 5  
Although there was initial consternation in Granada over 
the juxtaposition of these. events , cooler heads pointed out 
23El Nicaraguense , August 1 ,  1856. 
2 4 Ibid. 
25Manning to F lorintine Souci , San Miguel , El  Salvador , 
July 2 8 , 1 8 56 , ibid. 
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the unlikelihood of Great Britain � s  risking war with the United 
States over an internal conflict in Nicarag�a . El Nicaraguense 
observed that Great Britain could not be held responsible for 
the aberrations of one obscure representative whose actions 
were contrary to the laws of both nations. In addition , Lord 
Clarendon had as sur.ed .,FJ�xre.r . ,J:?y. ·. ietter/"'that :Great Britain would 
not intervene in Central America. 26 So Walker turned his at­
tention to the more immediate concern : the allied army in the 
north. 
By October , a splinter group of �egitimists had set up 
fortifications at San Jacinto , near Tipitapa , and threatened 
to cut the Managua-Granada line . Successive filibuster attacks 
final ly forced them away , but American losses included Byron 
Cole , who had been involved in the engagement almost by accident. 
At the same time , a Leonese party advanced south to Managua , 
and almost to Masaya. These forces were turned back by Gra­
nadan troops reinforced with fresh recruits from New York .
2 7  
Walker spent most of the remainder of October dashing back 
and forth trying to hold this line , which he was forced to 
reduce to Masaya-Granada , and finally just Granada , with the 
enemy encamped only twelve miles aw�y. 2 8  
On one occasion , October 1 3 , Walker was forced to counter-
26El Nicaraguense , August 9 ,  · 18 56 . 
2 7wheeler to Marcy , October 7 ,  1 8 56 ,  National Archives , 
M219 , 1 0/7 3. 
2 8rbid. , November 1 ,  18 56 , ibid . , 10/76� 
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march quickly from Masaya to drive out an arlied force which 
had actually occupied Granada. He was succes sful , with deva­
stating los ses to the enemy compared with slight casualties 
among his own force , 29 but not before the allies had committed 
a number of "outrage s "  against the persons and property of 
Americans . 3 0  Again Wheeler prepared his claims , and again he 
called for American warships to be posted to San Juan del Sur 
and San Juan del Norte . He warned the State Department that 
if this were not done , every American settler would have to 
leave or be in great danger from the "natives . "  He assured 
the Department that "unles s a force of our government is 
placed at San Juan del Sur , murder and rapine will ensue . 11 3 1 
2 9The allies  lost  four hundred men and left a number to 
be taken prisoner . Walker ' s  casualties were calculated at 2l  
killed and 5 5  wounded , ibid . , or 2 5  killed and 7 5  wounded . 
Allen , William Walker , 12 3 .  
30oepositions furnished by Wheeler to the Department of 
State showed that among the Americans murdered were John B. 
Lawless , a merchant , the Reverend William j .  Ferguson of 
Louisiana , David L .  Wheeler , agent of the American Bible 
Society for Nicaragua , and Henry C .  Carstein . The allies 
apparently intended · to take Minis ter Wheeler himself (he was 
in bed with fever ) , but American troops arrived in the nick 
of time . The victims had been marched first to the church , 
apparently shot on orders , and the bodies were then clubbed 
and beaten . The lives of others were threatened in demands 
for arms , ammunition , money , and , jewelry . Wheeler to Marcy , 
November 1 ,  1 8 5 6 , National Archives , M219 , 1 0/7 6 . 
3 1 rbid. 
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Unfortunately , Wheeler's bargaining position with the Depart­
ment was eroded , �s he had already been recalled , probably due 
to his second unilateral recognition of a 
With as many as three thousand opponents now congregated 
in  Masaya , Walker again had to address himself to probl�ms- on 
his southern flank. A new Costa Rican force under General 
Canas had occupied San Juan del Sur on November 7 ,  and Walker-­
needing to keep the transit route open at all costs in  order to 
receive reinforcements--took the major . portion of his army 
there t9 dislodge them. 3 3  The garrison of two hundred and 
fifty men he left in Granada then underwent the cruelest siege 
of the whole war. The defenders , forced back to the main 
plaza , were compelled to turn the cathedral into a citadel. 
When they hact ctrunk and eaten all their provisions , they were 
reduced to consuming mule meat--four inches square for every 
twenty-four hours . They died at the rate of three per day , 
and were buried only three ya�ds away. Many of those marooned 
in the edifice were American civilians , and they labored in  
the same j obs as the soldiers. Survivors were final ly picked 
up by Walker in a lake steamer , but the seventeen-day siege 
had taken a dreadful toll : One hundred and twenty died of 
disease , forty deserted , and only one hundred . thirty-five made 
it to the steamer , many of these succumbing later to disease 
3 4  
or  wounds. 
32Marcy to Wheeler , September 2 3 , 185 6 , ibid. , M77 , 27/2 5. 
33Allen , William Walker , 12 4-126. 
34scroggs , "Walker-Heiss Papers ," 3 19.  
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The city Walker was finally forced to abandon on December 
14 was but a shell , having been virtu·ally destroyed during the 
protracted battle. He proceeded to concentrate his forces at 
Rivas--a smaller , cleaner , more defensible town. At this point , 
the tide had definitely begun to ebb. The land had been wasted 
by war , and the few hundred remaining Americans were exposed 
to cholera , dysentery , typhoid , and yellow fever . They were 
being attacked by troops from four nations , and most Americans 
in the United States had lost interest because of distraction 
by the fall pre sidential carnpaign . 35 
The succeeding theatre of war was the transit path on the 
Caribbean side . Vanderbilt , who was �till determined to rid 
himself of his pretentious adversary and regain control of the 
rout_e and the company , resolved to cut off Walker by sei zing 
this portion of the cross ing. Hi s instrument wa s Sylvanus H. 
Spencer , another bold American soldier of fortune , 36 who led 
a Costa Rican force ( armed by Vanderbilt with the latest wea­
ponry) against the filibuster garrisons along the San Juan 
River , and by dec is ive strokes , not only captured them but the 
river and lake steamers as well. This campaign cut Walker off 
from the Caribbean and gave the allies communication between 
their northern forces at Granada and their southern troops at 
Virgin Bay and southward . In Walker's subsequent account of 
35Allen , William Walker , 126-127 . 
3 6 Ibid . , 14  3 • 
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the action , he alluded only to the Vanderbi�t involvement , 
without mentioning the Commodore by name; however , he did 
fulminate against Marcy (and President Pierce , by implication )  
for not asserting the United States prerogative and responsi­
bility for protecting American property (i. e. , the transit · 
steamers) .  Walker employed the somewhat specious argument 
that had the vessels been Nicaraguan , the state of war between 
the two countries would have conceded the legality of the 
Costa Rican action. As they were neutral ships , operating in 
Nicaraguan territorial waters where they were not masters of 
their own fates rather than on the high seas , they should not 
have been subj ect to belligerent seizure. 37 This assertion 
was in the face of the compelling fact that this waterway was 
t�c only route by which the Walker force could be  resupplied 
and reinforced from the Atlantic ports of the United States. 
The beginning of the end for the filibuster effort came 
when the allies moved in and occupied San �orge , a town vir­
tually within sight of Rivas ,  on January 28. For more than 
three months , skirmishes and assaults occupied the opposing 
forces. Walker held on to his position , continually hoping 
that a contingent he had sent to try to reopen the route to 
San Juan del Norte would be successful . Eventually ,  as the 
forces of the enemy increased and their partial encirclement 
37walker , War in Nicaragua , 350-351. 
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of Rivas became more effective , the rations of the filibuster 
· forces became--if not reduced--at least less palatable , as 
mule meat replaced beef. But the major blow was the increasing 
desertion rate , now no longer confined to European mercenaries 
but including long-time American comraqes-in-arms. President 
Mora had reversed his psychological tactics (from his former 
proclamation of complete extermination of the Americans ) ,  and 
now made it clear that the war was against one man: William 
Walker. Mora ' s  new proclamation assured amnesty to all deser­
ters , and this promise was scrupulously observed. 38 Apparently 
the seeming hopelessness of the American position was sapping 
the men under Walker ' s  command , and although replacements con­
tinued to trickle in from Cali fornia , the morale factor of the 
de sertions . could not be ignored. 
Meanwhile , in San Juan del Sur , an uneasy truce continued 
up unti l early April . The Costa Ricans had not invested the 
city , probably because it was under the guns of the Nicaraguan 
"navy"--the sloop Granada continued in port . In addition , 
United States Navy Commander Charles H. Davis had brought his 
sloop-of-war St. Mary's into the port in late January "with 
orders to do what he could for the Americans. 1 39 As a result , 
Walker was able to keep the wires and routes open to the port 
town , and to continue receiving news , men , and supplies. Davis 
38Allen , William Walker , 154·. 
39 rbid. , 1 56. 
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himself undertook to enforce a truce while , under agreement 
with both sides , he evacuated the Am�rican women and children 
from the besieged Rivas . Eventually , however , the allies 
erected fortifications along the transit route. 40 
On April 30 , Walker emissaries met with Davis at Costa 
Rican headquarters in San Jorge at the commander ' s  invitation 
in order to receive a proposition for evacuation . Davis pointed 
out that Walker ' s  position had become entirely untenable : the 
contingent on the San Juan River had embarked for the United 
States , so no help could be expected from that quarter ; the 
Garrison and Morgan faction of the transit company had deter­
mined to send no more steamers from California , so there would 
be no more recruits arriving ; Davis did not intend to allow 
the Granaa� to leave port , and would be sei zing it shortly , 
so it - would be of no help to Walker ; and finally , Walker ' s  pro­
visions were running out , so he could not hold on much longer 
under any circumstances . 41 
With this discouraging news , Walker was compelled to 
sign an agreement with Commander Davis . Walker and sixteen 
of his top staff would surrender themselves to Davis , and 
would be transported from San Juan del Sur to Panama . The 
remainder of the force , along with American civilians in the 
government , would be moved under the protection of Davis to 
40walker , War in Nicaragua ,. 41 4-429 passim . 
4lrbid . , 42 1 .  
San Juan del Nort� to embark for Colon . Guarantees for 
the lives and property of Nicaraguans in Rivas and still 
2 9 9  
loyal to the filibuster government would be the responsibility 
of Davis. The accord was signed on May 1 ,  185 7. Walker re­
mained convinced that Davis was acting on direct orders from 
Secretary Marcy , not to remain neutral and merly safeguard 
lives and property of American non-combatants ,  but rather to 
be instrumental in the capitulation of Walker. 42 
Of the immediate impact of the filibuster foray , person­
nel figures tell part of the story : of the 2 , 5 18 Americans 
who "enlisted 1 1 4 3  under Walker , about one thousand were killec 
or died of disease , 2 5 0  were discharged , 80 were captured , and 
the rest either survived at Rivas or were unaccounted for. 
The allied force--counting the entire war--numbered seventeen 
thousand eight hundred . Of  these , 5 , 080 were battle casualties , 
while uncounted thousands died of disease. In other terms , 
the transit route was never ef fectively reopened , and the "breach 
of ill- feeling between Central America and the United States 
had been widened . 11 44 
The Legitimist General Tomas Martinez as s umed the reins 
42 rbid. , 414-429  pas sim . 
43An Irishman captured at the Battle of Santa Rosa , before 
he was executed , wrote to his cousin to discourage any other im­
migrants : "You don ' t  even get the 2 5 0  acres but are forced into 
the army . "  Cos ta Rican Army Bulletin , March 2 7 ,  185 6 . 
44Allen , William Walker , 1 5 8. 
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of the pre sidency upon Walker's departure, but the s ituation 
remained unstable . By July, the filibuster was already thinking 
in terms of another expedition and had written to friends in 
Washington to intercede with the Buchanan administration, as-
suring the government that he would scrupulously _ avoid violating 
the neutrality laws . 4 5  In September, he wrote the same corres­
pondent again about reassuring the admini stration, and referred 
to the efforts of the Costa Rican, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran 
representative s to persuade Secretary of State Lewis Cass  to 
use United State s naval forces to prevent Walker ' s  landing in 
Central America in the event his departure from the United 
46 
States could not be forestalled . In the meantime, former 
filibus ters and new adherents were bus ily recruiting and 
rai sing money in eastern s eaboard and Gulf Coast citie s  for 
a second as sault on the little Central American country. 
Walker ' s  s�cond effort was a landing at Greytown on 
November 2 3 , 1 8 57, . under the guns of the United States sloop-_ 
of-war Saratoga. Commander Chatard of the Saratoga was later 
criticized for allowing it, but the officer was somewhat con­
fused with re spect to his re spons ibilities in the matter . 
Chatard wrote his commanding officer, Commodore Hiram Paulding, 
whose vessel was standing off Aspinwall . Paulding irrunediately 
full-steamed north with his flagship Wabash, followed by the 
45walker to John P .  Heiss, July 2 5, 185 7,  Heiss  Papers . 
46Ibid . ,  September 2 4 ,  1 8 57. 
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The American and British navies were riow unwilling to risk 
letting the situation get out of hand again . 
By the time Paulding arrived , Walker and his band of 
270 had already attacked. A contingent under the corrunand of 
"the gallant Colonel Frank Anderson" had taken posses sion of 
Fort Castillo , which commanded a strategic spot on the San Juan 
River , along with the river and lake steamers that had previous­
ly fallen into the hands of the Costa Ricans . 48 As Walker pre­
pared to move inland , Paulding ' s  marines stormcid ashore and 
interposed themselves be tween the filibuster s and their des­
tiny . Paulding took Walker into custody , and subsequently 
deposited him back at Mobile . For this action , which enraged 
some of the congressional expansionists , the Commodore had . to 
justify himself  before a congres sional investigating cornmittee. 49 
Walker ' s  third try was even more ill-fated . On December 4 ,  
18 5 8 , one hundred twenty men under Colonel Anderson , a soldier 
of fortune who had been with Walker since the ea rlie st days , 
sailed from Mobile without a clearance in the schooner Susan . 
Walker was to meet them later , but the band never arrived . On 
December 16 , the vessel  struck a coral reef about 60 miles 
from Belize , and left the men stranded on a small island. They 
47Allen ,· William Walker , . 163-165 . 
48scroggs ,  "Reminiscence s  of Ratterman , "  326. 
49James Rood Doolittle , Justification of Camodore Paulding's 
.Arrest of Walker (Boston : Buell & Blanchard , 1858) , passim. Paul-
. ding' s attitude toward Walker's efforts had altered sanewhat since 
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were subsequently rescued by the British sloop-of-war 
Basilisk , and transported back to Mobile. 50 The fourth 
effort was even more embarrassing, as the company Walker 
had organized in Mobile was stopped by the authorities be­
fore it left the harbor. 51 
Walker ' s  fifth and final opportunity to reestablish him­
self in Central America came as a result of a dispute over 
the ownership of RoatAn Island , off the Caribbean coast of 
Honduras , among Great Britain , the United States , and Hon­
duras . � rt was resolved in favor of Honduras , but the citizens-­
being principally British--decided to seek extra-legal avenues 
for redress : early in the spring of · l8 60 they looked to Wal­
ker for deliverance . Walker was delighted , and on April 20 
began sending a few men at a time down to reunite on Conzumel 
Island , west of Yucatan . After Walker joined them , they took 
the old Spanis� fortress of Trujillo on Cape Honduras {the 
traditional northernmost point of the Mosquito Territory) . 
After Walker had declared Trujillo a free port , the British 
ship Icarus arrived , and its captain , Newell Salmon , sent a 
the previous year . On January 4 ,  1856 , he had written . to 
Wheeler co�plimenting Walker ' s  character and closing with : 
" Be pleased to express to the General , my profound acknow­
ledgments , and my best wishes for his success in. giving . to 
Central America security and repose . "  Wheeler to Marcy, 
January . 15 ,  1856 ,  National Archive � ,  M219 , 10/40 . 
50scroggs , "Reminiscences of
.
Ratterman," 32 9 . 
51Allen , Willj.am Walker , 171. 
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message of prote�t to Walker , pointing out �hat the customs 
of the port had been mortgaged to Great Britain for a Honduran 
debt 12and that Walker had acted il legally in taking it , along 
with $3 , 0 0 0  from customs fees . Salmon further advised Walker 
that he should retu�n the money , surrender his force , and accept 
the protection of the British flag . 53 
Walker was astounded by this turn of events . He apologized 
for taking the customs house , but protested ignorance with res-
pect to the missing sum . (Later writers have speculated that 
the money may have been taken by native officials . ) With his 
small band of seventy men , Walker tacitly declined the offer of 
protection and stole out of the town - under cover of darkness , 
intent upon making his way south along the coast . His rear was 
beset by Honduran troops , and he was forced to carry on a run­
ning fight ·to the banks of the Rio Negro . At this point , Walker 
could not cross and could not retreat , and Salmon appeared on 
the river. The British captain took Walker and his men priso­
ners , and turned them over to Honduran officials . President 
Guardiola , a man who perhaps felt j usti fied in his vindictiveness , 
was in charge . The curtain rang down on the Walker ·saga and 
the decade of interventiqn when the filibuster fell before a 
Honduran firing squad on September 12 , 1860 . 
54 
52chatfield (Figure 13) had long held this over the Hondurans. 
53 
Ibid • , 172 • 
54 
Ibid. , 17  3 - 1 7  4 .  
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Figure 13. Frederick Chatfield. 
CHAPTER X 
THE LEGACY OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION 
The principle men of the Republic • • •  including 
the Cabinet Ministers • • •  have frankly stated to 
me that if they hereafter find that they cannot 
sustain themselves as an independent Republic , 
that they will ask formally to be annexed to the 
United States . 1 
w. F. Boone , United States Consul at 
San Juan del Sur , March , 1852  
There is in all  this country a deep-seated terror 
that , when the Americans are admitted into it the 
natives will be thrust aside--their nationality lost-­
their religion destroyed--and the common classes be 
converted into hewers of wood and drawers of water . 2 
Mirabeau B .  Lamar , United . States Minister 
to Nicaragua , February , 1858 
These representatives of the American people may have 
overstated their cases , but a dramatic change occurred in 
Nicaragua during the 18 5 0 ' s  not only in the life of the 
state but also in the attitude of the natives toward the 
United States. At the beginning of the era , due partially 
to erratic and inept American diplomacy , but more to Ameri­
can inattention , the Central Americans viewed the United 
States a� a possible benevolent mentor who would reinforce 
Isthmian e fforts to avoid . the grasping paws of the British 
lion . By the end of the decade , the impression was that of 
an adolescent giant , stumbling about somewhat , unable to 
control its own citizens and without any definite. foreign 
!Boone to Webster , March 16 , 1852 ,  National Archives , 
T-152 , 1/61. 
2Lamar to Cass , February 2 6 ,  1858 , ibid. , M2 19 , 11/4. 
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policy , and withal the major threat to Central American security. 
One devotee of Clio has observed that history is not what 
happened , but rather what people think happened. Whether or 
not a catastrophe befell Nicaragua during this period is un­
provable , but it is certain that the Nicaraguans themselves 
felt that it had. The historian's mission is to make past events 
intelligible , to find--or create--the patterns that can show us 
where we have been , and help us understand what we are. Unfor­
tunately , he does not enjoy the luxury afforded the pure scien­
tist who can operate with
.
a controlled experiment. The his­
torian can speculate and hypothesize ad infinitum , but he cannot 
recreate the event nor change the outcome. Without these tools , 
he is handicapped in determining the long-term impact of an 
historical phenomenon. So it is with Nicaragua in the decade 
of the 1850's. One can deal only with what happened , what 
those involved planned and ultimately realized , and what the 
subsequent life of the nation--in this case , Nicaragua--was 
like , with an occasional side trip into speculation. 
T�mas Mart1nez remained in the presidency until 1867 ,  and 
the Conservatives in control of the government at Managua 
until 1893. The period was characterized by relative peace , 
compared with the unsettled era from which Nicaragua had 
just emerged , but one of little democracy. The situation 
grew even worse , however , for a Liberal revolt introduced 
, 
. to the chief executive chair one Jose Santos Zelaya. Zelaya 
was uniformly despicable and unpopular at home and abroad , 
and the American Secretary of State had publicly labeled 
3 07 
him a "blot on the history of his country." Zelaya's rule, 
which ended in 19 0 9 , left the country in dire financial 
straits , with European creditors threatening diplomatic or 
military action . To forestall this eventuality, the United 
States intervened in 19 12 with a contingent of marines and . 
bankers . The approximately one hundred marines of the lega­
tion guard helped maintain peace for the next two decades , 
and the bankers managed Nicaraguan customs collections , the 
national bank , and the national railway. A brief respite in 
American intervention in 19 2 5  resulted in internecine strife , 
and the marines stormed back , two thousand strong , in 19 27. 
From then until 19 3 3 , the marines concentrated on establishing 
a dependable local security force , the National Guard , whi'ch 
would be apolitical and would maintain public order after 
the departure of the American military . With the advent of 
the Good Neighbor Policy , American military and financial 
representatives were withdrawn , and the leader of the National 
Guard , General Anastasio Somoza Garcia , used the leverage of 
the force at hie disposal to catapult himself into executive 
power. In a very real sense , the Somoza dynasty still con• 
trols the fortunes of that Isthmian country. 
United States diplomatic relations with Nicaragua , 
distracted during the decade of the Civil War, recovered 
with the ratification of a bilateral treaty in 1867. 
However, the accord did not construct a canal , and 
that issue remained to be revived sporadically during 
the next half of the century. In 187 0 , 
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a United States Congres sional appropriations bill provided 
money for canal surveys of Nicaragua and the Tehauntepec isthmus 
This was not the last appropriation for this purpose , but 
until the end of the century , the amounts were so minimal that 
the !esulting activity had little impact. The Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty remained an impediment to official patronage or private 
financiers in undertaking such a momentous task. By 1880 , 
even United States officialdom began to chafe under the res­
trictive provisions of the British accord. President Rutherford 
B. Hay�s publicly declared: 
The policy of this country is a canal under American 
control • . • .  If existing treaties between the 
United States and other nations or if the rights of 
sovereignty or property of other nations stand in 
the way of this policy--a contingency which is not 
apprehended--suitable s teps should be taken by j ust 
and liberal negotiations to promote and establish 
the American policy on this subject consistently 
with the rights of the nations to be affected by it . 3 
Nonetheles s, the British refused to discus s modifications 
of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty , and a bilateral accord with 
Nicaragua submitted to -the Senate by President Chester A. 
Arthur in 18 84 was not a cted upon. 
Toward the end of the century , the British attitude began 
to change. The Boer War and events in Europe and the world 
left Great Britain with few friends on the European continent 
and fostered a desire for Anglo-American accord . Also, the 
31reland, Boundaries , 19 5 .  
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British generally approved the action of the United S tates in 
wres ting the last  of the Spanish-American colonies from their 
mother country , thereby creating new markets  for British trade. 
At the same time, the Spanish-American War underscored the 
American desire for a shorter route by which to move its fleet 
from ocean to ocean than by Cape Horn . Finally , a bill in the 
United States Congress pointing toward a bilateral solution with 
the s tates of Nicaragua and Costa Rica promised to embarrass 
both the State Department and Whitehal"l . It was an admirable 
moment ror the British to accommodate the United States on the 
canal issue .  Accordingly , on February 5 ,  1 9 0 0 , British Ambas sa­
dor Lord Julian Pauncefote signed an agreement with Secretary 
of State John Hay whereby the United States could construct ,  
regulate , and manage an Istmian canal . Although the treaty 
paid lip service to the principle of the neutrality of such 
a canal , the right to obtain an exclusive American franchise 
was unquestionably conceded . 
Because of the French precedent in Panama , American atten­
tion by then was directed more toward that portion of the 
Isthmus as a possible route than across Nicaragua . Neverthe­
less , an act of Congress in 1 9 0 2  authorized Theodore Roosevelt ,  
in the event he should be unable to obtain satisfactory control 
of the necessary territory from Colombia , to deal with Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica . The administration's efforts to secure Colanbia' s  
ratification of a canal treaty failed , but the Panamanian 
revolt of 1 9 0 3 opened the door to negotiations with that new 
nation . Even after the completion of the Panama Canal in 1 914 , 
310  
the United States had not lost interest in an alternate water­
way acros s Nicaragua. Secretary of · -State William Jennings 
Bryan reached an agreement with Nicaraguan Minister (and next 
president) Emiliano Chamorro Vargas , providing that the United 
States would grant Nicaragua a payment of $ 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  in ex­
change for an exclusive canal . . franchise through that country 
plus naval bases in the Gul f  of  Fonseca and on Corn Is land. 
Though the outcry in Central America against the Bryan-Chamorr.o 
Treaty was long and loud , the United States Senate routinely 
approved in 1 91 6. The concession was never acted upon , but more 
recently , the Nicaraguan route - has been re-examined as one of  
the poss ible alternatives to the existing Panama Canal . The 
latter is too small to accommodate many modern ships , and the 
190 3 treaty which provided for virtual sovereignty in perpe­
tuity has come under increasing attack by the Panamanian govern­
ment . 
M1ether or not the canal would have been built or the tran­
sit road would have achieved more importance had it not been 
for American intervention is speculative . The battles on 
Nicaraguan soil among the American filibusters and financiers ,  
Walker , Kinney , Vander�ilt , White , Morgan , Garrison , et . al . ,  
in which the Nicaraguans themselves seem to have been mere spec­
tators , did +eave the route and t�e issue in shambles . But the 
destruction to Nicaragua may have been more physical than 
ideological . A crucial issue at the beginning of the era was 
the question of Central American union . Mario Rodriguez has 
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demonstrated in· his comprehensive book on Briti sh agent 
Frederick Chatfield that it was Great Britain, to a large 
degree, which was respons ible for the dis solution of the 
Central American Republ ic long before Americans became actively 
interested in the Isthmus. And it was Chatfield who continued 
to play the ·advocate of disunion in what might be called the 
first American Period . With this type of British presence, 
it may have ultimately been in the best interests of Central 
America that individual American citizens forced the issue 
to the· attention of the United States government, and caused 
the spasmodic attempts to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. If 
the American government had not been compelled to act t� 
check British encroachment on the Isthmus in the fifties, 
it might have been too late after the Civil War . British 
dominance in the region, and Briti sh colonies in addition 
to British Honduras, �ight have been firmly established. 
The cataloguing of Walker ' s  trespas ses against both the 
United States and Nicaragua �s  almo�t endles s: injuring pri­
vate capital in the United States, creating enormous destruc­
tion of life and property in Nicaragua, causing suspicion 
in Central America against the American people, adversely af­
fecting relations between the United States and Great Britain, 
and destroying interoceanic communication via the San Juan 
River. In one sense, however, his activities may not have 
had a deleterious effect on Central American union. He cer­
tainly proved, by compelling the states to band together in 
order to expel him, that in cases of extreme and imminent 
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danger the Isthmian republics �ould work together. Unfortu­
nately, as events showed, cooperation ceased and internal 
strife resumed when the threat had passed. Martinez and Mora 
did make a post- intervention gesture to�ard union, but they 
received little encouragement in Guatemala City, and the 
effort was terminated . when .Mora - was overthrown and killed in 
a counter-revolutionary attempt in 18 6 1 . Subsequent faltering 
steps were taken toward union in the Isthmus, notably the 
establishment of the Central American Court of Justice in 
1 9 0 8 .  Unfortunately, thi s  h.igh-minded endeavor met an early 
demise in 1 9 1 8  when Nicaragua·, at the instigation of the United 
States, defied the court I s injunct1on against the Bryan-Chamorro 
Treaty. The irony was that not only had the United States 
been instrumental in the creation of the court, but also 
was largely responsible for its dis solution. 
Walker ' s own campaign wa s aimed at creating union in 
Central America, though hardly the democratic federation en­
visaged by its chief supporters. This  i s  another irony and 
one that brings into sharp focus the nature of the era : the 
union was attempted by a foreigner, Walker, a nd largely des­
troyed by a foreigner, Cornelius Vanderbi lt. Nevertheless, 
as the United States government was continual ly urging re­
union among . the Isthmian states that they might better res ist 
British domination, in thi s  rather perverse sense Walker was 
an ideological agent of hi s home government. · If Walker did 
not achieve his goal of union for all five state�, it is  
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nonetheless probable that he contributed to union within 
Nicaragua itself . The pre-Walker split in Nicaragua between 
the Democrats (liberals) at Le6n and the Legitimists (con­
servatives) at Granada was not only ideological but also com­
mercial. Granada ·was oriented toward the Atlantic because 
of its trade via Lake Nicaragua al?:� the . ,San Juan River, while 
Le6n's major port was Realej o  on the Paci fic. Perhaps the 
commercial question of  free trade, which the liberals espoused , 
and high tariffs, which was a conservative tenet , was not 
resolved by the post-Walker transfer of  the capital to the 
mid-point of Managua . But the move did tend to uni fy commer­
cial views by making the economic concerns more national 
than regional . The transfer of  the capital was ostensibly 
for ideological purpo ses , in order to . avoid having to make 
a j udgment between the competing claimants, but . it was also 
partially caused by the fact that Walker had left the tradi­
tional capital, Granada , an empty shell. 
There remains the recurring question o f  the filibusters ' 
aims vis � vis the United States . Doubtless many of their 
supporters in the United States were so inclined because they 
looked upon the efforts as preliminaries to annexation of 
N icaragua and perhaps all of Central America to the United 
States of  America. The example o f  Texas was still fresh in 
the minds of many , but there was little substance in these 
hopes of a renascence of  what had been a unique situation. 
The fact that an identical event such as the annexation o f  
3 14 
Texas would never again occur was unknown to the filibusters 
of the 1 8 50 ' s. At least one of them , Colonel Kinney , seemed 
to have had in mind the recreation of the role he played in 
Texas , only this time he would be brought to center stage. 
In a letter written to a friend in Texas  in April , 1 8 55 , 
before he encountered di fficulties with the United States at­
torney and the port authorities in New York , the colonel in­
timated his intentions : " It requires but a few hundred Americat:i 
and particularly Texans , to take control of  all that country. 
I have grants of  land , and enough to make a start upon safely 
and legally. I intend to make a suitable government , and the 
rest will follow . 11 4 Unfortunately - for the colonel , his high 
hopes were dashed almost before he left the United States 
through the surreptitious intervention of Joseph L .  White 
of the Accessory Transit Company. 
• 
Conversely , Walker eventually made it clear that his plans 
included no such contingency as annexation . In fact , one of 
the maj or reasons for his repudiation o f  Nicaragua's anti­
s lavery statute , according to his own account , was to rule 
out--in the minds of Americans and Europeans alike--the possi­
bility of  annexation . Slavery was necessary , he reasoned , 
because the only way the regenerative Americans could hold 
Nicaragua after initial military conquest was to take control 
of the land ; otherwise , the American contingent would be re­
duced to the status of " jani za·ries " or a " praetorian guard. " 
4Brownsville ( Texas } Flag ,  May 5 ,  1 8 5 5. 
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However , "whites " ( as Walker called the North Americans ) 
could exploit sucess fully only with the use of  African labor. 
It should have been obvious ,  the filibuster felt , that the 
reintroduction of  slavery would preclude the chance ot  annexa­
tion , as the American Constitution forbade the importation of 
slaves from outs ide the Union . This would have meant having 
to drain the Southern states of slave labor , a commodity in 
which they were already in short supply. To the contrary , 
a dynamic ,  s laveholding , independent nation nearby would have 
provided employment for the South ' s  "superabundance of intellect 
and capital . "  Balance would have been restored to Southern 
industry by having its unemployed " intellect" going to , an area 
where no political obstacles would prevent it from getting 
the required labor . Walker even ventured that such an ar­
rangement would have provided a safety valve for the United 
States and made it possible to avoid the coming " irrepres­
sible conflict 1 11 5 It is  probable that the s lavery decree 
caused Walker to lose more support than he gained ,  as after­
wards the voices north of the Potomac espousing his cause 
were lonely and forlorn. But it was Walker ' s  defeat by the 
Costa Ricans at the instigation of  Vanderbilt which created 
the most despair among his adherents in the United States . 
If nothing succeeds like success , then nothing fails l ike 
failure , and the filibuster ' s  expulsion from Central America 
5walker , War in Nicaragua , 2 51- 2 8 0  pas s im .  
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appeared to write finis to his grandiose scheme. Cuba was 
also one of Walker ' s  objectives, �nd thqse in the United 
States--including most of  Washington officialdom during the 
decade of the 1 8 5 0 ' s--who felt that Cuba should naturally 
be incorporated into the federal union could never forgive 
Walker for ,>a 1etter � .wrote. to: Goicouria which was published 
in the New York Herald on Novenber 24,  1 8 5 6 : "Cuba must and 
shall be free, but not for the Yankees. Oh, no ! That fine 
country is not fit for those barbarous Yankees . What would 
such a psalm-singing set do in the island? " 
The official attitude o·f the United States government with 
respect to annexation of Nicaragua probably never deviated 
very much from the position expressed by an American Secretary 
of  State to the British charge in- Washington when the latter 
diplomat expressed some apprehension about United States ' 
interest in the Isthmian country. The Secretary said that it 
was United States ' policy to annex only empty spaces and un­
populated areas,6 thereby making a distinction between North 
American · rndians on the one hand and Central American Indians 
on the other. In truth, the major discrepancy between the 
anticipated course of the American government and that of the 
filibusters may have been in the direction that the extension 
6Marcy to John F .  Crampton, quoted in Marcy to Borland, 
June 17, 18 5 3, M7 7 ,  2 7/177.  ·Buchanan made a similar obser­
vation to Lord Napier , the British minister, in 1 8 5 9 : "We 
can only annex vacant ter�itory. " British Foreign and State 
Papers, XLVII I, 7 54.  
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of  the Union would take. The filibusters . were committed 
to beginning with Central America · and subsequently incor­
porating Cuba and perhaps other Middle American territories. 
Although the premature publication of the Ostend Manifesto 
embarrassed American officialdom, the consensus in 
Washington was that Cuba would come first. 7 Then the ques­
tion of  Central America could be addressed . Most rational 
American diplomats recognized that annexation of Nicaragua , 
deep in the heart of an alien culture , would have been an 
untenable gesture. That nation did not possess the virtue 
of being contiguous to the United States , or at least 
merely separated by narrow straits from mainland America . 
The same forces which obj ected to the incorporation of  any 
or all of Mexico south of  the Rio Grande on the assumption 
that the problems introduced by such an action would far 
�utweigh the benefits , held steady with respect to Nicaragua . 
Nonetheless , if either Walker or Kinney had succeeded in 
his plan to first Americaniz e Nicaragua , some of  the more 
obvious problems would have been removed. If this had oc­
curred·, the Nicaraguan' s spectre of losing his nationality 
and religion , and becoming a hewer of wood and a drawer of 
water could have been eerily prophetic. 
7Franklin Pierce , in his inaugural address , implied 
that the goal of Cuban annexation was to be given first 
priority in foreign affairs. New York Evening Mirror ,  
March 5 ,  1 8 5 3. Letters from current and former officials 
and congressmen applauding this judgment crowded Secretary 
of State Marcy ' s  desk. Marcy Papers , Library of Congress . 
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Perhaps the kindest thing that can be said about Walker 
was his regard for Nicaragu.a itself in comparison with 
the attitudes of  other American individuals  and institutions . 
Walker , who died a naturalized citizen of that country, 
and Kinney thought of  Nicaragua as a place to live, to 
cultivate, and to develop, albeit that development had 
overtones of exploitation . Vanderbilt and the financiers 
looked upon it as a narrow area of  the Isthmus, therefore 
a site ideally suited for crossing and moving on. Wealth 
should be derived from an honest enterprise, and even more 
wealth from a fraudulent one. The United States govern-
ment occasionally viewed the emerging nation as a pos sible 
commercial partner, but more often as a persistent and 
nagging problem. Faced with this mas s  o f  contradictions 
and the manifestations of  the contradictions, the Nicaraguans 
themselves were in turn baffled, xenophobic, desperate, 
occasionally hopeful, but almost never sanguine or self-con­
fident. The real bruise inflicted by the "filibusters and 
financiers " may have been to the spirit of  the people of the 
country . They emerged from the era perhaps more united , 
but surely less certain of  their destiny and less secure 
in themselves. 8 Their ambivalent attitude about Central 
8An example of this was Nicaragua's reluctance to nor­
malize relations with the United States for a full decade 
after Walker ' s  intervention, and its deliberate procras­
tination about signing a satisfactory transit contract 
with American capitalists during the same period .  Both 
cases of  inaction seemed to stem from a deep-seated fear 
of opening the door to any opportunity for Ameri can inter­
vention or exploitation . 
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American union , and later about wardship o f  the United· 
States , was possibly a persistence of the shock of American 
intervention in the 18 S O ' s . Withal , the focus of  American 
interest in Nicaragua in mid-century made that country a 
microcosm of United States-Central American relations during 
the last half of the nineteenth century. 
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